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In this dissertation, I set out to examine the artistic and aesthetic features of 
videogames as games. Ultimately, I argue that a complete understanding of the 
aesthetics of videogames requires a more robust account of the role of the player 
and the aesthetic impact of the choices she makes than has been previously 
given. While the idea that videogames are a strongly interactive 
media is acknowledged in the literature, less attention is given to how the unique 
relationship between game and gamer affects both the overall aesthetic experience 
of playing videogames and the position these games hold in the artworld.   
I first argue that the prevalent attempts at categorizing videogames as art 
fall prey to a similar pitfall, which ultimately contributes to a common mishandling 
of the aesthetic value videogames can offer. After highlighting the problems that 
the leading theories of art have in defining videogames as art, I turn attention to 
interrelated concepts of interactivity, gameplay, and player performance.   
I develop an original account of interactivity as it relates to videogames. My 
account is meant to capture the uniqueness videogames offer as works of art and 
also the importance interactivity plays in understanding the aesthetic experience of 
playing videogames. Working from my proposed account of interactivity, 
I then look to concepts of gameplay and player performance and how they relate to 
the overall aesthetic experience of playing videogames. I argue that gameplay 
mechanics affect the overall aesthetic value of videogames by both delimiting and 
creating opportunities for how the player engages with the game. In this way, 
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gameplay mechanics need to be taken into account when evaluating the overall 
functionality of a videogame as a game, and subsequently, need to be considered 
when assessing the aesthetic quality of a videogame. Moreover, how a player 
chooses to utilize and navigate gameplay mechanics with respect to the choices she 
makes when interacting with the game ultimately affect the aesthetic experience 
she has while playing. Hence, I argue that player performance can have a 
significant impact the aesthetic quality of videogame play. In doing so, I highlight 
how the atypical relationship among artist, audience, and artwork in videogames 
plays a pivotal role in shaping the aesthetic experience of gameplay. Finally, I offer 
a defense against the argument that even if videogames are art, they are artistically 
and aesthetically worthless.  In doing so, I develop a novel account of kitsch 
gameplay to better understand and evaluate videogames as artworks.
 
1 
Chapter 1: Introduction and Overview 
I’ve been to Vatican City twice. Once in 2006, as an undergraduate student 
in a study abroad program. And again, during the 15th century Italian Renaissance, 
when I was asked to assassinate Pope Alexander VI, also known as the notorious 
Templar leader, Rodrigo de Borja. I gleefully accepted my mission and completed 
it with overwhelming prejudice. Anyone who’s played Assassin’s Creed II (2009) 
can relate to my second visit and my cavalier attitude towards murdering a Pope 
(he totally deserved it). Videogames are highly immersive because they necessitate 
an interactive relationship with their users. In doing so, they invite entertaining, 
educational, introspective, emotional, and compelling aesthetic experiences. And in 
our increasingly technology-driven society, they are quickly establishing a firm 
foothold as objects worthy of rigorous intellectual study. As such, videogames are 
studied across multiple academic disciplines, exploring them as socio-cultural 
artifacts that can reflect free market behavior and social trends; as avenues for 
understanding artificial intelligence and our society’s emerging relationship with 
advanced technology; as ethical case studies; as forms of mass entertainment; as 
educational and motivational tools; and as potential artworks.1 My efforts here are a 
philosophical exploration on the artistic and aesthetic value of videogames and the 
experiences they offer, but I believe this project has cross-disciplinary value with 
its critical insight on videogames as complex cultural artifacts.  
 
                                                 




I was a gamer before I was a philosopher, spending countless hours of my 
adolescence in arcades and in front of TVs with a videogame controller in my 
hands. As such, my experiences as a gamer shape and inform many of my 
arguments here. I see this a strength of the project, in part because one of the 
overall goals is to help establish open lines of communication between the 
philosophical community interested in videogames and the gaming community 
interested in creating, designing, and engaging in worthwhile and rewarding 
gameplay experiences. For philosophers, a great deal of what I argue here connects 
directly with central questions in aesthetics including, but not limited to: What are 
the criteria for arthood? What is aesthetic experience? What aspects of a work 
account for the aesthetic experience it affords? What is aesthetic and artistic value? 
How are we to understand revolutionary artworks regarding their artistic and 
aesthetic value? Further, I hope that my efforts will help shift the discussion of 
videogames in philosophy of art to one that focuses on analyzing the aesthetic and 
artistic value of games on their own merit and distinct nature, instead of relying 
primarily on comparisons with other art mediums.  
For the gaming community, a philosophical analysis of the artistic and 
aesthetic value can provide the tools needed to categorize videogames as a 
legitimate art form. Contextualizing videogames as art can prime society to take 
more seriously the potential artistic and aesthetic value of the medium. It’s not 
necessarily an ontological impetus that motivates my desire to classify videogames 
as artworks, but a need for shifting the focus among scholars, game designers, and 
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gaming communities to the potentially unique normative value to be had while 
playing videogames. As a gamer, I’m attempting to bring the possible aesthetic 
value of videogame play into greater public consciousness. Hopefully, this helps in 
the production of better videogames overall, more meaningful gameplay 
experiences, and fewer pervasively kitsch games.  
Overall, this dissertation is best understood as a series of interrelated papers 
that follow a general approach of highlighting the variety of ways in which 
videogames qua games are artistically and aesthetically valuable, and how their 
gamehood shapes that value. Chapter two focuses on a common way that scholars 
argue that videogames are artworks: they are compared with traditional works, 
similarities in their constitutive features are surveyed, and the conclusion is either 
that videogames have enough in common with other artworks to be art, or they 
don’t. While this strategy can be helpful in determining the art status of 
videogames, it tends to gloss over the fact that videogames are games, and what 
makes studying them as works of art worthwhile is grounded partly in our 
understanding of them as games. After laying out a possible source of this problem, 
I examine ways in which the gamehood of videogames contributes to their artistic 
and aesthetic value.   
Chapter three continues the exploration of the relationship between the 
aesthetic value of videogames and their gamehood by thoroughly examining the 
concept of interactivity. In doing so, I offer an original account of interactivity as it 
relates to videogames, arguing for a distinction between agent-to-agent and agent-
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to-non-agent interaction to better understand the precise nature of videogame play. 
Afterward, I examine a few cases studies to show how aesthetic features of 
videogames and the gameplay experience are subject to changes in prominence for 
the player based on the type, source, and level of interaction during play. 
Ultimately, the concept of interactivity I propose helps makes sense of the aesthetic 
importance the player’s actions have during gameplay. 
Chapter four provides a framework for understanding the ontology of 
videogames as artworks by examining the distinctive relationship among the artists, 
artwork, and audience (AAAR) created by the necessarily interactive nature of 
videogames. I provide a survey of both positive and negative accounts of the 
gamer’s role in the AAAR, arguing that gamers are best understood as performative 
instantiators who help generate tokens or instances of an artwork type. In doing so, 
I aim to capture the pivotal role gamers have in creating an aesthetic experience 
during gameplay. Although I adopt a more traditional view regarding the artist-
artwork relationship in videogames, situating gamers as performative instantiators 
highlights how their actions within the game form a relationship with the artwork 
that directly impacts the aesthetic features of that instancing.  
 Lastly, chapter five handles the objection that even if videogames are 
works of art, they are necessarily of the lowest aesthetic and artistic quality because 
of the way users must engage with them; since videogames are meant to be played, 
users cannot help but act willfully during gameplay. Thus, they are unable to meet 
the transcendental thesis (most commonly attributed to Kant and Schopenhauer) 
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required for aesthetic experiences of the highest value. Without rejecting the 
already well-contested transcendental thesis, I entertain the possibility that if 
videogames are artworks, they are best understood as kitsch art and are unable to 
provide the highest kind of aesthetic experiences.  In defending against this claim, I 
develop an original account of kitsch gameplay as a vehicle to help understand the 
potential aesthetic value of individual videogames. Finally, I use a 
Schopenhauerian version of the transcendental thesis and argue that videogames 
with well-designed gameplay create opportunities for players to enter states of flow 
that are proprioceptively experienced as will-less action. In doing so, such games 
adhere to the transcendental thesis and can afford aesthetic experiences of the 
highest quality. At the end of this chapter, I offer my concluding remarks on the 




Chapter 2: Appreciating Videogames 
 Videogames are distinctive as a form of art precisely because they are 
games. A comprehensive understanding of the aesthetic of videogames requires an 
explanation of how videogames qua games affect the aesthetic experience of 
videogames qua works of art. The problem of ignoring how the gamehood of 
videogames affects our appreciative understanding has its roots in the way that 
scholars often argue that videogames are a legitimate form of art: videogames are 
compared with other widely accepted art forms, similarities are noted, and the 
conclusion is that videogames have enough in common with other art forms that 
they should be considered art. While this strategy can be convincing, it does a 
disservice to the videogame medium by inviting people to consider videogames 
works of art despite their gamehood; yet what makes studying videogames as 
works of art worthwhile is grounded partly in our understanding of them as games. 
In this chapter, I lay out what I take to be the root of this problem: the answers to 
distinct questions regarding what makes an object art and how that object is to be 
appreciated once identified as art are often conflated. I first offer a brief discussion 
of the way in which scholars often argue that videogames are legitimate works of 
art, noting the lack of reference to game mechanics. I then make the case that 
specificity of art form plays a central role in the appreciative understanding of 
works of art; in the case of videogames, part of their distinctness as works of art is 
that they are games. Thus, I offer an account of game mechanics that explains the 
impact that the gamehood of videogames has on our aesthetic attitudes towards the 
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medium. Lastly, I offer a few examples of how game mechanics affect the aesthetic 
experience of playing videogames. 
Section I: The Comparative Approach 
 To begin, let’s look at one common way videogames are often categorized as 
works of art. A strong case can be made for categorizing videogames as works of 
by comparing them to other works and noting the features they share. This strategy 
has roots in contemporary theories of art. Here, we’ll focus on prominent theories 
proposed by Jerrold Levinson and Berys Gaut, both of which lend themselves to 
the comparative approach.2  
 In a series of well-known papers, Levinson presents what is referred to as 
an intentional-historical definition of art.3 Levinson first formulates his theory of 
art in “Defining Art Historically,” where he writes: 
X is an artwork at t 
=df  X is an object of which it is true at t that some person or persons, 
having the appropriate propriety right over X, nonpassingly intends (or 
intended) X for regard-as-a-work-of-art – i.e. regard in any way (or ways) in 
which objects in the extension of ‘artwork’ prior to t are or were correctly 
(or standardly) regarded. (1979, p.240) 
In unpacking Levinson’s definition of art, there are two key points of which to take 
note. First, and most obvious, is Levinson’s reliance on the artist’s intention when 
determining whether or not something is an artwork. More specifically, a person 
who creates the work must have intended for it be regarded in a way in which 
                                                 
2 My argument can be generalized to most theories and definitions of art. However, examining all 
the competing theories would be beyond the scope of this project. Therefore, I am restricting focus 
to two of the more recent influential approaches that employ a comparative method. 
3 See Levinson (1979), (1989), (1993), (2002). 
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previous artworks have been correctly regarded. Levinson explicitly mentions that 
the artist need not be aware that her intention for X to be regarded in a certain way 
is one that falls in line with the way previous works have been correctly regarded. 
Even if the way the artist intends for her work to be regarded is, just by chance and 
unbeknownst to her, the same as other works have been correctly regarded, 
Levinson is willing to define such a work as art. 
 Second, it’s clear that what makes artifacts art is contingent upon what 
modes of regard have been correctly applied to previous works of art. Here is 
where the importance of the history of the artworld comes in to play. To be art, X 
must be appropriately connected with the modes of regard that have been correctly 
applied to other artworks throughout history.  Although Levinson is hesitant to give 
a full account of what modes of regard count as correct or standard, he does offer a 
list of examples. As a response to the potential objection that Levinson’s theory is 
too broad and includes obvious non-art as art, he notes that the notion of modes of 
regard needs to be interpreted comprehensively, and something sharing just one 
aspect of a mode of regard with previous artworks may not necessarily be art: 
Something closer to a comprehensive way of regard properly brought to 
bear on, say, almost any easel painting, would be this constellation: {with 
attention to color, with attention to painterly detail, with awareness of 
stylistic features, with awareness of art-historical background, with 
sensitivity to formal structure and expressive effect, with an eye to 
representational seeing, with willingness to view patiently and sustainedly, 
...}. (1989, p.24) 
At this point we can set aside the question of whether or not Levinson’s reply is 
adequate to the objection he is responding to, and simply use his example of a 
comprehensive mode of regard of easel paintings as a way of understanding how 
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videogames are compared to traditional works of art. To determine whether an 
object shares a mode of regard with other commonly accepted works of art, you 
compare it with other works’ intended mode of regard. 
 Just as Levinson’s theory necessitates that a videogame’s status as a work of 
art will rely on comparisons to other works of art, Gaut’s does the same, albeit 
through different means. Dissatisfied with theories of art that propose a set of 
necessary and sufficient conditions for something to be art, Gaut argues that art is 
best understood as a cluster concept.4 Starting from the view that definitions of art 
often fall prey to counterexamples, he follows a Wittgensteinian path, believing 
that “there are multiple criteria for the application of the concept, none of which is 
a necessary condition for something’s being art” (Gaut 2005, p. 273). Here, Gaut 
understands criteria as properties that count towards an object’s inclusion under a 
concept.  He goes on to explain what it means to ‘count towards’ an object 
belonging to a concept: 
First, if all of the properties that are criteria are instantiated, this suffices for 
an object to fall under the concept; and more strongly, if fewer than all of 
these properties are instantiated, this also suffices for the application of the 
concept. So there are jointly sufficient conditions for the application of the 
concept. Second, there are no properties that are individually necessary 
conditions for the object to fall under the concept (that is, there is no 
property that all objects falling under the concept must possess). Third, 
there are disjunctively necessary conditions for application of the concept: 
some of the properties must be instantiated if the object is to fall under the 
concept. (Gaut 2005, p.274) 
In adopting this strategy, Gaut successfully avoids criticisms levied against 
definitions like Levinson’s intentional-historical account. With no individually 
                                                 
4 See Gaut (2000), (2005). 
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necessary conditions, the cluster account has an easier time dealing with 
counterexamples that challenge the exclusiveness of traditional definitions of art. 
 Still, Gaut owes us a set of possible criteria we might include in our cluster; 
the formulation of which is inevitably based on the properties of other objects that 
are already widely considered works of art. Gaut offers the following as relevant 
criteria: 
(1) possessing positive aesthetic qualities, such as being beautiful, graceful, 
or elegant (properties which ground a capacity to give sensuous pleasure); 
(2) being expressive of emotion; (3) being intellectually challenging (i.e., 
questioning received views and modes of thought); (4) being formally 
complex and coherent; (5) having a capacity to convey complex meanings; 
(6) exhibiting an individual point of view; (7) being an exercise of creative 
imagination (being original); (8) being an artifact or performance which is 
the product of a high degree of skill; (9) belonging to an established artistic 
form (music, painting, film, etc.); and (10) being the product of an intention 
to make a work of art. (2000, p.28) 
 
Proper understanding of Gaut’s proposed criteria requires elucidation of two points. 
First, Gaut is quick to note that his set of criteria is amenable to change, should a 
plausible counterexample arise. He aims not to defend a particular version of the 
cluster account, but to offer it as a more palatable alternative to traditional 
definitions. Second, Gaut differentiates the cluster theory from a similar family 
resemblance theory that he calls resemblance-to-paradigm. “[The resemblance-to-
paradigm] view holds that something is art by virtue of resembling paradigm 
artworks” (2005, p.275). In doing so, Gaut avoids problems of vacuity and 
incompleteness with respect to finding appropriate paradigm artworks. However, 
his view still calls for a comparative analysis of commonly accepted works of art in 
order to establish a set of criteria. It is unclear what other means would be available 
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in arguing for one set of criteria over another. The set must be established by taking 
inventory of the properties typically associated with commonly accepted works of 
art and noting the similarities, varied as they might be. In fact, Gaut understands 
this implication as a strength of the cluster theory, noting that we often appeal to a 
variety of criteria when arguing about whether something is art (2005, p.278). In 
doing so, we inevitably appeal to comparisons with other works of art.  
 Ultimately, Levinson and Gaut come to different conclusions on what makes 
an artifact a work of art, but both theories nicely represent the approach that some 
leading theories of art encourage: determining what makes an artifact a work of art 
often involves comparisons to other accepted works of art. This is particularly true 
with revolutionary artworks or works in new art forms: the art status of such works 
may be assessed by considering which features, intrinsic or relational, they share 
with established works. And the literature on videogames seems to reflect this. 
In his article “Are Video Games Art?”, Aaron Smuts uses the comparative 
approach to argue that, according to most definitions of art, videogames can, in 
fact, be categorized as artworks. He relies heavily on comparisons to film. As 
Smuts notes, “game designers often try to make their games look more like film by 
including cut scenes and imitating other cinematic features. Most narrative-driven 
games are heavily interspersed with full-motion video sequences called cut-scenes” 
(2005, p.9).  By deliberately including small cinematic scenes, game designers 
seem to have clear intentions of having games recognized as similar to works of 
cinema. Further, one could easily see this effort as being associated with criteria 
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from Berys Gaut’s cluster account. After all, cinematic scenes in videogames can 
be formally complex, convey complex meanings, be expressive of emotion, be a 
product of a high degree of skill, etc., all in a manner similar to what might be seen 
in a film. Smuts goes on to discuss ways in which games often try to emulate the 
look of a film, e.g., through various lighting techniques. He notes that in the first-
person shooter game Halo, when the player looks at the sun, it appears as if the 
player is looking through a cinematic camera (2005, p.9). It’s no secret that 
videogames share many of the properties of other artworks in the medium of the 
moving image. As such, one would be hard-pressed to argue that game designers 
do not intend their products to be regarded in at least some of the ways other 
artworks have been historically and standardly regarded, which is what Levinson 
requires for arthood. Again, Smuts succinctly puts it, “Through repeated allusions 
and attempts at emulating the moving image, game designers intend that we 
appreciate their games as we do digital animation and video art” (2005, p.9). 
Hence, there are certain correct modes of regard with respect to the moving image 
that are also applicable to videogames. Likewise, if we consider videogames in 
relation to Gaut’s cluster theory, many games seem to instantiate clusters of art-
relevant criteria that, in other artworks, are sufficient for arthood.5  
 Similarities can be found between videogames and works in many other art 
forms. Many videogames are largely narrative driven, leading the player through an 
immersive story, much in the same way novels, plays, and epic poetry do. “Beyond 
                                                 
5 Gaut himself considers the art status of videogames as directly related to the connections they have 
with cinema. See Chapter of 5 of his A Philosophy of Cinematic Art (2010).  
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the goals of verisimilitude, games share narrative themes and expressive goals with 
the history of Western literature and theater” (Smuts 2005, p.11). Narrative-driven 
videogames address sociological, ideological, and political issues in a way also 
done in other forms of literature. For instance, the first-person shooter BioShock 
(2007) examines the notion of a dystopian society founded on objectivist morals 
featured in Ayn Rand’s famous Atlas Shrugged (1957). The entire story of 
BioShock is driven by themes widely considered in other artworks. Although it’s 
obvious BioShock was not intended to be regarded as a novel, the underlying 
narrative motifs are still present in both works. As such, a strong case could be 
made that the designers of BioShock intended for their game to be regarded in a 
manner similar to the way Atlas Shrugged was standardly regarded: as a reflection 
on the relationships among individual freedom, self-interest, and power. Here, we 
again find correct modes of regard with respect to a widely-accepted art form that 
are intended to be applied to videogames. 
 Though there are several similarities between videogames and other 
recognized art forms, for brevity’s sake I’ll only discuss one more. Specifically, 
videogames have the ability to evoke emotional responses much in the same way 
other art forms do. Grant Tavinor takes note of this similarity videogames share 
with other art forms when he discusses the case for videogames being art. In doing 
so, he explicitly takes the classification of videogames as an art from the cluster 
theory approach (Tavinor 2009, p.177). He also spends a chapter in The Art of 
Videogames arguing that we respond emotionally to videogames in a way 
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comparable to the way we respond to other fictional artworks (2009, p.131-149).6 
Often, game designers use various strategies employed in other artworks to create 
fictions that we have genuine emotional responses to. They want to create an 
emotional experience similar to experiences one might get from engaging other art 
forms. As Dominic Lopes notes, “Video games present narratives and moving 
images. By doing so, they evoke the same kinds of emotional responses as we see 
in the classic fiction and film genres” (Lopes 2010, p.114). For example, the 
survival horror game Resident Evil 4 (2005) uses various lighting and audio 
techniques to create a suspenseful, and at some points fearsome, fictional world, 
eliciting the corresponding emotional responses from the player. In creating dark, 
eerie environments that the player must traverse while fighting undead zombies, it 
seems clear the game designers wanted audiences to regard Resident Evil 4 much in 
same way we might regard other frightening fictional works. Again, we see reason 
to believe that some videogames are specifically created to be regarded in a way 
other fictional artworks are sometimes standardly regarded, and that they instantiate 
many of the criteria from Gaut’s cluster account in doing so. 
 Given that videogames seem to engage the audience similarly to the way in 
which other art forms do, we have reason to believe that game designers intend for 
their product to be regarded, at least in some respect, in ways other works of art 
have also been regarded. Videogames incorporate elements from a variety of 
different artistic mediums to create experiences like those we might have with other 
                                                 
6 Tavinor ultimately concludes that part of what makes videogames distinct as potential works of art 
is their ability to elicit “self-directed” emotional responses.  
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artworks, thus instantiating many of the properties that count towards an object 
being a work of art. Overall, there is a myriad of similar modes of regard and 
cluster criteria that videogames share with other widely accepted forms of art.  
Section II: The Problem with the Comparative Approach and a Possible 
Solution 
 Although the comparative approach is an effective strategy for convincing 
doubters that videogames are a legitimate art form, it often comes with an 
undesirable cost. Since games are not typically considered to be works of art, most 
of the comparisons made to other works of art either neglect or deliberately ignore 
essential elements of videogames that have a direct effect on our aesthetic and 
artistic appreciation of them. This can lead to a fundamental misunderstanding of 
the unique appreciative value videogames offer qua games. Exploring the root of 
the problem with the comparative approach will help set the stage for explaining 
the importance of gamehood of videogames and potential value it affords.  
 The problem with the comparative approach is that it leaves us susceptible to 
conflating two closely related, but distinct questions: (1) Which features make 
something an artwork? and (2) Which features of the thing are most central to 
appreciating it as art? At times, the answer to (1) is presented as the answer to (2) 
as well. The comparative approach may successfully establish a work’s arthood by 
way of characteristics it shares with other works, but it would be a mistake to 
assume that these characteristics should be our primary focus when we appreciate 
or evaluate the works. Appreciation and evaluation rightly focus on features that 
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make a work distinctive, not those by virtue of which it resembles many other 
works of art.  
 It’s important to recognize that using the comparative approach for a new 
classification of an artifact as art (or not) may be unavoidable; if the goal is to 
expand the extension of a category, then a comparison of the old members with the 
potential new members seems at least strongly intuitive, if not necessary.7 If this is 
true, then all revolutionary forms of art are potentially subject to the conflation 
problem. In fact, the conflation problem itself may contribute to the resistance 
some revolutionary artworks initially face by critics and audiences alike; they try to 
answer question 1 about a revolutionary work by appealing to accepted answers to 
question 2 about an already well-established work, where the well-established work 
seems to be the closest related object to the revolutionary work with respect to 
question 1. Film critic Roger Ebert’s now infamous argument that videogames 
cannot be art rested in part on an assumption like this. “Video games by their 
nature require player choices, which is the opposite of the strategy of serious film 
and literature, which requires authorial control … I believe the nature of the 
medium prevents it from moving beyond craftsmanship to the stature of art.” (Ebert 
2005, online). Ebert’s statement seems to imply that because videogames relinquish 
authorial control, which is part of what we appreciate/evaluate in film, they 
necessarily cannot be appreciated as art. Both defenders and objectors of the art 
status of videogames are prone to conflation.   
                                                 
7 Thanks to Grant Tavinor for this helpful insight. 
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The framework for a possible solution to the conflation problem can be 
built on the works of Kendall Walton and Dominic McIver Lopes. In his well-
known article “Categories of Art,” Walton argues for a contextualist understanding 
of aesthetic properties. Specifically, he says that a work’s aesthetic properties are 
contingent not only upon the work’s perceptible, non-aesthetic properties, but also 
on which of those non-aesthetic properties we see as standard, variable, and contra-
standard relative to a category of art (Walton 1970, pp.338-9).  
How, then, does Walton’s contextualist position help solve the conflation 
problem with the comparative approach to art categorization? By understanding 
features of a work as standard, variable, and contra-standard relative to a specific 
category of art, we have a way of distinguishing what features help answer question 
(2). What makes something a specific kind of work is the fact that it shares 
standard features associated with other works of that kind. But what we appreciate 
in any work is dependent primarily on what features are variable relative to its 
category. Thus, we can adequately answer (2) by appealing to the variable features 
of a work. A Waltonian framework offers a promising starting point for solving the 
problem: it highlights that the features that warrant our attention during 
appreciation can, and indeed should, be separated from those that motivate us to 
categorize it in a particular way.   
At this point, we are left with two options for dealing with the conflation 
problem exhibited by some theories of art. We could simply ignore (1), noting that 
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answering (2) can still prove to be informative without requiring a theory of art.8 Or 
perhaps we could reframe (1) in a way that proves to be more fruitful, and lends 
itself to less confusion when answering both questions. In adopting the latter 
strategy, rather than ask, “what is it that makes something an artwork?,” we might 
ask, “what is it that makes something an artwork of a specific kind?” Call this 
question (1*), where a kind is a category established by a Waltonian framework. 
This strategy is one that Dominic McIver Lopes first discusses in “Nobody Needs a 
Theory of Art” (2008) and later refines in Beyond Art (2014).  
 In Beyond Art, Lopes begins defending (1*) over (1) by distinguishing what 
he calls his “buck passing theory of art” from “buck stopping theories of art,” like 
those of Levinson and Gaut (2014, pp.13-15). Traditional, “buck stopping” theories 
answer (1) by giving conditions or criteria intended to be applied to every work of 
art, regardless of kind. Lopes’ “buck passing” theory of art answers question (1), 
but in doing so raises two other important questions (hence, the metaphor of buck-
passing).  He holds that “x is a work of art = x is a work of K, where K is an art” 
(2014, p.14). So, for Lopes, what makes something a work of art (i.e., the answer to 
question 1) is that it is a work of some art kind, K. From this, the two questions that 
lead to the ‘buck passing’ moniker reveal themselves: which kinds are art kinds and 
what distinguishes each art kind? These two questions are closely related to (1*) in 
so far as they all go beyond the more generalized task of developing an overall 
theory of art and focus on developing theories of the arts, or specific art forms 
                                                 
8 I suspect that most will see this as the more unpalatable of the two suggestions, especially if one 
favors a Waltonian framework: we need to place a work in a category first in order to know which 
features are variable (and thus expressive) relative to a category. 
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(2008, p.119). Lopes favors this approach because of what he sees as a common 
deficiency in most theories of art: theories like Levinson’s and Gaut’s fail to 
adequately address the problem of revolutionary artworks, or “hard cases” (2014, 
p.35). Spending a whole chapter in Beyond Art, Lopes argues that hard cases, or 
revolutionary works of art like Warhol’s Brillo Boxes or Duchamp’s Fountain, 
create a dialectal impasse for theories of art. And this unavoidable impasse is 
enough to choose buck-passing theories over buck-stopping theories (2014, pp.53-
8). He starts by dividing theories of art into two broad camps, traditional and 
genetic theories: 
The ‘traditional stance’ is taken by theories that propose the possession of 
some exhibited feature (or a disjunction of exhibited features) to be 
necessary for an item to be a work of art. On any theory taking this stance, 
nothing can be a work of art unless some exhibited feature—sadness, 
beauty, profundity, for example—makes it so…The alternative is the 
‘genetic’ stance. A theory taking this stance makes the possession of some 
genetic feature sufficient for being a work of art. As a result, all it takes for 
an item to be a work of art is for it to have the requisite provenance. What 
makes some items works of art may be their exhibited features, but this is 
not a necessary for art status. (Lopes, 2014, p.49) 
 
Further, Lopes states that “genetic features of an art work are features of its 
provenance rather than its appearance or meaning (2014, p.48). Under Lopes’ 
distinction, Levinson’s theory of art is an example of the genetic kind, where 
having a correct intended mode of regard establishes the appropriate provenance of 
the work, and thus its status as an artwork. On the other hand, Gaut’s account is 
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primarily an example of the traditional stance, where a work needs to exhibit 
properties from an established cluster of criteria in order to be categorized as art.9  
After dividing buck-stopping theories into two different kinds, Lopes goes 
on to say that the motivation for favoring one over the other (either the traditional 
or genetic stance) relies on the intuition you have regarding hard cases. In short, 
genetic theories are favored by those who believe things like Cage’s 4’33” and 
Duchamp’s In Advance of the Broken Arm are artworks because such theories 
supply the tools needed to defend the art status of these hard cases. Those who 
favor traditional theories do so with the opposite intuition; hard cases are more 
easily denied artwork status based on their failure to exhibit the required features 
defined by a specific traditional stance.  
By itself, the dilemma created by clashing intuitions is not enough to give 
up on buck-stopping theories. An argument can still be made in favor of either the 
genetic or traditional approach, based on which stance meets the criteria of theory 
choice, where the criteria include both normative and descriptive adequacy. So, 
Lopes’ final step in setting up the dialectal impasse is to examine the criteria used 
to choose between theories (2014, p.53). However, the criteria of theory choice 
seem to be based on the same clashing intuitions that fuel the dilemma between the 
genetic and traditional stances: “The trouble is, there is a deep disagreement about 
the criteria for choosing a theory of art and this disagreement about criteria for 
theory choice stems from clashing intuitions about the hard cases” (Lopes 2014, 
                                                 
9 Admittedly, some of the properties Gaut includes in his cluster can be understood as genetic 
features. Thanks to Sherri Irvin for pointing this out. 
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p.53). Those with traditionalist intuitions about hard cases will argue that the most 
important criterion for theory choice is normative adequacy. That is, which of the 
competing theories best aligns with our intuitions over how we ought to categorize 
hard cases? On the other hand, geneticists will insist that descriptive adequacy is 
paramount: which of the competing theories best captures actual artworld practices 
when it comes to hard cases? The deeply rooted intuitions about hard cases lying at 
the heart of both traditional and genetic theories seem to be unwavering, and this is 
where Lopes sees the dilemma turning into an unavoidable dialectal impasse: 
In brief, the choice between theories in each stance is impossible to make 
because the stances represent contrary intuitions on the hard cases, and 
furthermore, the same intuitions determine criteria of theory choice. The 
debates represent a clash of intuitions that they cannot resolve. (2014, p.55) 
In light of the dialectal impasse, Lopes suggests that we should move past the task 
of answering question (1), and focus more intently on (1*), which would naturally 
help us answer question (2) with respect to revolutionary forms of art, including 
videogames.  
Section III: Videogames as Games 
 Having established the need for both understanding and appreciating works 
of art in relation to an appropriate art kind, an examination of videogames as an art 
kind is in order. Such a task requires understanding how videogames operate as 
games. What makes videogames distinct from other art kinds is that as games, they 
are meant to be played. Since Wittgenstein famously challenged the ability to 
define “game” with a set of necessary and sufficient conditions in his Philosophical 
Investigations (1953), scholars have wrestled with questions of both what it means 
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to be a game, and what it means to play a game. Without diving too deep into those 
waters, we can look to a general theory of games provided by Bernard Suits to see 
how aesthetic value of videogames is shaped by their essential gamehood. In The 
Grasshopper: Games, Life and Utopia, Suits takes direct aim at Wittgenstein’s 
position, offering what he takes to be a definition of gameplay: 
My conclusion is that to play a game is to engage in activity directed towards 
bringing about a specific state of affairs, using only means permitted by rules, 
where the rules prohibit more efficient in favour of less efficient means, and 
where such rules are accepted just because they make possible such activity. 
(2014, p.48) 
 
From this general definition of what it means to play a game, Suits goes on to 
identify four elements that together constitute the necessary and sufficient 
conditions of gameplay. He states, “the elements of game are 1/ the goal, 2/ the 
means of achieving the goal, 3/ the rules, and 4/ the lusory attitude [of the 
player(s)]” (Suits 2014, p.50). We can use elements that Suits mentions as a 
foundation for understanding how specific gameplay mechanics, as opposed to pure 
cinematic or narrative elements, shape the distinct value of videogames.10  
  Applying Suits’ general theory of gameplay to videogames highlights a key 
difference between them and their traditional counterparts.11 Videogames are a 
special kind of game in terms of how players engage with them. Part of what 
distinguishes videogames from other kinds of games is the way in which the 
                                                 
10 It’s worth noting that although Suits is offering these elements as a set of necessary and sufficient 
conditions that constitute gameplay, I am not committed, nor need I be, to this conclusion. Rather, I 
see Suits as offering a strong framework with which we can understand the nature of videogames as 
games, regardless of whether or not the four elements constitute necessary and sufficient and 
conditions for gameplay.  
11 Brock Rough (2017) argues that not all videogames are games. If this is the case, then some 
videogames may require a form of appreciation that is distinct from what I advocate here. The 
details will depend on the specifics of these artworks and how they function. 
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constitutive rules of the game are set up and enforced. Because videogames are run 
on computers, the constitutive rules of the game are part of the computer program 
itself and cannot be broken by the player without direct manipulation of the 
program.12 This restriction doesn’t apply to more traditional games. For instance, if 
you’re playing chess on a physical board with real pieces, you can easily break the 
constitutive rules: you could simply move your rook diagonally across the board. 
However, if you’re playing chess on a computer, it’s impossible to move your rook 
in any way other than horizontally or vertically on the board; the constitutive rules 
of chess are part of the computer program itself and restrict players’ movements to 
legal moves without exception. Thus, in videogames the lusory means that are both 
afforded and restricted by the constitutive rules cannot be easily modified.13 
However, the result of breaking or changing the constitutive rules of a videogame 
is the same as it is with traditional games. If a player directly changes the computer 
program in a way that affects the constitutive rules of chess, then the resulting 
game would no longer be chess. 
 At this point, we can use Suits’ theory of gameplay to examine how the 
aesthetical value of videogames is shaped by their gamehood. The rules, the lusory 
means prescribed by the rules, and the lusory attitude of the player(s) all have the 
                                                 
12 There are cases where socially constructed rules may be considered constitutive and exist outside 
of the game algorithm. In competitive gaming communities, for example, certain character abilities 
and/or playstyles may be banned for a particular event. Such cases present an ontological challenge 
but have less of an impact on the normative concern in this chapter. 
13 Admittedly, some games allow for opportunities to modify constitutive rules: changing the 
difficulty settings among easy, medium, or hard in any videogame may be understood as changing 
the constitutive rules. Even in such cases, there are restrictions on how much players can modify the 
rules, so there is always a core set of constitutive rules that players must abide by. My thanks to Jon 
Robson for pointing this out.  
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potential to shape the aesthetics of videogame play. To illustrate this point, I turn 
attention to the concept of failure in videogames and how it relates to Suits’ 
elements of gameplay. 
Section IV: Failure as a Function of Game Mechanics 
Suits’ framework provides the tools needed to see how gameplay in 
videogames affects the aesthetically appreciable features of the game itself. More 
often than not, videogames are played with the intention of completing a prescribed 
prelusory goal. And like most games, attempts at completing the prelusory goal 
within the prescribed lusory means often fail. Analyzing the concept of failure and 
its relationship to videogame mechanics helps illustrate the importance of 
gameplay in our aesthetic appreciation of the game. In this section, I briefly explain 
the importance of failure and its connection to videogame mechanics. I then argue 
that the variety of ways in which a player may fail in a videogame are best 
understood in relation to important Suitsian game concepts. Failure made possible 
by players interacting with the formal features of a game (i.e., the lusory means 
prescribed by the constitutive rules used to accomplish prelusory goals) is 
desirable. However, failure induced by poorly conceived and executed mechanics 
that disrupt these formal features is the wrong kind of failure: it is failure that 
hinders or eliminates the possibility of experiencing aesthetically appreciable 
elements of the game. Ultimately, this argument strengthens my overall position 
that proper understanding and evaluation of videogames as an art kind demands 
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accounting for gameplay and player performance; and that the value of the 
videogame qua game directly affects the value of the game qua work of art. 
Regardless of how objectives are presented to a player, simply setting up 
goals opens up the door to potential failure. Most often, players engaging in a game 
expect a certain level of failure when exploring in game environments for solutions 
to gameworld problems. In fact, to a certain extent failure is welcomed when 
playing a videogame. Part of adopting the lusory attitude that Suits sees as an 
essential part of gameplay is tacitly accepting the idea that the less than efficient 
means by which you choose to accomplish the prelusory goal can lead to failure. 
By adopting the lusory attitude, players knowingly accept that following the 
constitutive rules of the game may cause failure to achieve the prelusory goal. As 
Jesper Juul notes in The Art of Failure, “if you pick up a single-player video game, 
you expect the designer to have spent considerable effort preventing you from 
easily reaching your goal, all but guaranteeing that you will at least temporarily 
fail” (2013, p.11). The expectation of failure plays a key role in keeping the player 
in the proper epistemic relationship with the game that is needed to retain at least 
some level of interactivity for the player as she progresses through the game and 
becomes more proficient at navigating the in-game environment. If a player is 
guaranteed success without the threat of failure, then engagement with the game 
turns into manipulation as opposed to interaction.14 The limited unpredictability 
                                                 
14 For a more detailed account of the relationship between unpredictability and interactivity, see 
chapter 3.  
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required for interaction is no longer a feature of the game if success is a foregone 
conclusion.15 
 Furthermore, if the prelusory goals are too easy to achieve within the 
prescribed lusory means, then the game becomes less enjoyable.16 Juul discusses 
this phenomenon at length, drawing comparisons to the paradox of tragedy (2013, 
pp.33-45). He argues that gamers purposely seek out games in which they expect to 
fail even though failure is generally regarded as a negative experience, much in the 
same way audiences seek out tragic cinema and theatre even though such works are 
meant to elicit negative emotional reactions. Juul ran an online experiment to test if 
failure is correlated with enjoyment when playing a simple game he designed. After 
playing, he asked the players to rate how much they enjoyed their experience. “As 
it turned out, the most positive players were the ones who failed some, and then 
completed the game. Players who completed the game without failing gave it a 
lower rating than those who failed at least once” (Juul 2013, p.36). No matter how 
the paradox of failure is resolved, the mere fact that it exists illustrates how 
important the prospect of failure is in videogames. Therefore, establishing what 
constitutes an acceptable level of difficulty is a key in gameplay design, and 
requires meticulous construction of the constitutive rules.  
                                                 
15 There may be videogames where the unpredictability of possible outcomes remains without the 
possibility of failure if there are multiple ways a player can succeed. In cases with multiple win 
conditions, the idea of temporary failure at achieving one of those conditions is still importantly 
connected with unpredictability. Thanks to Jon Robson for pointing this out.  
16 Conversely, if a videogame is too difficult, players’ enjoyment suffers as well. So it is important 
that the potential for failure is created through appropriate, balanced game rules.  
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With the relationship between failure and game mechanics in mind, I turn 
my attention to the impact it has on how videogames are appreciated. When 
successful, game mechanics relating to the constitutive rules and lusory means that 
help determine difficulty share two important features. First, they ensure a player 
will remain challenged and typically fail to accomplish a goal at some point during 
play. Second, successful employment of one or more of the mechanics ensures that 
player fails due to her own actions, erroneous or otherwise, and not because of poor 
gameplay design. Each of these features can have a significant impact on the 
aesthetically appreciable elements of a game. Regarding the first, Juul noted that 
the expectation of failure plays an important role in a player’s overall enjoyment of 
a videogame. From this point it’s no challenge to see how a game that is too easy 
suffers aesthetically as well. Often when a game is too easy players become 
disengaged, and the potential for a unique aesthetic experience found through 
interactivity and immersion is lost. Games that are too easy, or require little 
attention to rules of skill, fail to take full advantage of what sets videogames apart 
from other artistic mediums: the potential for a highly immersive, interactive 
experience. A player that is challenged is more likely to feel that her input actually 
matters in her gaming experience, thus deepening the level of immersion into the 
game world. This, in turn, opens the door for a more meaningful and appreciative 
experience. Games that don’t challenge a player come across as dull and boring and 
lose the distinguishing features of their artistic medium. They fail to take full 
advantage of the unique way games can get a player personally invested in the 
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overall experience she is helping create. In doing so, easy games negate the value 
of working within the videogame medium. 
Moreover, it’s important to note that failure adds to the value of the game 
and a player’s overall enjoyment only if her input plays a crucial role in bringing 
about failure. As Juul noted, this type of failure, caused by user action (where the 
action is best understood as failing to follow the prescribed rules of skill), is 
welcomed when playing a game. However, when failure is a product of poorly 
constructed constitutive rules and other faulty game mechanics as opposed to user 
choice, it detracts from the overall appreciative value of the game.17  Perhaps the 
most obvious way is when a player is unable to advance the narrative due to a game 
glitch or design error. Further, when failure is at least in part a product of badly 
designed game mechanics, the actual play of the game is a detriment to the entire 
experience. Games that contain numerous glitches, are unbalanced, or have poor or 
unnecessarily complex control schemes often lead to failure in the wrong sort of 
way.  
For instance, when the fourth installment of the popular action role-playing 
Fallout series, Fallout: New Vegas (2010), was first released it was littered with 
numerous bugs and glitches that severely affected a player’s ability to progress 
through the game. One of the more serious bugs involved losing saved game files 
                                                 
17 There are videogames where random failures may occur despite a player’s choice. Super Smash 
Bros. Brawl (2008) is one example. At random times, a player’s character may trip and fall not 
because of any action she took, but because random falls are built into the algorithm of the game. 
Arguably, such events in videogames are best understood as failure produced by constitutive rules, 
and it could be contended that videogames which rely too heavily on randomly generated failure as 
their primary source for failure rapidly lose appreciative value by creating a disconnect between 




in their entirety if the player entered a certain area of the game world. Throughout 
the game, there are numerous underground areas, or vaults, to explore. Each vault 
is numbered, and several players reported having trouble with their saved game file 
when they entered Vault 3 (GameFAQs 2011, online). After completing the 
missions in Vault 3, upon trying to exit the vault and return to the main world 
players reported not being able to save their game anymore, and that all other saved 
files they had were corrupt and could not load. With the potential for over 100 
hours of gameplay, New Vegas requires multiple sittings to complete; the ability to 
save your progress is a necessity. Thus, a problem of this magnitude makes the 
game virtually unplayable and failure inevitable, obviously negating most of the 
enjoyment that the game might have offered, aesthetic or otherwise. Less severe 
glitches and bugs were also reported that contributed to failure in the wrong sort of 
way; there are other instances where enemies glitch and ‘melt’ into the 
environment, rendering them invisible to the player, yet they can still inflict 
damage on the player’s character. Thus, the player is left facing unbeatable enemies 
and unavoidable failure. These bugs contribute to failure regardless of user input, 
and lead to frustrating gaming experiences, with no chance of player success. In 
turn, what was intended to be an aesthetically immersive experience where a player 
feels as if they are engaging first hand in an intense and mysterious world becomes 
a display of inept world-making.  
New Vegas’s bugs and glitches, which lead to the wrong kind of failure, 
sever the connection between player and game, and work and audience, otherwise 
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found in a game without such problems. The sense of control needed for an 
interactive experience is lost, and the player is alienated from the game-world, no 
longer feeling as if her choices actually matter in producing what she is 
experiencing. In addition to rendering the game unresponsive to user input, glitches 
like those found in New Vegas serve as the wrong sort of reminder that the player is 
engaging in a work of fiction. Non-player characters suddenly disappearing without 
explanation is similar to a performer breaking character in a play or movie; it 
damages the cohesiveness of the fictional world and leaves the audience confused.  
The relationship between failure and game mechanics represents just one of 
the ways in which the gamehood of videogames affects their aesthetic value. When 
it comes to narrative driven games, striking a balance between gameplay, player 
choice, and telling a worthwhile story is not an easy task. In the following section, I 
examine how constitutive rules work in conjunction with storytelling, further 
establishing the importance of including gamehood in our aesthetic understanding 
of videogames. 
Section IV: Constitutive Rules and Narrative 
 I mentioned in the opening section that when establishing the art status of 
videogames, scholars often deliberately ignore gamehood and focus on other 
artistic elements of the medium. This strategy leads to a fundamental 
misunderstanding of what makes videogames a unique artistic medium. Thus far I 
have addressed the problem only from a theoretical standpoint by highlighting the 
need to establish a videogame aesthetic (or theory of videogames as an art kind) 
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that includes features of gamehood for a more accurate understanding of the 
medium. However, the disjointed approach to understanding the aesthetics of 
videogames is, in part, a product of how game designers and producers sometimes 
approach their craft: when it comes to balancing gamehood with narrative, the 
divide between the two elements is rarely addressed. Yet even this divide helps 
galvanize the idea that gamehood is essential to developing an adequate 
understanding of videogame aesthetics. To illustrate, let’s look at how the 
videogames Braid (2008) and The Last of Us (2013) incorporate the constitutive 
rules of their respective gameplay into their narratives.  
 Developed by independent game designer Jonathon Blow, Braid is a side-
scrolling puzzle platformer, where the player controls the protagonist, Tim, who is 
trying to rescue a princess from an unknown enemy.18 Each level of Braid invites 
the player to solve various in-game puzzles in an effort to collect jigsaw puzzle 
pieces which must be put together to advance to the next level. For the most part, 
Braid plays like any other puzzle platformer: players must traverse in-game 
obstacles by jumping across pits and onto platforms, disposing of enemies by 
jumping on their heads, or simply running away from them. Anyone familiar with 
Super Mario Bros. (1985) will recognize most of the game mechanics. However, 
Braid’s signature game mechanic, set up by its constitutive rules, allows the player 
to manipulate time in various ways to progress through the game. Rather than 
giving the player a set number of lives to complete levels like Mario Bros., Braid 
                                                 
18 Braid’s general story pays homage to the classic “hero saves the princess” trope seen in games 
like Super Mario Bros. (1985) and Legend of Zelda (1986).  
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allows the player to rewind time whenever an error is made and try a different 
approach. And each level adds a wrinkle to the basic time manipulation mechanic 
that is central to solving the central puzzle of that particular level. For instance, in 
world 4, in addition to the player being able to rewind at the press of a button, time 
is manipulated when Tim moves across the screen: as Tim moves towards the right, 
time goes forward, and when he moves left, time rewinds. As the player progresses, 
the twists to time manipulation from previous levels are often incorporated into the 
next level, building on puzzles already solved.  
 Although other games have utilized time manipulation as a game mechanic, 
Braid sets itself apart by synthesizing the mechanic with its narrative.19 When the 
player is first introduced to Tim, it’s unclear what has happened to his Princess, or 
why she’s in need of rescue; but what is clear is that Tim has made some sort of 
mistake and is stricken with guilt and regret. Before the first level starts, the player 
is presented with a brief paragraph explaining Tim’s melancholia: 
Tim is off on a search to rescue the Princess. She has been snatched by a 
horrible and evil monster. This happened because Tim made a mistake. Not 
just one. He made many mistakes during the time they spent together, all 
those years ago. . .Our world, with its rules of causality, has trained us to be 
miserly with forgiveness. . .But if we’ve learned from a mistake and 
become better for it, shouldn’t we be rewarded for the learning, rather than 
punished for the mistake? (Braid, 2008) 
Almost immediately, Braid’s storyline invites the player to consider what it would 
be like to go back in time and make up for past mistakes. Tim is clearly regretful of 
past wrongdoing and will go to great lengths to make up for it. The narrative 
                                                 
19For example, The Legend of Zelda: Ocarina of Time (1998) and Prince of Persia: The Sands of 
Time (2003) both use time manipulation as a game mechanic.   
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focuses on a character yearning to erase the past, and the central game mechanic 
maps seamlessly on to this idea. By allowing the player to rewind time, Braid 
successfully connects its gamehood with the narrative, taking full advantage of the 
interactivity videogames offer. Doing so creates a cohesive object of aesthetic 
appreciation, where the artistic value of the narrative and gamehood are intimately 
intertwined. 
 In the last level, Braid solidifies the connection between its central game 
mechanic and the story. Curiously labeled “1,” the final level tasks the player with 
rescuing the Princess from her captor. The player can still manipulate time, only in 
this level, time already flows in reverse; so when she presses the corresponding 
button, time then flows forward. As the level opens up, Tim is underground, 
separated from the Princess who is on the surface, being held by a large figure 
wearing a knight’s armor. Tim watches as the Princess escapes the knight’s grasp, 
crying out for help, with the knight calling for her to come back. She then runs 
across the stage while Tim, still underground, races to catch up with her, avoiding 
various obstacles and traps along the way. At the end of the stage, Tim finally 
reaches the Princess. However, when he gets close to her, time suddenly reverses 
flow, and the player watches as the actions she took to rescue the Princess are 
reversed.20 Now, the Princess is running away from Tim as he gives pursuit. Again, 
she cries out for help, and this time the knight is calling for her to join him, as she 
jumps into his arms, avoiding the reach of Tim. As the level ends, the player 
                                                 
20 Recall that in the final level time is already reversed, so once Tim reaches the Princess, time starts 
moving forward again. 
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realizes Tim is the monster that the Princess is hiding from, and the knight comes 
to her rescue. Again, Braid invites the player to see the central game mechanic as a 
crucial part of the narrative itself. Tim desperately wants to right the wrongs he 
committed in the past, and the game mechanic reflects his desire before helping 
reveal the twist ending: no matter what Tim does, his past mistakes are irreversible. 
Integrating the game mechanic with the narrative as Braid does makes the narrative 
more impactful to the player, and helps tell the story, rather than diminish it. 
 Where Braid succeeds in taking full advantage of the opportunity 
videogames provide for telling an immersive story, The Last of Us represents a case 
where the gamehood detracts from the potential aesthetic impact narrative 
videogames can offer. Set in a modern day dystopian society, The Last of Us is a 
survival horror action adventure played from the third person perspective. Most of 
the game takes place twenty years after an airborne fungal outbreak turns humans 
into zombie-like monsters. The player controls Joel, weathered survivor of the 
original outbreak, who reluctantly takes on the task of escorting Ellie, a teenage 
girl, from Pittsburgh to one of the last medical centers standing in Salt Lake City. 
Ellie represents humanity’s last chance of curing the outbreak, as she is somehow 
immune to the effects of the fungus. The hope is that the doctors in Salt Lake will 
be able to create a vaccine based off of Ellie’s immunity.  
 Throughout the journey to Salt Lake, the player must navigate her way 
through infected zombies, hostile groups of survivors, and environmental obstacles 
impeding progress. As far as the central game mechanics go, The Last of Us keeps 
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with the tradition of most survival horror games. The player can choose to directly 
confront enemies, using a variety of weapons to dispatch them, use a stealthier 
approach by sneaking around enemies and avoiding conflict altogether, or use a 
mixture of both strategies. Resources like weapons, ammunition, and first aid are 
scarce, so the player must plan her strategy accordingly.  
 Although the gameplay of The Last of Us is standard when it comes to 
games of its genre, the story and character development have been praised almost 
universally by critics and gamers alike. The game received an overall rating of 95 
on metacritic.com, with several commenting on the unusual success of a 
compelling story being told through a game (Metacritic 2018, online). The story 
primarily revolves around Joel and Ellie’s relationship. Throughout the game, the 
player learns about Joel and Ellie’s pasts, and how their pasts affect their 
relationship. Mostly through cut-scenes and scripted dialogue, it’s revealed that 
Joel had a daughter close to Ellie’s age when the outbreak first occurred and was 
unable to save her. This sets up his future relationship with Ellie, as he slowly 
accepts his role as Ellie’s protector and surrogate father figure. Moreover, Ellie, 
who was born after the initial outbreak, only knows a world post-apocalypse. Joel 
often serves as a historian for Ellie, explaining how life was before the outbreak. 
As the story progresses, Joel and Ellie’s father/daughter-like relationship is 
cemented as the player navigates the gameworld. Solving various puzzles in order 
to progress often requires help from Ellie, further strengthening the relationship 
between the Joel (the player) and Ellie. Joel and Ellie work together throughout the 
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game, establishing a dynamic bond where they become mutually dependent on one 
another; as many times as the player is asked to save Ellie by controlling Joel, Ellie 
saves Joel an equal amount.   
By the time the game and story reach the climax, Joel and Ellie have formed 
a fiercely loyal connection with one another: a connection that the player can’t help 
but feel obligated to protect. So when they finally reach the hospital, there is an 
unnerving sense that the player will be faced with a difficult choice. Again, through 
a series of cut-scenes and contextual dialogue, it’s revealed that extracting the 
tissue necessary to create the vaccine and save humanity will kill Ellie. At this 
point, Ellie has been knocked unconscious in a previous fight, so it’s up to Joel to 
make the decision: leave Ellie with the doctors, essentially killing her but saving 
humanity, or violently break her out, dooming humanity but saving her life.  
The entire game and storyline set up the player to confront this unavoidable, 
anxiety-ridden choice. As I was playing the game, anticipating the moment when I 
would have to decide whether to save Ellie or save humanity came with a sense of 
agony. Although I knew it was building to this point, I still didn’t know what 
choice I would make. And then, as the moment approached, the game did 
something that, within a highly interactive medium, came as an unwanted surprise: 
the choice was made for me. In a cut-scene lasting roughly 10 minutes, Joel breaks 
Ellie out and kills any doctors stopping him from escaping with a still unconscious 
Ellie in his arms. As they drive away in the following shot, Joel lies to Ellie, 
knowing full well that she would have wanted to stay and sacrifice her life for the 
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good of humanity. He tells her that there were others like her and that the doctors 
were unsuccessful in creating a vaccine, ultimately giving up on the project. In the 
final scene, as Joel and Ellie are walking through the wilderness back to a 
community they discovered earlier, Ellie again confronts Joel, asking him to swear 
that he told her the truth about the hospital. For the second time, Joel’s response is 
left out of the hands of the player, as he lies once more to Ellie, knowing she would 
never forgive him if she knew the truth.  
Although telling the final chapter of the story through non-interactive cut-
scenes and scripted dialogue creates a cohesive and lasting impression, it makes for 
a less interesting overall work of art qua videogame. In this case, the rules of the 
game prohibited the player from making any choice about how she would respond, 
given the choice that the entire story was building towards. Because the pivotal 
moment of choice is taken out of the player’s hands, the final product is disjointed. 
Nothing about The Last of Us qua game relates to or reinforces The Last of Us qua 
narrative. The relationship built up between the player (playing as Joel) and Ellie is 
cast aside, as the player is forced to passively watch the ending unfold, rather than 
being a part of it. By restricting the player’s actions in this way, The Last of Us fails 
to take advantage of the special opportunity videogames can provide to their 
audience as an interactive medium. What’s left is a distinct story and a distinct 
game rather than a story told through a game.21  
                                                 
21An alternative (and perhaps more charitable) interpretation suggests that the lack of player-
controlled narrative in The Last of Us is deliberate. That is, the game intentionally restricts choices 
to foreground a characterological dissonance between the player and their character Joel. The 
player’s lack of narrative freedom may be a self-reflective feature meant to highlight the complex 
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At this point it’s clear that there are important non-aesthetic features of 
videogames as games that affect our aesthetic experience of them. If we are to have 
a complete understanding and proper evaluation of the aesthetically appreciable 
nature of videogames, then we must include these features in the discussion. 
Understood as a product of the constitutive rules, game mechanics are a perfect 
example of one such feature, affecting the appreciable nature through failure and 
storytelling. We cannot merely focus on the obvious similarities videogames may 
share with other artistic mediums. A framework that both recognizes and helps 
explain what sets videogames apart as an artistic medium needs to include an 
evaluation of gameplay, including game mechanics. 
 
  
                                                                                                                                        
nature of the relationship between the perceived sense of authorial control gamers might feel and the 
reality that they are forced to follow certain narrative paths to finish the game. Whether the lack of 
freedom and disconnect between the narrative/gameplay is understood as a defect or a deliberate 
appreciative feature, The Last of Us still serves as an example why it is important to include features 




Chapter 3: Interactivity, Unpredictability, and Aesthetic Change in 
Videogames 
Within the aesthetics literature, the topic of interactivity is being met with 
increasing interest. Surprisingly, though, there has been little written on how 
interactivity affects aesthetic experience. As a highly interactive medium, the 
videogame provides an excellent starting point for exploring the relationship 
between interactivity and aesthetic experience. In this chapter, I argue that the 
degree and source of interactivity has a significant aesthetic effect on the play of 
videogames. First, I draw an original distinction between agent-to-agent interaction 
and agent-to-non-agent interaction with a survey of the literature on interactivity. I 
then spell out the connection between meaningful interaction and unpredictability 
in videogames. Afterward I show that, in varying degrees, videogames rely on at 
least two sources of unpredictability: game-produced (built into the algorithm of 
the game) or player-produced (generated by players’ choices). Finally, I illustrate 
that the aesthetic experience of playing videogames varies depending on the degree 
and source of unpredictability present in the game. Specifically, I show that if 
game-produced unpredictability is dominant, the narrative will play a larger role in 
the aesthetic experience. As game-produced unpredictability diminishes, game 
content (what is being presented) may recede in the player’s experience while the 
mode of presentation becomes more prominent. In addition, as game-produced 
unpredictability decreases, player performance plays a more prominent role in 
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aesthetic experiences. The player may become more aware of her own involvement 
in creating her aesthetic experience. 
Section I: Understanding Interactivity 
Consider first the notion of interactivity and its relationship with 
unpredictability. Several definitions of interactivity have been proposed in various 
academic circles. As Lori Landry notes in her entry on interactivity in The 
Routledge Companion to Video Game Studies, “the definition of interactivity has 
historically been contested, with scholars from different fields emphasizing either 
technology, the communication setting, or the perceiver, yielding different insights 
and interests” (2014, p.173). The number of attempts made to define interactivity 
speaks to both the importance of the concept itself and the difficulty one faces 
when explaining the term. It may be that the concept of interactivity cannot be 
properly understood with a singular definition in mind. Dominic McIver Lopes 
echoes this sentiment while discussing interactivity and computer art: 
The trouble with “interactivity” isn’t that it’s meaningless. The real trouble 
is that it means too much—it means so many different things in so many 
different situations that it’s hard to come up with a one-size-fits-all 
definition…Luckily, a theory of interactivity isn’t obliged to cover 
interactivity in every domain, though it should fit all works of computer art. 
(2010, p.36) 
Following Lopes’ lead, I will restrict my attention to the concept of interactivity as 
it relates to videogames specifically. 
 Videogames afford interactive experiences in two ways: interaction with 
the game system itself, and interaction with other players through the game. 
Essentially, this is what separates single player games from multiplayer games. The 
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former is a case of agent-to-non-agent interaction, whereas the latter is a case of 
agent-to-agent interaction. Thus, understanding the fundamental difference between 
cases of agent-to-agent interaction and agent-to-non-agent interaction is paramount. 
Dating back to the well-known Turing Test, the question of whether machines (in 
our case, computers) could be appropriately considered genuine thinking agents in 
any robust sense depends on their ability to interact with other agents (Turing 1950, 
pp.433-60). The basic idea behind the Turing Test is to take both a person and a 
computer program, and have a judge discern which one is the person and which one 
is the computer by asking each a series of questions. If the judge cannot reliably 
distinguish between answers given by the computer and answers provided by a 
person, the computer is said to pass the test. In essence, the Turing Test uses a 
conversation between two people as a model by which to judge intelligence. A 
conversation is often taken as a classic example of interaction between two agents. 
In a conversation, both parties exert partial control over the direction of the 
exchange and where it ultimately ends. Each agent has limited command of how 
the conversation will develop, and responses are shaped by what the other agent is 
saying. Ideally, neither party can to completely dictate the flow of the exchange, yet 
each is able to adjust on the fly and respond accordingly to what the other person 
has said. There is an element of organic adaptivity in a conversation between two 
agents. Although each agent might be able to predict how the other is going to 
respond given the context and subject matter of the conversation, there is an open-
endedness that characterizes the exchange. A person can interrupt the other to 
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expand on a topic or ask a related question, which would alter the course of the 
discussion.  
It’s precisely the lack of organic adaptivity that helps identify the computer 
in Turing Tests and that distinguishes agent-to-agent interactions from agent-to-
non-agent interactions. Using a conversation as a model of a classically interactive 
exchange, videogame designers are tasked with creating a game that does its best to 
imitate the responses a genuine agent might give to user-generated input. By 
attempting to imitate genuine agent responses to user input, interactivity with non-
agents materializes with a crucial epistemic component, dependent on the 
perception of the agent involved. The player, being the only agent, must be in the 
proper epistemic state with the game for the experience to be interactive: in cases of 
single player games, it needs to appear as if the player is interacting with another 
agent, instead of simply inputting data into a computer program. Videogames 
attempt to mimic or emulate the organic adaptivity found in genuine agent-to-agent 
interaction with what I call “limited unpredictability.”  
Aaron Smuts, Dominic McIver Lopes, and Andrew Lippman all offer 
accounts of interactivity earmarked by unpredictability. Explaining these views will 
clarify the notion of limited unpredictability. In his article “What is Interactivity?”, 
Smuts argues for a generalized definition of interactivity. However, I will consider 
the adequacy of his account as it relates specifically to video games. He writes, 
“Something is interactive if and only if it (1) is responsive, and (2) does not 
completely control, (3) is not completely controlled, and (4) does not respond in a 
 
43 
completely random fashion” (Smuts 2009, p.65). From conditions two and three, I 
take Smuts to be saying that interacting with something requires that that thing be 
at most partially controlled by your actions while at the same time producing 
results that at most partially control your subsequent actions. That is, the actions of 
all parties involved in an interaction are at least somewhat influenced by the other 
party, and no single party completely determines or dictates another party’s actions. 
Though there must be some control involved when interacting with 
something, to have too much control over it would no longer be compatible with 
interaction. As Smuts puts it, 
It is crucial to note that we must not be able to infallibly predict the 
response of that with which we are interacting. If we can reliably predict the 
response and there are no other ways in which we can act on the thing, then 
there is no longer interaction; there is merely control or manipulation. For 
the thing to remain interactive for us there must be forms of input that result 
in responses that we cannot accurately predict. (2009, p.65) 
So, even though for something to be interactive it must not respond in a completely 
random way, it must also not be completely predictable. A good place to start 
making sense of a distinction between mere control and interaction would be at the 
level of predictable outcomes. The more predictable something’s responses to input 
become, the less interactive it becomes. On this view, the same thing can be 
interactive for one person (a novice), and not at all interactive for another person 
(an experienced player). Distinguishing between manipulation and interaction 
reinforces the notion that interactivity is a relational property dependent upon the 
epistemic position of the agent(s) involved. If an agent becomes too familiar with 
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the responses that a non-agent will give to specific input, then the exchange shifts 
from interaction to manipulation. 
 Here, we begin to see the importance of understanding Smuts’ account of 
interactivity as specialized to interacting with non-agents.22 The limited 
unpredictability of game responses to user input attempts to capture some of the 
organic adaptivity found in agent-to-agent interaction. When successful, it offers 
control to the player, yet the responses to user input are varied enough to make 
them difficult to predict, simulating the presence of genuine agency behind the 
responses to the player’s input. Keeping Smuts’ notion of interactivity in mind, 
let’s look at what Lopes says about unpredictability and interactivity. 
Like Smuts, Lopes recognizes the important role unpredictability plays in 
making sense of interactivity. Ultimately, Smuts and Lopes come to different 
conclusions about what it means for something to be interactive; Lopes does not 
explicitly include a condition of unpredictability in his definition of interactivity. 
However, he does mention that unpredictability is an important feature in paradigm 
examples of interactive objects. In “An Ontology of Interactive Art,” Lopes draws 
upon the ontology of games to help develop an ontology of interactive art. He takes 
games to be an example of strong interactivity because “their users’ input helps 
determine the subsequent state of play”; moreover, Lopes points out that the 
players help determine the structural properties of the game itself (2001, p.68). At 
any point during a game, a player has at least partial control over how that 
                                                 
22 This is not to say that Smut’s account of interactivity isn’t tenable in understanding agent-to-agent 
interaction. Organic adaptivity that earmarks agent-to-agent interaction ensures that there is at least 
some unpredictability in the responses to input from both agents. 
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particular instance of the game is laid out. The rules of the game, combined with 
player choices, determine the properties of the states of play. For example, at any 
given point in a chess game, the location of the bishop is determined by the rules 
dictating how it can move on the board, the current layout of other pieces, and the 
choice of the player to move the piece. Once the game has started, an explanation 
of the structure of the game at any given point would inevitably involve a 
description of a player’s input. Lopes goes on to say, 
Playings of most games, like baseball or chess, can progress through an 
indefinite number of sequences of states. This is a key feature of games 
worth playing. Our enjoyment of games depends on their future states being 
unpredictable. (2001, p.75) 
Admittedly, Lopes is not offering unpredictability as a necessary or sufficient 
condition for interactivity.23 However, he does seem to acknowledge that 
interactivity and unpredictability are close bedfellows. For Lopes, what makes a 
game strongly interactive may be the fact that the player plays a direct role in 
bringing about different sequences of states, but what makes this interactivity 
interesting and worthwhile is the unpredictability of the sequences of states 
themselves. Both Lopes and Smuts thus see unpredictability as an important 
element that shapes interactive relationships.  
 Unsurprisingly, Smuts and Lopes are not the only ones who see the 
connection between unpredictability and interactivity. In an interview with Stewart 
Brand discussing interactivity, MIT Professor Andrew Lippman notes the 
                                                 
23 For the most part, I favor Smuts’ definition of interactivity over Lopes’. However, the fact that 
Lopes does not require unpredictability for interactivity is not detrimental to my position. That he 
sees a crucial relationship between the enjoyment of strongly interactive media and unpredictability 
is sufficient for my purposes. 
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importance of a program not being too predictable in its responses to user input 
(Brand 1987, pp.45-50). Lippman frames unpredictability as “limited look-ahead.” 
He states: 
Another one was limited look-ahead….You can’t have precomputed 
everything you’re going to say. In a conversation, how far ahead of where 
you’re talking are you really thinking? You have a goal, but since it’s 
interactive, and each one of us is going to interrupt the other, we can’t 
anticipate ever reaching that goal or where we’re going or how far we’re 
going to digress, so you don’t look that far ahead in composing interaction. 
From the point of view of programming it would mean that you wouldn’t 
necessarily string together the entire database….[Y]ou’d start to draw upon 
the whole database on the fly, to compose what your responses would be. 
See? It has to be on the fly. (Brand 1987, p.48) 
 
Lippman is approaching the concept from the view of what it takes for a non-agent 
to keep the agent in the proper epistemic state in order for interaction to take place. 
He goes on to say, “you want to avoid building a system that sort of has this default 
path that you’re going to go down unless you change it. You really do want it to 
happen on the fly, because defaults are…boring” (Brand 1987, pp.48-9). If a 
system’s responses to user input become too predictable, and the agent can look 
ahead and see how each sequence in the exchange plays out, then the level of 
interaction rapidly decreases. Lippman seems to agree with Lopes that what makes 
interaction enjoyable is the limited unpredictability of the exchange itself, a 
sentiment showcased in many videogames.  
For example, in the basketball videogame NBA 2K13 (2012), the player is 
invited to create a basketball player and guide him through an NBA career in a 
game mode called “MyCareer.” The developers go to great lengths to make the 
experience immersive and interactive: in addition to simply playing in simulated 
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NBA games, the player can personalize the look and position her character plays; 
play in multiple seasons; sign endorsement deals; track her popularity through 
social media; meet with general managers to discuss trades, contracts, and other 
players on the team; design her own shoe; and answer questions during post-game 
interviews. Essentially, NBA 2K13 draws upon classic elements from character 
customization found in traditional role-playing games and packages them in a 
sports game. At this point, I want to focus one specific feature of MyCareer mode 
to illustrate why limited unpredictability plays such an integral role in creating 
interactive experiences: the post-game interview. After each basketball game, there 
is a press conference where the player’s character (PC) is asked a question about 
his performance in the game. The player is then given a choice between four 
different responses, with each response affecting the PC’s popularity among fans 
and teammates in a different way. The question asked during the interview is 
determined in part by the player’s performance in the basketball game. For 
instance, after a game that I played in which I scored a considerable number of 
points, I was asked, “It seemed pretty clear that you tried to step it up offensively. 
Is there anything particular you can point to that led to this performance?” I had 
four response options: A) I was just having a good game, B) Mostly Coach and my 
teammates, C) Not wanting to lose the game, D) I was hitting my shots. The first 
time I encountered this question, the exchange felt like I was genuinely interacting 
with the game. Limited unpredictability worked in at least two ways to help create 
the feeling of interaction. First, the question itself seemed naturally linked to my 
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performance, capturing some of the organic adaptivity one might experience in a 
real conversation about the game. Clearly, my input mattered in the direction that 
the interview took, yet I could not have predicted exactly what question was going 
to be asked of me. Further, the responses I could offer all seemed to represent 
natural responses a real NBA player might consider, but I couldn’t predict with 
high accuracy how each response would affect my PC’s popularity among fans and 
teammates. In this instance of the post-game interview, limited unpredictability 
helped create the proper epistemic state for me to be in as if I was interacting with 
the game itself; the responses to my input weren’t entirely random, yet they weren’t 
easy to predict either. As Lippman put it, the computer-generated responses to my 
input felt as if they were “on the fly,” and thus the post-game interview felt highly 
interactive. 
However, the level of interactivity dramatically decreased as my PC 
progressed through the NBA season. The more games I played, the more repetitive 
the post-game interviews became. There were several occasions throughout the 82-
game season where my PC scored a considerable number of points, and I was asked 
the same, or a rather similar, question about my offensive performance in nearly 
every post-game interview that followed. In addition, my response choices were 
exactly the same as well. Responses to my input that initially seemed limitedly 
unpredictable were becoming annoyingly redundant the more I played. I knew that 
if my PC performed well offensively, I would be asked a question about it; 
eventually I knew exactly how each response I could choose would affect my 
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popularity as well. As the exchange became more predictable, the level of 
interactivity decreased. With limited unpredictability decreasing, the feeling of 
organic adaptivity disappeared, and the exchange became one of manipulation 
rather than interaction. The post-game interview began to follow a “default path” 
that Lippman suggests programmers avoid when designing interactive systems. It 
no longer felt like a conversation, and it became a rather boring part of the game.  
At this point, we can start to make sense of limited unpredictability and its 
role in creating enjoyable interactive experiences. If we restrict our focus to how 
the concept functions in videogames, it is helpful to distinguish between agent-to-
agent and agent-to-non-agent interaction. Videogames afford both types of 
interaction, and limited unpredictability plays an important role in each type. As we 
have seen, in single player games, where interactivity is exclusively agent-to-non-
agent, limited unpredictability helps establish the proper epistemic state by 
mimicking organic adaptivity to make the experience feel genuinely interactive. 
Essentially, the extent to which a single player videogame can be interactive 
depends on its responses to user input being limitedly unpredictable. The responses 
cannot be completely unpredictable because complete unpredictability amounts to 
almost no control at all. Limiting the unpredictability is meant to bound interaction 
at the level of complete randomness and ensures that the user’s input plays a 
meaningful role in helping to determine subsequent states of play.24 Requiring at 
                                                 
24 I take this to be a way of understanding Smuts’ requirement that the object must be responsive to 
count as interactive.  
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least some unpredictability for interaction is meant to help distinguish between 
manipulating or controlling something and interacting with it.25   
In multiplayer games, a player may experience both agent-to-agent and 
agent-to-non-agent interaction, sometimes independently and sometimes 
simultaneously.26 In these cases, limited unpredictability again ensures the 
experience remains interactive and does not turn into mere manipulation. And, as 
Lopes and Lippman point out, unpredictability helps make interaction interesting 
and enjoyable. Without limited unpredictability, the agent-to-agent interaction 
experienced through multiplayer videogames lacks what makes the exchange 
engaging and worthwhile. In most multiplayer videogames, as long as one is 
playing with someone else, the exchange will include organic adaptivity because no 
agent will completely dictate or control the actions of any other agent. However, 
there are cases where the game itself, understood as a platform through which 
agents interact, may severely limit the organic adaptivity by restricting the range of 
possible actions each player can take. Tic-tac-toe is an example of a game where 
agent-to-agent interaction quickly devolves into a mechanical exchange where no 
one ever wins because the range of moves and outcomes are easily predictable once 
the player understands the game.27 Overall, there seems to be a general agreement 
that limited unpredictability is vital to the type of interactivity afforded by 
videogames. 
                                                 
25 In this respect, I’m closer to holding Smuts’ view that unpredictability is a constitutive part of 
agent to non-agent interactivity.  
26 This is a point I return to in a later section of the chapter. 
27 Thanks to Sherri Irvin for pointing this out. 
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Section II: Sources of Limited Unpredictability in Videogames 
 Thus far I have shown the important relationship between interactivity and 
limited unpredictability.  Now I wish to focus on the sources of unpredictability 
with respect to videogames and discuss how changes in the degree of source-
specific unpredictability affect interactivity. In terms of identifying sources of 
unpredictability within games, Lopes offers a good starting point.  Lopes contends 
that “unpredictability is sometimes a result of rules incorporating randomness, but 
in most games it is also the result of players’ choosing what moves to make, and 
this requires skill” (2001, p.75). I agree with Lopes that unpredictability can be 
game-produced and/or player-produced.  However, two points need elaboration for 
my purposes, given that Lopes’ focus is on games in general, whereas mine is on 
videogames specifically.  
First, unpredictability can be generated by rules of a videogame in at least 
two ways. For instance, a videogame may be programmed to randomize the 
number, type, and/or location of enemies or obstacles you face as you progress 
through it. An example would be the puzzle videogame Tetris (1984), where an 
algorithm randomly generates the pieces used to advance in the game. In addition, 
videogames may deliberately withhold information from a player at certain points. 
For example, in narrative-driven videogames, a player’s in-game character is often 
in situations where it is unknown how the story will progress, and what choices are 
available to her. Minimal instructions may be given to the player stating what needs 
to be accomplished to advance in any given stage or level, but what in-game 
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obstacles she may encounter as she attempts to complete the given tasks is not 
easily predictable.28 In both instances, I refer to this unpredictability as game-
produced unpredictability.  
Additionally, it is easy to understand how player-produced unpredictability 
affects multi-player videogames. If you are playing with other people, they will 
undoubtedly make decisions that are not entirely predictable (while hopefully not 
entirely random either) that affect the subsequent states of the games. However, the 
notion of player-produced unpredictability can affect single-player videogames as 
well. This follows from the fact that a significant level of skill can be required by 
single-player games. Given that execution of player-produced choices is fallible, 
the sequence of states a videogame goes through can be difficult to predict even for 
the individual who is playing, regardless of whether the expected consequences of 
the intended action are known. Even if a player knows exactly what is required to 
succeed at a certain point in the game and how to go about it, it may take a player 
several tries to accomplish an in-game goal. For instance, consider the first-person 
shooter series Halo (2001).29 When playing in single-player mode, at various times 
the game requires that the player defeat a certain number of enemies to advance in 
the level. A player may reach a part in the level where she knows the number and 
location of enemies as well as what is required to defeat them (e.g., shooting them 
                                                 
28 In section III, I discuss the videogame BioShock, which is an excellent example of narrative 
driven unpredictability.  
29 In a first-person shooter, the player navigates her in-game character from a first-person 
perspective. She sees the game through the eyes of the in-game player character; thus typically only 
the character’s arms and hands are visible to her. In a third-person shooter, by contrast, the entire 
body of the character is visible. As the reader might have guessed, the games are called “shooters” 
because the primary gameplay focuses on eliminating enemies using various projectile weapons.  
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with a weapon or blowing them up with a grenade), but often it is easier said than 
done. A player may make a mistake, such as an errant gunshot or a misplaced 
grenade, and subsequently lose the battle and have to start over, perhaps adopting a 
different strategy the second or third time around. This sort of trial and error makes 
it difficult to predict states of play. Even when the ultimate outcome of the 
engagement is predictable (i.e., the player succeeds and progresses to the next part 
of the game or fails and must start over), the properties of the particular sequences 
of states experienced can vary greatly with each attempt. Here, the unpredictability 
is associated with how the player acts within the context of the game, not 
necessarily the outcomes of the particular actions she takes. Although the line 
between player-produced unpredictability and game-produced unpredictability is 
thinner in single-player than in multi-player games, it exists nonetheless. 
Given that unpredictability is a relational property contingent on the 
player’s epistemic position, there can be varying degrees of interactivity that 
coincide with the source or type of unpredictability. It might be best to think of the 
sources of limited unpredictability in videogames as lying on two interrelated 
scales. A videogame can be more or less interactive in terms of both game-
produced unpredictability and player-produced unpredictability. As is evidenced in 
the above paragraph, single-player games typically rely more on game-produced 
unpredictability than player-produced unpredictability, though both elements may 
be included. Conversely, multi-player videogames may rely more on player-
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produced unpredictability as the cornerstone of interactivity.30 In part, the 
distinction between sources of limited unpredictability mirrors the distinction 
between agent-to-agent interactivity and agent-to-non-agent interactivity. If we 
have a single-player game where only one agent is part of the interaction, then 
game-produced unpredictability is more prominent. If the game features 
multiplayer modes of play, and there is a chance for agent-to-agent interaction, then 
both game-produced and player-produced unpredictability can be experienced. In 
what follows, I will first focus on single-player videogames and make the case that 
changes in the degree of game-produced unpredictability affect the aesthetic 
experience of gameplay. I then turn attention to multiplayer games, arguing that 
changes in both degree and type of unpredictability can affect aesthetic experience 
as well.  
Section III: Degrees of Unpredictability and Aesthetic Change 
In this section I discuss the relationship between degrees of unpredictability 
and aesthetic change in play. Different aesthetic features of a play-through of a 
videogame will be dominant in the player’s experience, depending on the degree 
and source of unpredictability involved in the interaction. When game-produced 
unpredictability is prevalent in interactivity, aesthetic elements of the narrative are 
more prominent. As game-produced unpredictability diminishes, aesthetic elements 
                                                 
30 The trend for single-player and multi-player games to rely more heavily on one type of 
unpredictability over the other is fast changing. Massively multiplayer online games, such as World 
of Warcraft (2004), attempt to incorporate both sources, allowing for multiple player collaboration 
to accomplish different and new goals the game itself offers. Furthermore, games like Demon’s 
Souls (2009), which is a primarily single-player game that is played over an online network, allow 
players to indirectly affect the single-player story mode of others playing the game. For example, a 
player may leave a message for others, indicating an enemy ambush ahead.  
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of the performative aspect of videogame play are more prominent. Discussing a 
few examples will help make sense of what I have in mind. First, take BioShock 
(2007), a single-player, first-person shooter, survival-horror game.31 In BioShock, 
the player is immersed in a narrative set in a dystopian underwater society, called 
Rapture, during the 1950s. The citizens of Rapture have gone mad, and the player’s 
objective is to survive their onslaughts and confront and defeat the man who is 
responsible for Rapture’s current state.  
On first play-through, what is captivating about BioShock is the narrative 
itself. It initially relies on game-produced unpredictability to keep the player on 
edge and actively engaged throughout the play. As a player, you are immersed in 
the world of Rapture knowing almost nothing about how or why you came to be 
there, except that you survived a plane crash. As the game progresses, more 
information is slowly revealed that helps piece together the overall narrative. 
Adding to the unpredictability of the narrative is the role the player has in shaping 
the story. The player’s choices play a crucial role in determining the final ending of 
the narrative. At various times throughout the game, the player must choose to 
either rescue or “harvest” little girls who possess valuable resources needed to 
proceed. If the player chooses to rescue a girl, the player receives fewer resources 
but the little girl lives. If the player chooses to harvest, the little girl dies but the 
player receives a great deal more resources. Depending on which choice is made, 
the player will reach a different ending of the story. Although the choice itself is 
                                                 
31 In a survival-horror game, the player’s objective is to keep the in-game character alive in scary 
situations.  For a nice description of the artistry of BioShock, read Grant Tavinor’s “BioShock and 
the Art of Rapture.” Philosophy and Literature. 33.1 (2009): pp. 91-106. 
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binary, it helps maintain the feeling that the player’s choices genuinely matter in 
determining subsequent states of the game, creating a more interactive experience 
than might otherwise be had. 
BioShock repeatedly puts the player in unpredictable situations. In each 
level of the game, you are given a main goal, and, at times, various sub-goals that 
you must accomplish to advance. However, a player must do a great deal of 
exploration to figure out exactly how and where each goal needs to be 
accomplished. BioShock also allows for a large amount of creativity from the 
player as she attempts to complete goals or defeat enemies: The player may freeze, 
electrify, incinerate, use mind control, set immobilizing traps, or even dispatch a 
swarm of bees to attack an enemy. Or she simply may choose to shoot an enemy 
with a revolver. Various combinations of attacks can also be utilized, depending 
how imaginative the player may be. Furthermore, the computer generated and 
controlled enemies in each level are programmed to act and react to the player’s 
actions in a variety of different ways in an effort to mimic organic adaptivity 
through limited unpredictability. For instance, if a player chooses to incinerate an 
enemy, the enemy might suddenly flee and look for a water source to put out the 
flame before resuming any attack. BioShock attempts to keep the player guessing 
and creatively involved as she progresses through the story and does an excellent 
job of using game-produced unpredictability in doing so.32 
                                                 
32 BioShock incorporates elements of player-produced unpredictability as well.  Like many other 
videogames, BioShock requires a considerable amount of skill to complete. As in Halo 2, the player 
of BioShock may have to try and beat a level several times before actually succeeding, due in part to 
the difficulty of the level and how well the intended actions are executed. 
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Keeping this in mind, let’s look more closely at how changes in degree of 
game-produced unpredictability in BioShock affect aesthetic features of the 
gameplay. As the player advances through BioShock, or perhaps plays through the 
entire game additional times, the level of game-produced unpredictability 
inevitably diminishes. The player becomes more familiar with the narrative, the 
way the enemies act and what needs to be done to defeat them, her in-game 
surroundings, and the overall computer-generated responses to various inputs. As 
game-produced unpredictability decreases, the player is less likely to focus on 
certain aesthetic features that, at first when game-produced unpredictability was 
greater, were extremely striking. In BioShock, enemies that once came across as 
frighteningly aggressive, disfigured mutant abominations start appearing on a 
routine basis and are easily overcome and no longer as frightening. The dark, 
gloomy setting of a crumbling underwater city is less violent and eerie, and the 
unnerving feeling of not knowing what is around the next corner becomes less 
prevalent in the gameplay. In cases of playing through the game more than once, 
the player may find the narrative less intriguing and mysterious, given they know 
how the story progresses and ultimately concludes.  
Though the shock value of a playthrough may be lost as game-produced 
unpredictability decreases, the player may focus on other aesthetic features of the 
game. The sharpness of the texture, the vividness of the color scheme, and the 
meshing of the audio with the visuals are more easily noticeable if game-produced 
unpredictability decreases: you’re less worried about being attacked by mutated 
 
58 
humans and thus able to enjoy the scenery a bit more. When game-produced 
unpredictability diminishes, what is being presented becomes less important than 
how it is presented. That is, the intricacies of the style and overall aesthetic gestalt 
of the game are subject to a deeper appreciation, much in the same way one might 
be more attuned to the fine detail and physical texture of expressive brush strokes 
after multiple viewings of a painting; the style of the presentation of the 
representational content becomes the prominent appreciative focal point.  
Furthermore, in single-player games like BioShock, as game-produced 
unpredictability decreases, player choices become more important in both 
exploiting the interactivity of the game and shaping dominant aesthetic features of 
the play-through. I mentioned earlier that BioShock allows players to creatively 
defeat enemies by using a combination of powers and weapons. These variations, 
contingent upon choices the player makes, are a feature of play that gains more 
attention as game-produced unpredictability diminishes. Knowing how the 
computer-generated enemies respond allows for more experimentation in defeating 
them. In a first encounter with an enemy, the player may want to just defeat them in 
the most effective way possible. But as enemies become more predictable, the 
player can choose to be more creative and original in how she engages them, 
enhancing the aesthetic quality of the experience. So, as various elements of game-
produced unpredictability diminish, and a player becomes more knowledgeable 




Thus, as game-produced unpredictability decreases a player will more than 
likely shift her focus to how well she is performing in the game. What once was a 
matter of just “surviving by any means necessary” may turn into “accomplishing 
this goal in the most skillful and ingenious way possible.” Aesthetic features of the 
player’s performance within the game are brought to the forefront as the degree of 
game-produced unpredictability diminishes. Style of play may be scrutinized more 
heavily: Was the player too aggressive here? Should she have been more 
defensive? Was the optimal path taken to accomplish the goal? Did she miss out on 
opportunities to accomplish a side-mission or secondary goal in the game? Did she 
take full advantage of every resource available to her at the time? In essence, when 
a game becomes less interactive due to the decrease in game-produced 
unpredictability, a player is more likely to be concerned with playing the game 
well, as opposed to merely advancing to the next level. Here, playing the game well 
isn’t reducible to concrete outcomes of advancing or failing to advance in the 
game; it’s more about producing the desired outcome with a stylistic flourish. This 
shift in attention to the skill of the player as a performer is analogous to the shift in 
attention one might expect from seeing a play or movie for the second time or 
watching a sporting event. Knowing what the story is and how it ends, one might 
focus more on how well the story is being told, including the way in which the 
actors perform. Similarly, a veteran basketball player might decide to attempt a 
reverse windmill dunk to score instead of a simple layup. Although each act is only 
worth two points, finishing with a dunk instead of a layup is a demonstration of 
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superior skill. In the same way, a videogame player can critique the aesthetic 
appeal of her actual play of the game, as opposed to simply the game itself, or the 
ultimate outcome of her choices. 
Shifts in aesthetic focus caused by changes in the degree of interactivity can 
be found in non-narrative driven videogames as well. For instance, the popular 
videogame series Guitar Hero (2005) is a case where the notion of player 
performance takes on an obvious prominence as game produced unpredictability 
decreases. Every game in the Guitar Hero series has roughly the same gameplay 
mechanics and objectives. Guitar Hero functions much like a rhythm-based Simon 
Says game, where the player is required to press various buttons on a guitar shaped 
controller at the right moment as the required button combinations scroll across the 
screen. The control scheme is intended to mimic playing a real guitar. The player 
can choose from a variety of well-known songs to try and play, each with its own 
pattern of button combinations. The overall objective of the game is to accumulate 
the most points by correctly hitting the button combinations at the right time. By 
hitting a sufficient percentage of buttons correctly, the player advances through the 
entire song. If the player misses too many ‘notes,’ she fails the song and must start 
over from the beginning. 
Guitar Hero incorporates game-produced unpredictability in two different 
ways. First, each song has its own unique set of button combinations that must be 
hit to succeed in the game. Depending on how quickly a player memorizes the 
song-specific button patterns, there can be a relatively high degree of game-
 
61 
produced unpredictability based simply on the song selection. Second, within each 
song there are 4 difficulty settings a player may choose from when playing, ranging 
from easy to expert. On the easy setting, each song incorporates only three of five 
buttons available on the controller, and the rate at which the required button 
combinations appear on the screen is relatively slow. As the player advances 
through the difficulty settings, more buttons are incorporated in the patterns, and 
the combinations start appearing in rapid succession. On the expert setting, the 
player must use all 5 of the buttons, making the patterns all the more difficult to 
memorize, and the speed at which the notes appear is considerably faster. So, what 
may have been a relatively simple song to master on the easy setting could turn out 
to be quite difficult even to complete on the expert setting. 
By allowing the player to choose from numerous songs, each with four 
different difficulty settings, Guitar Hero keeps the degree of game-produced 
unpredictability (as well as the level of interactivity) at a high level for most 
players well after they first play it. There are, however, instances where a player 
may become extremely proficient at playing one, if not many, of the songs on all 
four difficulty settings. In the course of mastering a song, the level of interactivity 
diminishes, and the aesthetic features associated with the player’s own role in 
playing the game become more prominent. At this point, gameplay arguably starts 
to look and sound more like a performance of a musical piece than simply 
following a set of button combinations on a screen. Indeed, in their article 
“Performance Hero,” Craig Derkson and Darren Hudson Hick argue that instances 
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of playing Guitar Hero should be treated as performances of songs (2009, online). 
Ultimately, they conclude that when “the Guitar Hero or Rock Band player 
performs at expert level with minimal error, it seems, the player can indeed be said 
to be legitimately performing the song in question (Derkson 2009, online). If we 
are willing to accept some playings of Guitar Hero as legitimate performances of a 
musical work, then it is plausible that certain aesthetic features more closely 
associated with the player’s actual performance will become prominent, and those 
features associated with the game itself will recede. The player will become less 
concerned with the overall function of the game and the features that initially made 
it challenging and enjoyable and focus more on her own input as an integral part of 
the performance. For instance, one might focus less on how the song compares with 
the original recordings or live performances, or how closely the button 
combinations represent actual chords in the song and turn her attention to how the 
mistakes she makes affect the overall quality of that particular playthrough. A 
successful performance of a notoriously difficult song like DragonForce’s 
“Through the Fire and Flames” in Guitar Hero 3 (2007) on expert level may be 
more aesthetically pleasing and rewarding to the player and/or audience than a 
failed attempt, or an attempt that hits a lower percentage of notes. Admittedly, this 
might also be the case when game produced unpredictability is still relatively high. 
However, my point is that once a player reaches the level of manipulation as 
opposed to interaction, her focus will typically be more on the performative aspects 
than it was when levels of game produced unpredictability were high. In sum, the 
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more familiar a player becomes with the game’s responses to their input, more 
attention will be drawn to the effect the player’s choices have in contributing to the 
aesthetic experience of the playthrough.  
Section IV: Types of Unpredictability and Aesthetic Change 
Thus far I have focused on showing how changes in the degree of source 
specific unpredictability cause certain aesthetic features to be more prominent in a 
playthrough. A similar argument can be made for changes in the type or source of 
unpredictability. As game-produced unpredictability gives way to player-produced 
unpredictability, we once again see certain aesthetic features associated with player 
performance come to the forefront of the gaming experience. To illustrate, I will 
turn attention to multi-player games and discuss how shifts in the source of 
unpredictability facilitate change in the overall aesthetic experience of gameplay. In 
these cases, the game acts as more of a conduit through which agent-to-agent 
interaction takes place. While game produced-unpredictability is still noticeable, 
player-produced unpredictability plays the dominant role in the interaction. First, 
take the popular fighting game Super Smash Brothers Brawl (2008), in which up to 
four players are pitted against one another.33 Players can select from a list of 36 
characters, each with his or her own unique set of moves and attacks. The objective 
of the game is to inflict a high percentage of damage on your opponent with various 
attacks, with the ultimate goal of knocking them off the stage. The higher the 
                                                 




damage percentage a player’s character suffers, the more likely he or she is to be 
knocked off the stage.   
Initially, Brawl incorporates game-produced unpredictability in ways 
similar to those found in Guitar Hero. Where Guitar Hero uses a variety of songs 
and various difficulty levels to keep unpredictability at a high level¸ Brawl does the 
same with the variety of characters, stages and difficulty settings a player may 
choose from. Although the control scheme is set up the same way for each 
character, the specific moves mapped on to each button are unique to every 
character. That is, even though every character has both basic and special attacks, 
each attack is different depending on which character is chosen. For example, if the 
player chooses to fight as Mario from the Super Mario Bros series (1985), then her 
standard special attack is to shoot a fireball at opponents. If the player chooses to 
fight as Link from the Legend of Zelda series (1986), then her standard special 
attack is to shoot an arrow at opponents: yet both attacks require the same button 
combination. The control scheme makes it easy for a player to learn the basics of 
Brawl. However, given the large list of characters and their unique corresponding 
move set, mastering the game proves challenging. Even if a player decides to use 
only one or two of the available characters, the intricacies involved with each 
character’s move set require a significant amount of time to figure out how to fully 
utilize a character. There is a great deal of character exploration available in Brawl¸ 




In addition to the character list, Brawl gives the player an option to choose 
from several different stages on which to battle. Each stage is also unique and has 
the potential to affect the gameplay in several different ways. Some stages are 
relatively simple, consisting of a platform on which to battle and not much else. 
Others are more complex and may even include elements that have a direct impact 
on the fight. For instance, some stages are designed to inflict damage on characters 
at random times. Others may randomize the control scheme, making it so that 
pressing forward on the controller moves the character backward, pressing down 
moves the character up, and so forth. Coupled with the variety of characters, the 
stages themselves add an element of game produced unpredictability to Brawl. 
Lastly, when playing in single player mode, a player is allowed to choose 
computer-controlled opponents at various difficulty settings to fight against. This 
adds to game-produced unpredictability in at least two ways. First, with difficulty 
settings ranging from one (easiest) to nine (hardest), a player is faced with different 
computer-generated responses to her inputs. A computer-controlled character at 
level one is going to behave and respond differently than a computer-controlled 
character at level nine. This adds a good deal of unpredictability to the initial 
single-player experience. Secondly, each computer-controlled character has 
behavioral peculiarities that are independent of the level of difficulty that is chosen. 
For instance, a slower, stronger character will have a different fighting style than a 
faster, weaker character when controlled by the computer. Because there are so 
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many combinations of players, opponents, stages and difficulty levels, game-
produced unpredictability is virtually impossible to eliminate.   
Admittedly, Brawl successfully incorporates several features to keep game-
produced unpredictability at a high level throughout the single player experience. 
However, as with the other examples discussed thus far, if one spends enough time 
playing Brawl, the level of game-produced unpredictability inevitably diminishes. 
In addition, unlike single-player games like BioShock, the availability of a rich 
multiplayer experience provides the opportunity for interactivity to remain at a 
relatively high level. In multiplayer modes, when game-produced unpredictability 
has reached a low level for a player, there remains a high-degree of player-
produced unpredictability. Even if a player is familiar with every character’s move 
list, the style of play the computer uses for each character, and the patterns of the 
stage interference, when playing with human opponents, players are unlikely ever 
to know with any certainty what the other is going to do in a given game situation. 
Players who have mastered Brawl will undoubtedly use a variety of attacks and 
strategies to best their opponents. Part of being a successful Brawl player is 
keeping your opponent guessing how you will go about attacking and defending. In 
multiplayer modes, well-rounded players will typically supply a significant degree 
of player-produced unpredictability. 
As the type of unpredictability shifts from game-produced to player 
produced, the object of interaction for a player also changes; the experience goes 
from being one of agent-to-non-agent interaction to one of agent-to-agent 
 
67 
interaction. In single-player modes of Brawl, where game-produced 
unpredictability provides the majority of opportunity for interactivity, it is the AI of 
the game itself with which a player is primarily interacting. In multiplayer modes, 
where player-produced unpredictability provides the bulk of interactivity, it’s the 
players interacting with one another, with the game acting more as a conduit for 
player-produced unpredictability and less as an object of interaction.  
As one may have guessed, when game-produced unpredictability 
diminishes, giving rise to player-produced unpredictability and a different object of 
interaction, we again see certain aesthetic features associated with player 
performance become more prominent in the gaming experience. In games like 
Brawl, where players are pitted against one another, there is opportunity to both 
appreciate and evaluate not only your own input, but that of other players as well. 
Once a player has reached a point where game-produced unpredictability and 
agent-to-non-agent interactivity are minimal, there is less interest in what the game 
brings to the overall experience and more interest in what the player(s) themselves 
are bringing to the experience. Aesthetically, diversity among moves and combos a 
player performs takes a more prominent role.34 Initially, players unfamiliar with the 
game mechanics and character moves may rely on the repetitive use of one or two 
moves to win a match.35 Although this strategy, unaffectionately known in the 
                                                 
34 In videogame jargon, “Combo” refers to any particular set of button combinations that, when 
successfully executed, link together several basic attacks in a specific order, to deal additional 
damage to an opponent. 
35 In these cases, a player can be said to be interacting with both the game and the player she is 
fighting. If she is inexperienced with Brawl, then game-produced unpredictability will still be at a 
high level. Thus, she may be simultaneously experiencing both types of unpredictability, whereas 
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gaming community as “spamming,” can be effective in achieving victory, it 
detracts from the potentially rich aesthetic experience of fighting games. When a 
player spams, she reduces the scope of aesthetically appreciable features that she 
herself could have brought to the gaming experience. Brawl invites the player to 
utilize a great deal of creativity in linking together combos and finding ways to 
defeat her opponent(s). When player-produced unpredictability is more prominent, 
from an aesthetic standpoint, Brawl increasingly becomes a showcase of the skill 
and performance of the players rather than the game designers. If a player chooses 
to spam moves, she limits her own performance, and thus the appreciable aesthetic 
qualities of the experience. This self-imposed limitation is analogous to a painter 
reducing the rich, vibrant color scheme of a sunset to shades of gray when the 
entire color palette is readily available. Spamming moves can diminish the 
aesthetic quality of a gaming experience because it changes the nature of 
interactivity. The more important a player’s choices become in terms of 
interactivity, the more important those choices become regarding aesthetic 
experience. 
 Whereas Brawl primarily pits players against one another, there are co-
operative multiplayer games that showcase a similar change in aesthetic focus 
when game-produced unpredictability is secondary to player-produced 
unpredictability. Take, for instance, the first-person puzzle-platform game Portal 2 
(2011), in which the player must solve a series of puzzles in order to advance. Most 
                                                                                                                                        
her opponent, who may be more familiar with the game mechanics, may be primarily experiencing 
one type of unpredictability. 
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of the puzzles are maze-like, requiring the player to navigate from start to finish 
with various obstacles and enemies placed throughout the levels: there are 
automated turrets; bottomless pits; insurmountable walls; and pits full of lava, 
spikes, or acid that the player must be careful to avoid. The player controls a 
character equipped with a “portal gun” that shoots two portal openings that can 
connect distant surfaces to one another. The player can travel through the openings 
herself, move items required to solve puzzles from one place to another, and 
connect bridges together to complete levels. When playing co-operatively, two 
players, each with their own portal gun, are tasked with working together to solve 
the puzzles required to advance in the game.  
Upon initial playthrough, the experience simultaneously offers both agent-
to-agent interaction and agent-to-non-agent interaction: There is a high degree of 
both game-produced and player-produced unpredictability. Game-produced 
unpredictability is showcased primarily through level and puzzle design. As the 
players advance through the game, the puzzles become increasingly more difficult 
to solve due to the addition of new elements that must be manipulated in order to 
progress. For instance, once the players reach level 16, they are introduced to “light 
surface bridges” that can be extended and connected through portal openings. 
However, upon first exposure to the bridges, it’s unclear how the player is 
supposed to use them. The majority of game-produced unpredictability is 
showcased through a trial and error use of the portal gun with new elements as they 
are introduced. Upon first exposure to levels with newly incorporated game 
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elements, the level can seem disorganized, disarrayed, cluttered and puzzling. Over 
time the player familiarizes herself with the level and how to best use the tools 
available to her to solve the puzzle. During this familiarization, unpredictability 
recedes, and the solution to the puzzle slowly starts to manifest. The more 
proficient the player becomes at using the tools, the more predictable both 
responses to user input and the sequences of states in the game become. Thus, 
agent-to-non-agent interaction changes into manipulation. However, the co-
operative element of the game makes execution of the solution to the puzzle more 
complex than it would be if the game were single-player. No matter how familiar 
each player becomes with a specific level, they must work in synchronization with 
one another to actually accomplish the goal. At times, this proves to be quite 
difficult. In the Halo example discussed earlier, I argued that player fallibility can 
lead to unpredictable sequences of game states even if the ultimate outcome is 
binary (i.e., the player either fails or succeeds). In cooperative games like Portal 2, 
this problem is compounded; both players are fallible, and it takes coordination 
from each to achieve the desired outcome. So, player produced unpredictability still 
plays a large role in sustaining the agent-to-agent interactivity of the playthrough, 
even while the agent-to-non-agent interactivity diminishes. 
Here, the shift in type of unpredictability and interactivity experienced in 
Portal 2 cooperative play accompanies a shift in aesthetic focus as well. The early 
feeling of a disorganized, scattershot level intended to confuse and perplex recedes; 
familiarity gives rise to a new way of looking at the level. The players can see 
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through the initial complexity of the puzzle and recognize the beauty of what often 
becomes a simple solution, much in the same way an experienced mathematician 
might come to see the beauty in a solution to a complicated formula proof. The 
initial impression that the design of the level is chaotic and haphazard gives way to 
a new understanding and appreciation once the solution is recognized; the level 
comes across as calculated and meticulously constructed. Further, the aesthetic 
features associated with player performance are of greater importance. Successfully 
executing a solution affords an opportunity for synchronic stylistic flourish. If both 
players are familiar with the level, then they can attempt to accomplish the goal 
more creatively, much as two basketball players might attempt an alley-oop dunk 
rather than a simple bounce pass. Cooperative play offers a chance for two players 
to join together in creating a mutually satisfying aesthetic experience. 
In closing, I have shown that interactivity needs to be understood and 
defined contextually. In the case of videogames, which afford both agent-to-agent 
and agent-to-non-agent interaction, limited unpredictability plays an important role. 
There seem to be at least two kinds of limited unpredictability in videogames: 
game-produced and player-produced. Depending upon the degree and source of 
unpredictability in a play-through, different aesthetic features will be more 
prominent in the player’s experience. When game-produced unpredictability is 
dominant, aesthetic elements of the narrative and representational content are more 
prominent. As game-produced unpredictability recedes, aesthetic elements of the 
performative aspect of videogame play overtake those of the narrative. My aim 
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here was to explore in a more detailed way the relationship between interactivity 
and aesthetic experience within video games than has been previously done. In my 
efforts, I have attempted to capture how the experience of playing a game evolves 
over time, and why certain games can remain engaging and aesthetically 
worthwhile, even when the player was a strong grasp of the game. Hopefully in 
doing so, I have opened new avenues for discussion about interactivity and 




Chapter 4: Gamers as Performative Instantiators 
Appropriately understanding videogames in the context of their status as 
artworks and how users consume them is no easy task.36 One of the special features 
videogames offer as objects of artistic and aesthetic consideration that sets them 
aside from works in traditional mediums is the kind of relationship fostered 
between the player and the game: one that is necessarily interactive. Although there 
is a general agreement among videogame scholars that videogames are inherently 
interactive, the role gamers play concerning the artistic and aesthetic value 
videogames afford is more controversial. Traditional art forms (painting, sculpture, 
music, film, etc.) typically establish a clear-cut ontological boundary of the roles 
involved in the artist, artwork, and audience relationship (henceforth referred to as 
the AAAR): the artist’s role is one of intentionally creating and presenting an 
object (the work) that is then attended to by the audience in an effort to understand, 
evaluate, appreciate, interpret, etc.37 As inherently interactive objects, videogames 
blur the lines of the AAAR. In this chapter, I explore both positive and negative 
accounts that attempt to define the AAAR in videogames, ultimately agreeing that 
players are not artists, performers, narrators (when applicable), or audiences of a 
work in any traditional sense, nor are videogames traditional works-for-
performances. While several scholars have noted that the interactive nature of 
works like videogames creates a new kind of AAAR, less attention has been paid to 
                                                 
36 I use the term “users” and “players” interchangeably.  
37 This statement is best understood in a general sense, especially regarding what counts as “creating 
and presenting an object,” where “creating” and “object” are broad enough categories to include 
things like conceptual art and found art.  
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the emerging aesthetic experience explicitly fostered through that relationship, 
especially in terms of gameplay;38 to that end, I offer an account of the AAAR with 
videogames that coincides with understanding unpredictability as integral to 
interactivity. Drawing predominately on the works of Dominic McIver Lopes, 
Berys Gaut, Andrew Kania, and Shelby Moser, I contend that players are best 
understood as performative instantiators, generating instances of works by 
interacting with a game through artist sanctioned constitutive rules that both afford 
and restrict the actions players can take. Moreover, actions taken by the player as 
they instantiate the game are aesthetically relevant with respect to the relationship 
they form with the game. That is, the gamer’s actions are aesthetically relevant in a 
similar way a that musician’s actions are aesthetically relevant to a performance of 
a musical work, but this does not mean that gamers perform the videogame work 
like a musician performs a musical work. Understood this way, we are left with two 
mutually dependent, but ontologically distinct objects of aesthetic appreciation: the 
game itself (best understood as a complete game algorithm or CGA) and the 
experience of play that occurs as a result of the relationship fostered between the 
CGA and the player as they engage with it.39 Further, when playing, the aesthetic 
features of both the game and the experience are subject to changes in prominence 
for the player (and/or audience) based on the level and type of interactivity 
                                                 
38 For more on this see Fernandez-Vara 2009; Lopes 2001& 2010; Tavinor 2009 & 2017; Meskin 
and Robson 2016; and Nguyen 2017.  
39 Moser’s CGA is slightly different than the standard definition of a computer algorithm; in 
computer science, an algorithm is understood as a precisely-defined procedure consisting of a 
sequence of unambiguous instructions that allows a computer to solve a problem. Thanks to Dean 
Hougen for pointing this out.  
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involved. My position hopefully clears up some of the ontological confusion 
surrounding videogames as potential artworks and further opens the door for 
developing a more robust account of the aesthetics of games. 
Section I: What the AAAR in Videogames is Not 
A good place to start carving out the AAAR with videogames is to 
eliminate some of the more traditional conceptions of the relationship. To that end, 
Andrew Kania provides some helpful insight. In “Why Gamers are Not 
Performers” (forthcoming 2018), Kania argues against the view that videogames 
are works for performance in the traditional sense, like music is for musicians, 
dance is for dancers, or theater is for actors.40 Kania rightly points out the need to 
“develop new theories in order to understand what goes on when we interact with 
[videogames]” (2018, p.196). I agree that a proper understanding of the ontology of 
videogames and our engagement with them necessitates a different framework than 
we find in more traditional performance works. Furthermore, the position he takes 
nicely sets the stage for developing a positive account of the AAAR with 
videogames by looking more closely at the concept of interactivity and how it 
relates to the player’s role. Spring-boarding from Kania’s position will help 
identify what the object(s) of both artistic and aesthetic appreciation are when it 
comes to playing videogames.  
Kania sets out to refute the claim “that merely in virtue of their interactivity, 
videogames are works for performance and gamers performers” (2018, p.187). He 
                                                 
40 In another work, “Gamers are Not Narrators” (forthcoming 2018 Routledge) Kania adopts a 
similar position to argue that users of videogames are not narrators or co-narrators of a story (if 
there is one) in any robust sense. 
 
76 
begins by first examining two related concepts of interactivity espoused by 
Dominic McIver Lopes (2001 and 2010) and Berys Gaut (2010). He ultimately 
concludes that Gaut “captures the essence of interactivity better than Lopes” (2018, 
p.189). Kania comes to this conclusion as a result of agreeing with Gaut’s criticism 
that Lopes’ account is overly inclusive. Lopes defines a work of art as interactive 
“to the degree that the actions of its users help generate its display (in prescribed 
ways)” (2018, p.188). Gaut contends that on this formulation, works in traditional 
arts such as theatre and musical performances are inappropriately categorized as 
interactive, since the users (the performers of the work) help generate the works’ 
displays by following the prescriptions of scripts and scores, respectively (2018, 
p.188). Kania then points out that Gaut’s strategy for solving this problem is 
superior to Lopes’.  
Although both Lopes and Gaut clarify the role of the user, Gaut stipulates 
that in interactive works there is an essential combination of roles between the user 
and the audience; audiences of interactive works simultaneously play the role of 
users by instantiating the work itself (Kania 2018, p.188). Traditional theatrical and 
musical performances involve distinct roles for audience and users, whereas 
interactive works do not. Although Lopes acknowledges this, he does not see it as a 
necessary component of interactive works, which is why Kania ultimately favors 
Gaut’s refinement of the user’s role to avoid construing works in the performing 
arts as interactive. But Gaut argues that by accepting this refinement, we are also 
accepting an implication that audience members take on the role of performers 
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when playing videogames, in so far as they instantiate the work much as actors and 
musicians instantiate scripts and scores. Thus, videogame users are also performers 
of the work. Kania denies this implication because accepting it necessitates that 
other traditional works of art are wrongly categorized as performance-works; for 
instance, sculptors casting from molds are instantiating their works, but this act 
should not be considered a performance of a work (Kania 2018, p.189). His 
strategy for rejecting this implication relies on explaining why sculptures are not 
the right kind of works to be thought of as works-for-performance. Kania 
accomplishes this by endorsing an account of the role of a work-performer offered 
by Lopes that distinguishes gameplay from work-performance (2018, p.189). 
Essentially, Lopes argues that a work-performance requires that the performer 
know what features a display of the work-for-performance must have in order for it 
be a display of that work. Not only do gamers typically lack the knowledge of the 
features of a game must have in order to be a proper display of that work, Kania 
justifiably points out the complexity of contemporary videogames makes it the case 
that no one (including game designers) knows all the necessary features of a proper 
playing/display of a game (2018, p.190).  
Kania also gives two highly intuitive reasons to think that the usual 
playthroughs of videogames are not work-performances. He first claims that 
paradigm performances are communicative, in so far as performers and audiences 
are typically distinct in their respective roles (Kania 2018, p.193). To say that a 
user is self-communicating when playing a videogame is unusual at best, and as 
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Kania states “it casts doubt on the possibility of a performance art that is essentially 
self-directed, as an interactive performance art would have to be” (2018, p.193).  
Second, Kania contends that, unlike traditional performances, gameplay is not a 
candidate for any kind of robust performative interpretation of a work: 
Though one might talk of a gamer’s mastery of a particular video game or 
the brilliance of her choices and strategy in navigating the game, it is not 
common to talk of the interpretation of a game communicated through, or 
implicit in, a given playthrough…. [N]either gamers nor those who follow 
other gamers commonly conceive of their gameplay as an act of 
communicating a particular conception of the game they are playing, that is, 
as embodying an interpretation….none of this makes it impossible for the 
gamer to provide an interpretation of the game to herself (or to others) by 
playing it, but it does suggest that the idea that typical video games are 
designed for the gamer to play such an interpretive role is implausible. 
(2018, p.193) 
 
In traditional performance mediums like theater, cinema and music, the performers 
are typically granted some degree of interpretative freedom when they help 
instantiate respective works. Take, for example, The Joker, a recurring villain in the 
DC Comics Batman universe. Batman narratives are told in multiple mediums, 
including comics, graphic novels, cinema, television and videogames. 
Unsurprisingly, several different film actors have played the Joker, each with their 
own interpretation of the character. Jack Nicholson’s Joker in the 1989 film 
Batman is more comical and outlandish than Heath Ledger’s Joker in The Dark 
Knight (2008), who was portrayed as a sinister sociopath, establishing an overall 
darker tone to the work itself. In most narrative driven videogames, character traits 
that may affect the narrative are firmly established, offering little to no room for the 
player to embody their own interpretation of the work as a whole. 
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Additionally, Kania argues that even an expert well-versed in the features of 
a playthrough of a game is not executing a performance of a work, but rather 
performing in producing an instance of an artwork (2018, p.193). So the actions 
taken by the expert gamer are not necessarily part of the performance of the work 
(the videogame itself), but are auxiliary “performances.” He likens this to what is 
occurring with the videos of Picasso painting on glass: what is captured in the 
video is a performance that may be entertaining and aesthetically appreciable, but it 
is not a performance of the artwork understood as a painting. In emphasizing this 
point as it relates to performing gamers, Kania claims that “similarly, there is no 
role for a performer to play prescribed by most videogames” (2018, p.193-4). That 
is, the role that is prescribed by most videogames for their users may give rise to 
performative aspects based on player skill and execution, but this does not mean 
that their actions constitute a performance of the artwork. 
The last case Kania considers is expert or exemplary playings of 
videogames. Relying on David Davies’ terminology, the contention here is that 
exemplary playings of games are works in their own right, or performance-works 
as opposed to works-for-performance. Kania is willing to entertain the idea that 
such playings might be performance-works, perhaps in the same way pure 
improvisational music pieces are: 
But could not a playthrough qualify as a performance-work on its own 
merits, as it were, independent of the ontological status of the game itself? 
Many have argued, for instance, that “pure” improvisations, such as Keith 
Jarrett’s Köln Concert, are works of art in their own right, despite being 
performances that are not of any preexisting (or indeed reinstantiable work. 
Could an expert playthrough be just such a work of art? (2018, p.194) 
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Even if accept this possibility, he contends that such an understanding is 
uninformative when it comes to the ontology of videogames. Furthermore, he 
argues that “the gamer’s performance relies on interacting in prescribed ways with 
a highly structured pre-existing artifact—the videogame” (2018, p.194-5). Thus, 
expert playings of games fundamentally differ from pure improvisations in a way 
that may disqualify them from being performance-works. Before moving on, it’s 
worth repeating that in denying that the performing gamer is engaged in a 
performance of the work of the videogame, Kania claims “that there is no role for 
performer prescribed by (the designers of) typical video games” (2018, p.192). 
However, he clearly seems to think there is some prescribed role for a gamer to fill 
when they play a videogame. Clearly defining that prescribed role is at least part of 
my objective in this chapter.  
Overall, I agree with Kania that attempting to understand the artistic 
status/value of videogames using existing frameworks and theories developed for 
more well-established mediums often leads us astray. Specifically, he’s convinced 
me that 
video games are not works for performance because they are not created 
with a prescribed role for a work-performer to play, and typical gameplay 
differs significantly from paradigmatic work-performance. Thus, even if she 
may perform in playing the game, the player cannot give a performance of 
the game any more than one can give a performance of a painting, novel, or 
other nonperformance artwork. There may be exceptional video-game 
playthroughs that are performance-works in their own right, but this does 
not show that the games being played in such cases are works for 
performance. (2018, p.196) 
To think of videogames as works for performance or their instances as 
performances of a work is misguided. But Kania’s efforts offer the beginnings of a 
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potential positive account of what is going on when we interact with videogames 
by calling for a closer look at interactivity and how it functions in gameplay; a call 
that will be answered in section two.  
 While Kania concludes that gamers are not performers, nor are videogames 
works for performance, others have suggested that gamers might be understood as 
co-authors or co-creators of a work. Since videogames necessitate that the audience 
play a direct role in creating instances of a work, it may be helpful to think of them 
as collaborative authors who help define the work’s meaning when they instantiate 
particular instances. In “Ontology and Aesthetics of Digital Art” (2008), Paul 
Crowther defends a collective authorship view. With respect to traditional visual 
arts, Crowther duly notes that the audience may reposition themselves with respect 
to the work, allowing for alternative viewpoints, “[b]ut the audience is not called 
upon to engage with the work in a way that alters its existing physical and virtual 
structure by virtue of such repositioning” (2008, p.165). With digital imagery, 
Crowther argues that “significant modifications to the original program can be 
performed, in principle, wherever and whenever it is realized using the apparatus 
through which it is realized” (2008, p.165).  Thus, Crowther concludes that the 
audience of a digital work function as “an active participant in the generation of the 
work, rather than passive observer” (2008, p.165-6). He grounds this conclusion on 
the inherently interactive nature of digital art. Crowther gives five main vectors, or 
domains of interactivity as they relate to digital art, but when it comes to 
videogames the last two he mentions are most important:  
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4) By voluntary interface where the user navigates a program or exercises 
choices that are reciprocated through the computer’s opening up new 
creative possibilities of interface in response to them. 
5) User-transcendent interface—where the user instigates and guides a 
program that is able to then develop at various levels of autonomy in 
formulating and projecting visual configurations. (2008, p.165) 
Most videogames can be understood as operating in at least one of the vectors 
mentioned above. Designers create digital game spaces that are navigated and 
explored by players, and the space itself can change based on the choices made by 
the players. Crowther seems to recognize this while speaking about the potential for 
user-based development of digital works. “Earlier on I stressed the importance of 
the interactive dimension of digital art. In its navigational forms, this means the 
viewer or user of a program can explore and extend its scope on the base of choice 
and (in the case of games) an element of skill (2008, p.167).41 He goes on to 
suggest that as digital technology advances, navigable digital works may call for 
new understandings of authorship: “visual idioms may emerge where the virtuoso 
interpreter takes on something of the same significance as the creator of the work” 
(2008, p.168). In this sense, Crowther seems to be considering digital works like 
videogames as performance-works, where player actions are just as artistically and 
aesthetically relevant as the features of the game itself. Addressing virtual reality as 
a navigational form of digital art, Crowther suggests: 
it is easy to conceive of programs where it is not the elicited VR 
environment that is important, so much as the use to which the immersant 
puts it. (In this respect, for example, consider how a program attuned to 
nuances of movement might be realized by an immersant trained to 
professional ballet standards.) (2008, p.168) 
                                                 
41 Emphasis mine 
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At the very least, Crowther’s position implies that users of digital works are 
integral to producing instances, or tokens, of a work type. But he takes one step 
further, attributing a sense of authorial control to users, citing the inherently open-
ended, interactive nature digital art embodies: “It may be that the work grows far 
beyond [the basic parameters established by the original creative individual or 
team], taking on a new identity on the basis of how it is realized by new 
generations of users” (2008, p.168).  Crowther offers little in terms of how much 
authorial control users have over digital works, but it seems plausible that it would 
depend on the degree of navigable freedom afforded to users within the work/game 
space. So an open-ended sandbox game like MineCraft (2009) seems to relinquish 
a significant amount of authorial control to its users, whereas games like Tetris 
(1984) are more limiting in this regard. That is, MineCraft gives players more 
navigational freedom regarding their choices within the digital gamespace than 
Tetris does.  Crowther concludes by taking note of the distinct ontology his account 
accompanies:  
Not being tied to existence in one place and time, and in many cases, being 
navigable or having evolutionary potential is something with intrinsic 
fascination. One the one hand, the work is disembodied in terms of parallels 
with traditional art “objects,” but at the same time the fact that it can be 
realized in times and places determined by the user means that it has an 
intimacy and special status through being realizable very much in one’s 
own personal space. It is embodied as the user wills….” (2008, p.169) 
Crowther’s position leaves us understanding the AAAR with videogames as a 
hybrid relationship, where the artist(s) and audience work collectively together to 
establish the identity of the artwork. 
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The collective authorship view is also taken by Annika Waern in her 2012 
article “Framing Games,” albeit for subtly different reasons. Waern’s primary goal 
is to establish a working definition of games to bridge the gap between digital and 
non-digital game studies (2012, p.1). For my purposes, the details of Waern’s 
argument are less important than her conclusion: “A game is a (designed or 
emerging) system of rules, goals and opposition, which has as its primary purpose 
to allow people to engage with it for paratelic reasons, while agreeing that the 
actions performed are re-signified” (2012, p.11). Unpacking Waern’s definition 
reveals why her account endorses a collective authorship ontology. First, Waern 
seems to outline what it is to play a game in addition to defining what a game is. 
The first half of her definition lays out what a game is as an object: a constructed 
system designed for people to engage with it purely for the sake of the engagement 
itself and not for some extrinsic goal (this is implied by the mention of ‘paratelic 
reasons’). The second half of the definition speaks to the kind of activity players 
must take part in when they interact with the system. In this regard, Waern’s 
definition aligns with the Suitsian conception of gameplay, requiring players to 
adopt a lusory attitude, whereby they tacitly agree to act in accordance with the 
rules of the system solely because it makes possible the activity itself (Suits 2014, 
p.55). The last part of Waern’s definition may be the most crucial in understanding 
why her view endorses collective authorship; actions performed during play are re-
signified. Waern adopts Gregory Bateson’s understanding of resignification: 
The second requirement that I would put on play is thus that actions are re-
signified. As Bateson describes it, this creates a double-layered meaning of 
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actions. Firstly, the meaning of an action is different from outside of the 
play situation…But at the same time, this meaning is ‘not real’; it stands for 
a real action, but it does not mean what the action it stands for means. 
(2012, p.6) 
Understanding actions as being re-signified in play is intuitively satisfying, as few 
would contend that combat in a game like Sea of Thieves (2018) is “real combat.” 
Waern uses the videogame Counter Strike (2000) to illustrate resignification:  
Counter Strike lets a key press represent firing a gun. Firstly, the action 
itself is not “contrary to real” - it is a real key press. Through the game 
simulation, it is given a representational meaning as a kill, and this 
representation is fictional (as nobody actually dies). But the fictional 
meaning is rendered moot, as the key press has another and more important 
meaning as a way of scoring. This meaning is not simulated by the game 
but created by it: when you manage to press the key in the right way, you 
increase the score for your team. (2012, p.7) 
At this point, it’s clear why Waern’s account is best understood as endorsing 
collective authorship: 
If we accept that games exist to be played, this influences how we 
understand their meaning. The meaning of games is not created by the game 
designer, and nor is it created by the human player in playing the game. It 
lives in between, emerges through play and is structured by design. (2012, 
p.12) 
 Since games are meant to be played (or engaged in for paratelic reasons) and the 
meaning of a user’s actions is re-signified within the context of the game, then the 
overall meaning of the work is determined by the system itself and the actions 
taken by the user. Meaning is created through the relationship formed between the 
user(s) and the system; with this claim it’s important to remember that Waern is 
referring to the meaning of a game as a whole, and not just it’s narrative or 
representational content. Presumably, the degree to which the meaning of a 
videogame is established by the actions taken by the player corresponds with the 
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level that those actions are re-signified within the context of the game space. 
Understood from Waern’s position, it may be case that the meaning of most 
videogames qua games is established largely by the pre-existing system since the 
system itself often contains robust representational content, but that meaning 
emerges through play, or the actions taken by the user. So while Crowther contends 
that users are co-authors of a work because their choices help determine features 
that establish an overall identity of the work, Waern’s position holds that users are 
co-authors because the meaning of the work can’t be established without taking 
into account the actions of the user. Before moving on, it’s important to recognize 
that I offer both Crowther’s and Waern’s view as examples of positive accounts of 
how we might understand the AAAR in videogames. My efforts are not exhaustive 
but intended to highlight attempts at understanding how the interactive nature of 
videogames challenges the traditional AAAR.  
 While the collective authorship view seems tenable, in A Philosophy of 
Computer Art (2010), Lopes argues that it rests on a mistaken ontological 
supposition: a failure to distinguish displays of a work from the work itself. This 
error occurs because in traditional visual mediums, the work and the display of the 
work are often the identitical; Van Gogh’s The Starry Night qua artwork is 
ontologically the same as Van Gogh’s The Starry Night qua display. Although 
mostly visual, computer art, Lopes argues, is ontologically closer to musical works, 
where the work is repeatable across time and space (2010, p.56-9). So when we 
attend to computer art there are two closely related, but ontologically distinct 
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objects of appreciation: the work itself (perhaps best understood as a computer 
algorithm) and an instance, or display of the work. But since audiences (users) of 
computer art help instantiate displays of a work by interacting with it, “the question 
is whether users also play the role of computer artist by generating its varying 
displays” (2010, p.75). For Lopes, the answer is obviously no: 
I may intend to generate a display of the work through my actions; but the 
work isn’t the same as its display and an intention to generate a display isn’t 
an intention to make the work. Moreover, the work would have exactly the 
same features no matter what I do to generate its display. While that display 
wouldn’t have the same features were it not for how I act, the work, once 
again, isn’t the same as the display I generate. Nothing I do creates the 
computational process or physical apparatus, so nothing I do creates the 
work. (2010, p.75) 
If we apply Lopes’ proposed ontological framework to Crowther and Waern’s 
position, the work itself isn’t under any sort of user generated authorial control. 
Computer art necessitates that tokens, instances, or displays of a particular work are 
only realizable by interacting with the work itself, but that doesn’t mean that 
audiences take on the role of author or co-author of the work when they interact 
with it. For Crowther, this would mean that audiences play a central role in 
establishing the features of a specific display of a work, but not the features of the 
work itself. And for Waern, it means that audiences help give meaning to a specific 
display of a work, but not the work as a whole. Either way, Lopes’ contention 
preserves a more traditional understanding of the AAAR with respect to computer 
art and videogames, one similar to that of the performing arts. Through the 
combined efforts of Kania and Lopes, it’s made clear that videogames test the 
boundaries of traditional conceptions of the AAAR, and that the role of the player 
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cannot be reduced to more conventional ones, like that of a performer, narrator, or 
author. However, there are a few ideas from the positions discussed above that are 
useful for constructing a positive account of the AAAR with videogames.  
Section II: What the AAAR is in Videogames 
 There is some common ground shared among Crowther, Kania, Lopes and 
Waern. At a minimum, they all agree that videogames are ontological multiples. 
That is, they are types whose tokens are instantiated by users who interact with a 
computer algorithm in a way prescribed, both implicitly and explicitly, by the 
creators of the algorithm. An appropriate understanding of the AAAR with 
videogames can be built on this minimalistic groundwork. A good place to start is 
with a proper understanding of what videogames, understood as objects of artistic 
and aesthetic interest, are. To that end, Shelby Moser offers an intuitively 
convincing position in her work, “Videogame Ontology, Constitutive Rules, and 
Algorithms” (2018). 
Moser argues for an algorithmic ontology of videogames, similar to views 
held by Lopes (2001) and Tavinor (2011) (2018, p.45). However, her account of a 
videogame algorithm is the most explanatorily robust and detailed. She begins by 
adopting a Suitsian framework, using his understanding of constitutive rules as 
individuation conditions for games in general (2018, p.42-5).42 Afterward, she 
endorses Lopes’ definition of an algorithm to argue that a videogame’s algorithm is 
ontologically essential: 
                                                 
42 For a more detailed explanation of Suits’ account see the “Appreciating Videogames” chapter.  
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For his account of interactive art (of which videogames might be a subset), 
Lopes defines an algorithm as the work’s set of rules. Further on, he 
clarifies that “the algorithm just is the function that maps any one state of an 
interaction-instance onto the next state, given an interactor’s gesture and the 
sequence of previous states” (2001: 76). Lopes suggests that the algorithm 
relates to an ontology in a direct way because, like the constitutive rules, it 
helps us to individuate one work from another. (2018, 45)43 
Moser then tidies up the definition by carefully distinguishing between a 
videogame’s algorithm and code, explaining why the code does not contribute to a 
videogame’s identity: 
the programming code of a videogame is necessary for gameplay because it 
translates the algorithm into a format that is readable and executable by the 
hardware, but the programming code’s changeability from one device to 
another means that the specific code does not contribute towards the 
ontology of videogames.  (2018, p.47) 
In other words, because videogame algorithms can be implemented using a variety 
of coding languages on different hardware and using different software, the 
programming code is not ontologically essential to the work. Moser is quick to 
point out that “although the code is not relevant for an algorithmic account of 
videogame ontology, this should by no means suggest that the code is altogether 
unimportant or uninteresting from an aesthetic point of view” (2018, p.47). 
Aesthetic features of a display of a videogame work may be contingent on things 
like the programming language and hardware used, but individuation conditions for 
the work itself should refer to the stable algorithm. 
 Moser makes one last addendum to her algorithmic ontology, responding to 
a potential criticism that claims game algorithms are too simple (a mere set of 
                                                 
43 Moser also accepts Lopes’ argument that provenance of a work matters too, so that if it happens 
that two algorithms are the same, they can be individuated by their origin (p.46). 
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rules) or too vague (lacking a prescription for appreciation). She cautions that we 
ought to think of videogame algorithms as “complete game algorithms” or CGAs 
(2018, p.43). A CGA, Moser contends, “contains information that extends beyond 
the rules and states of play…to include prescriptions for things such as features of 
the sprites and characters, expressions, colors, background textures, music, text, 
animations, mood lighting, narrative, and other assets” (2018, p.50). Understood 
this way, we can trace potential aesthetically relevant features of the work back to 
the CGA, thereby eliminating the worry that the algorithm is too ontologically 
simple or vague to individuate works.  
 Before closing, Moser addresses two hard cases that may give pause to 
endorsing a CGA ontology. The first is videogame mods, whereby a player can 
change features of a game by directly changing the game’s code. Mods can be as 
simple as enhancing textures of the in-game environment, or may involve more 
drastic changes, like rendering the zombies in Left 4 Dead (2008) to look like 
Teletubbies or increasing the damage per second inflicted by a specific weapon.44 
Moser contends that, in certain cases, modding games may change the constitutive 
rules of the game (2018, p.53). The second hard case is more common; videogames 
often allow the player to control the level of difficulty, sometimes in the middle of 
play. If we follow a Suitsian approach, changes in difficulty result in changing the 
constitutive rules of a game, so it becomes a different game.  
                                                 
44 If you’re interested in Teletubby mods: 
https://steamcommunity.com/sharedfiles/filedetails/?id=352606721. Further, if the mods are purely 
cosmetic and don’t affect what are to be considered the constitutive rules of the game, then they 
don’t change the identity of the game.  
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In dealing with both cases, Moser stays committed to her Suitsian position. 
Concerning mods that change the constitutive rules, she admits that users might be 
playing different games, but they are still engaging with the same work qua CGA.45 
A CGA will both afford and restrict the kinds of mods that are compatible with any 
given videogame, but the mods themselves do not alter the CGA, even if they may 
change the constitutive rules of gameplay (2018, pp.53-4). The same holds true 
when difficulty settings are changed. The ways in which a player might change the 
difficulties of the game are built into the CGA: “The algorithm consists of the 
potential constitutive rules that a work can have, but when we change the game 
settings, the constitutive rules of that particular display will differ from the other 
display(s)” (2018, p.56). For these reasons, Moser believes “both the mod examples 
and the difficulty modes presented above are of the same work and different 
games” (2018, p.55).  
At first glance it may seem that Moser’s final move in offering different 
identity conditions for the work and the game leaves us with a rather messy 
ontology. At the very least, it seems counter-intuitive to claim that a player who 
changes the difficulty settings while playing a videogame thereby starts playing a 
different game. However, there are a few ways of deflating this problem. First, in 
cases where players play a game on the same difficulty settings multiple times (or 
generate displays of the CGA multiple times), even those instances will likely 
                                                 
45 Although somewhat obvious, it should be noted that if players make any changes to the CGA 
itself, then the work is no longer the same. 
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contain different, aesthetically relevant features. Minimally, we’re okay with 
individuating those instances of the work as distinct tokens of the same work type.  
Further, it may turn out that a certain constitutive rule or set of rules written 
into the CGA are never actualized, or acted on, during one instance, but are in 
another. This is especially true of videogames that rely on random number 
generator algorithms to create a sense of unpredictability while playing. For 
example, let’s say I play two matches of MarioKart 8 (2014) with a random course 
selection.  If one match is on the Hyrule Circuit racetrack and the other is on 
Rainbow Road, they will have different constitutive rules based on the portion of 
the CGA that each track is programmed in accordance with. And its already 
common practice to refer to different modes of a game, so it doesn’t seem like a 
reach to realign the conversation into one about CGAs and instances, or displays of 
CGAs. Take the MarioKart example again; a player may choose between playing 
in battle mode, or in time trial mode. In battle mode, players are tasked with 
popping balloons floating above other drivers’ vehicles using a variety of items as 
weapons. The player who collects the most points by popping the most balloons 
and avoids having their balloons popped by other players in the allotted time wins 
the match. In time trial mode, players compete against themselves by trying to 
complete the course as fast as they can, in an effort to break personal records. There 
are no other drivers on the course, so most of the items picked up have no causal 
efficacy even if they are used, which means that certain sets of constitutive rules 
aren’t applicable in time trial mode that are in battle mode. For a Suitsian, these 
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modes would be considered entirely different games. But they would still be 
instances, or tokens, of the same videogame, understood as a CGA.  
Finally, it’s worth recalling the depth and detail of Moser’s CGA concept: 
“The CGA specifies this degree of variance of the rules, the perceptual properties, 
and potentially the artistic properties of a videogame” (2018, p.43). Given Moser’s 
conception of the CGA, the Suitsian individuation conditions for games in general 
no longer do any heavy metaphysical lifting for understanding the individuation 
conditions for videogames, and they don’t need to. What’s the payoff of using 
Suitsian conditions to individuate and refer to different “games” if we can just as 
easily talk about videogames specifically in terms of multiple instances of a CGA? 
If we accept videogames as artworks, realizing that they are CGAs and can be 
multiply instanced, we have all the tools needed to understand the ontology of 
videogames and have meaningful conversations about how that ontology affects 
their artistic and aesthetic potential. Overall, Moser’s algorithmic ontology serves 
well to help identify what a videogame is, if it is a work of art.  
Having now established what the artwork is in the AAAR with videogames, 
let’s take a closer look at the artist-audience relationship that is fostered through the 
work itself. First and most obvious, the artist(s) are the individual(s) who 
(co)design, (co)create, and (co)author all of the properties and features of the CGA. 
In creating the CGA, artists communicate explicitly and implicitly to the audience 
what the prescribed way(s) of engaging with the work are.46 Since CGAs are 
                                                 
46 For more on the ways in which artists might sanction appropriate ways of engaging with a work, 
see Irvin (2005). 
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instantiated as games, users are explicitly prescribed to play the game; they must 
adopt a lusory attitude by complying with the constitutive rules of the game(s) (that 
is, use lusory means) to accomplish prelusory goals. Moreover, players are 
implicitly asked to follow rules of skill, understood in a Suitsian framework (more 
on this in section III). But it’s important to note that following rules of skill is not 
necessary for appropriately instancing the work itself; only following the 
constitutive rules relevant to that particular instance of the CGA is required.  
At this point, all the building blocks needed to articulate the AAAR in 
videogames are in place: Artist(s) (co)design, (co)create, and (co)author a CGA, 
and in doing so prescribe/sanction a method of interactive engagement for players, 
both explicitly—through constitutive rules, or game mechanics—and implicitly—
through rules of skill. When players appropriately engage with the CGA, they take 
on the role of performative instantiators, whose actions are aesthetically relevant to 
a particular instance of the CGA based on their skill. More specifically, when users 
take on the role of performative instantiators by interacting with the CGA,47 they 
form an aesthetically appreciable relationship with the CGA, which leaves two 
ontologically distinct, but mutually dependent objects for aesthetic and artistic 
consideration: the CGA itself and the experience of play fostered through 
relationship between the CGA and the player, where the aesthetically appreciable 
features of the experience are intimately related to and affected by the skill of the 
player, and consequently, the level of interactivity during play.  
                                                 




By situating players as performative instantiators, I hope to call attention to 
the central importance of their own actions in shaping the aesthetic experience of 
play without committing myself to the problems noted in section I by calling 
gamers performers or authors. For the reasons explicated by Kania above, gamers 
do not meet the conditions of traditional performers (2018, pp.192-4). Although 
gamers are not performers, the relationship between the player and the game shares 
some of the same aesthetically appreciable features seen in the more traditional 
performer/work-for-performance relationship. Moreover, in my understanding of 
the AAAR with videogames, the artist’s role in the creation of the work and the 
ontological status of the work itself are similar to what’s found in certain forms of 
cinema, theater, performance poetry, and music. What is distinct is the how 
experience of the work is shaped by the emerging relationship fostered between the 
audience as performative instantiators and the instances of the CGA that they 
directly bring about. While it remains true that we can aesthetically appreciate the 
CGA itself, what’s most intriguing about videogames is that the audience-artwork 
relationship itself becomes aesthetically important in terms of shaping the 
experience of play. The remainder of this chapter lays out this idea in more detail 
and offers a case study illustrating the potential emergence of both positive and 
negative aesthetic qualities of the experience of play fostered through audience-
artwork relationship.  
Section III: The Aesthetics of Performative Instantiation  
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Recall from an earlier chapter that I take interactivity with videogames to be 
mostly an epistemic relationship, since the unpredictability of the CGA’s response 
to user input eventually diminishes as the player becomes more knowledgeable of 
how the game responds to her input. That is, as a player becomes more proficient in 
navigating within the game space and accomplishing in-game goals, the level of 
interactivity decreases, and the engagement becomes closer to a kind of 
manipulation than interaction.48 It’s common among the gaming community to 
speak of “mastering” a game; one way of cashing out this concept is to think of it 
as understanding exactly how a CGA will respond to your input and using that 
knowledge to your benefit as you attempt to accomplish in-game goals.  
A helpful Suitsian parallel can be drawn regarding rules of skill. For Suits, a 
rule of skill “operates, so to speak, within the area circumscribed by the constitutive 
rules” (2014, p.51). Suits’ example of a rule of skill would be “to keep your eye on 
the ball” when you are playing baseball. If you break a rule of skill, or don’t follow 
its prescriptions, you don’t stop playing the game entirely (as you would if you 
were to break a constitutive rule), but you probably fail “to play the game well” 
(2014, p.52). So as a player familiarizes herself with the game, the rules of skill 
associated with that game become more apparent, and by repeatedly attempting to 
follow those rules during play, she masters the game. In most games, rules of skill 
aren’t immediately available or apparent. It usually takes some trial and error as 
you play the game to figure out what rules of skill should be followed in order to 
                                                 
48 This may not be the case with multiplayer games. For a more detailed account, see the chapter on 
interactivity, unpredictability, and aesthetic change.  
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play well.49 Even if a player is aware of the rules of skill, this doesn’t guarantee 
that they will actually be able to follow those rules. For example, a rule of skill in 
basketball might be, “dunk the ball when you are close to the basket, so it cannot be 
blocked by an opponent.” If I can’t jump high enough to dunk a basketball, then I 
can’t follow that particular rule of skill. This might help explain why we enjoy 
watching expert playings of games like basketball; the rules of skill associated with 
the game are such that only a select few people can follow them, so mastery of the 
game seldom occurs. When it comes to videogames, simply by creating the CGA, 
artists implicitly create rules of skill for users by asking them to complete in-game 
tasks.  
 Keeping the notion of rules in skill in mind, let’s refocus on performative 
instantiations. Instances of a CGA are the playings of a game that are defined by 
one of the possible subsets of constitutive rules detailed by the CGA itself. But 
before a CGA is instanced as a game, it exists as a conceptually incomplete system, 
requiring input from a player for the system to be actualized or instanced. When 
users start the input process (or initiate play), they thereby complete the system 
defined by the constitutive rules of that particular instance. In doing so, they 
inevitably start acting in accordance with, or against rules of skill as they set out to 
accomplish in-game goals prescribed by the constitutive rules of that instance. It’s 
important to remember that players cannot help but follow the constitutive rules of 
                                                 
49 You might also come to understand rules of skill through the testimony of others who have 
already mastered the game. The ways in which you discover rules of skill are by no means 




any particular instance, since they are written directly into the CGA itself. When it 
comes to playing the game, an argument could be made that an important variable, 
and thus appreciable feature (adopting a Waltonian view) of any instance is how 
closely the player follows the relevant rules of skill suitable for that particular 
instance while they interact with the CGA. 
Furthermore, the relationship formed with that particular instance of the 
CGA can take on a variety of different aesthetic qualities. For instance, when a 
player successfully executes prescribed in-game goals while following rules of 
skill, there is an emerging aesthetic gestalt of the experience itself, with the CGA 
and player functioning in harmony, as both the challenges afforded by the game 
and the solutions enacted by the player emphasize the elegance and grace of the 
completed system. Of course, such harmonious relationships can only be 
achievable if the CGA includes well-designed game mechanics, with appropriately 
responsive controls and meticulously constructed challenges that offer achievable 
solutions.50 Conversely, if the player fails to follow the appropriate rules of skill in 
that instance, or the CGA is poorly constructed with glitchy game mechanics, 
unresponsive controls, and overly simple or overly difficult challenges, then the 
emerging aesthetic gestalt of the experience fostered by the relationship may take 
on negative qualities: a dissonant relationship is formed between the player and the 
game, accompanied by feelings of imbalance, frustration, haphazardness, banality, 
and clumsiness. Again, it’s important to remember that emerging aesthetic features 
of the experience cultivated through the relationship are dependent both on the 
                                                 
50 See the chapter on appreciating videogames for more detail. 
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CGA system itself and the actions taken by the player.51 Understood this way, the 
actions taken by the player can be proprioceptively evaluated from a performative 
perspective, much in the same way a dancer might evaluate her own instancing of a 
ballet performance.52 It’s also important to note that in any given instance of the 
CGA, the player will likely experience a range of both positive and negative 
aesthetic qualities, because those qualities are dependent on the skillful execution 
of intended actions.53  
An example will help illustrate the kind of aesthetic fluidity a gamer can 
experience as a performative instantiator. Ori and Blind Forest (2015), is a side-
scrolling, 2D puzzle platformer that tasks the player with guiding Ori, a tree spirit, 
through various areas of Nibel, an enchanted forest, in order to restore the 
elemental balance that was upset after a natural disaster. Unanimously praised for 
its graphics, world-building, and gameplay design (Metacritic 2018, online), Ori 
challenges the player in a myriad of ways that gamers well versed in puzzle-
platforming games will recognize. About halfway through the narrative, the player 
must guide Ori through the insides of a giant tree to free the element of water and 
revitalize Nibel. Once the player restores the element, the final task is to navigate 
Ori up to the top of the tree, avoiding the rising water that rapidly fills the trunk. 
Doing so is one of the more challenging sequences in the game, requiring adept, 
                                                 
51 The same can be said for multiplayer videogames as well. Although it may be the case that a more 
complex relationship is formed, one among all the players involved and the game. 
52 For more on proprioceptive aesthetic experiences, see Barbara Montero’s “Proprioception as an 
Aesthetic Sense” (2006). 
53 Another way of understanding why following rules of skill are important is because the player is 
more likely to enter a state of flow when successful. As discussed in the chapter on kitsch gameplay, 
the possibility of entering states of flow may be crucial to creating aesthetic experiences of play of 
the highest quality or kind. 
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well-timed jumps from limb to limb, and precise execution of combat moves to 
simultaneously dispatch enemies and avoid life-threatening obstacles like spiked 
platforms and walls. I’ll sheepishly admit that it took me dozens of attempts before 
I succeeded in guiding Ori to the top, even after I was well acquainted with when 
and where each challenge occurs. But even as I failed in one frustrating attempt 
after another, I was able to recognize the elegance of the challenges created by the 
designers of the CGA because I came to understand what was required of me to 
enact the intended solutions to those challenges. That knowledge of both the 
problems created in the game-space and the possible solutions available to me 
played a crucial role in the phenomenology of my play. With every failed attempt, I 
felt the dissonance between my actions and the game-space; as I slowly started to 
realize what was required of me in order to succeed, each failed attempt 
materialized into an experience of the relationship with the CGA that 
proprioceptively felt clumsy, tragic, frustratingly ugly, and unbalanced because of 
my actions. However, even though my actions were accompanied by negative 
aesthetic features, they were framed that way in part because I was able to 
recognize the potential for a positive experience created by a well-crafted CGA. So 
with each action that was successful in overcoming in-game obstacles by following 
implicit rules of skill, I worked in concert with the CGA to create a synchronized, 
unified relationship, earmarked by positive aesthetic qualities of gracefulness, 
elegance, and harmony. Furthermore, just as the relationship between the player 
and the CGA remains unbalanced and desynchronized in failed attempts, so too 
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remains the elemental imbalance in the fictional forest as Ori fails. The poetic 
juxtaposition of gameplay and narrative only adds to the aesthetic gestalt of the 
play experience.  
Before concluding, there is one caveat worth mentioning: my proposed 
account of the AAAR with videogames and the nature of the potential aesthetic 
experience that is afforded by that relationship does not require that the player 
actually succeed in accomplishing in-game goals. But it does require that the player 
adopt a lusory attitude while playing the game. It’s not necessarily the success or 
payoff of achieving in-game goals that affords the potential for an aesthetic 
experience, but the player’s willingness to engage in play, thereby creating a 
relationship with the CGA through their own actions that’s most important. Further, 
a player might still appreciate the elegance and beauty of the CGA as a system and 
the opportunities it affords the player to engage with it, without actually doing so. 
This leaves open the possibility of appreciating the relationship between the CGA 
and player from an outside audience perspective as well, much as we might 
appreciate expert performances of more traditional works. Admittedly, though, the 
most positive and intrinsically rewarding experiences are probably those where the 
player does succeed in accomplishing in-game goals.  
To conclude, as potential artworks, videogames are distinct in part because 
of the kind of AAAR they provide. The view I propose is less radical than the 
collective authorship accounts of Waern and Crowther, as it preserves a more 
traditional distinction between artist, audience, artwork. It also avoids the problems 
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associated with calling videogames works for performance and gamers performers 
of a work, while simultaneously highlighting how the relationship cultivated 
between the audience and the work plays a crucial role in shaping the aesthetic 
experience of gameplay. With videogames, the audience’s relationship with the 
work itself becomes aesthetically relevant. Understood as performative 
instantiators, a gamer’s actions are integral to the aesthetic gestalt of experience the 
work in a way not seen in traditional mediums. As such, we should look to develop 
positive accounts of the ontology of videogames as artworks by looking more 
closely at the experiences of playing videogames, and in turn use that ontology to 





Chapter 5: An Apology for Videogames 
 Thus far I’ve avoided offering a formal argument claiming that videogames 
can be works of art. My reasoning for this is two-fold: there already are several 
persuasive arguments made in the literature in favor of this view, as noted in 
chapter two, and I also believe serious work can be done to understand both the 
aesthetic nature of videogames and their value regardless of their categorization as 
art. However, this approach still leaves open whether videogames are worth playing 
in terms of their artistic and aesthetic potential. As I see it, the strongest hesitancy 
to understanding videogames as a legitimate artistic medium is that their very 
nature as games disallows the kind of engagement needed for the most worthwhile 
aesthetic experience. It may be the case that videogames are indeed art, but because 
they necessarily involve play, they are closer to kitsch art than to high arts. In this 
chapter, I build a defense against the view that videogames can never afford the 
rich, in-depth aesthetic experiences that the traditional arts offer. In doing so, I first 
lay out the objection that even if videogames are art, they are necessarily one of the 
lowest forms because they are games; as such, they require audiences engaging 
with them to adopt a lusory attitude, which necessarily limits the kind of 
appreciative attitude needed for meaningful aesthetic experiences. My efforts here 
are based on views about the artistic status of videogames inspired by Roger Ebert 
and Brian Moriarty. As a supplement to this objection, I then lay out an account of 
kitsch art, relying primarily on Tomas Kulka’s theory, and apply it to videogames; 
doing so highlights the idea that both representational content and gameplay can be 
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kitsch. I then offer a novel account of kitsch gameplay to better understand the 
potential artistic and aesthetic value of videogames. Lastly, I respond to the 
objections using a Schopenhauerian framework and contending that the role the 
player has in creating her own aesthetic experience is precisely the right kind of 
engagement to lead to a worthwhile, introspective, and enlightening aesthetic 
experience.  
Section I: Pushpin is Not Poetry 
 In popular culture, the debate over the artistic status of videogames gained 
attention when well-known movie critic Roger Ebert drew the ire of gamers by 
defending the claim that videogames can never be art (2010, online). In 2005, Ebert 
reviewed Doom (2005), a film adaptation of the popular first-person shooter 
videogame of the same title. After panning the film, he responded to a handful of 
reader comments where he first denied that videogames could ever be art. But it 
wasn’t until 2010 that Ebert formally condemned the idea. In “Videogames Can 
Never Be Art,” Ebert responds to a TEDx talk on the artistic value of videogames 
given by Kellee Santiago (2010, online). He takes up each of the examples 
Santiago uses to argue that videogames are art and quickly proceeds to dismiss 
them. Yet the crux of Ebert’s argument relies on the conflation of the categorical 
and honorific uses of “art.” For example, look at his comment about Braid, a game 
Santiago refers to as art: “She [Santiago] also admires a story told between the 
levels, which exhibits prose on the level of a wordy fortune cookie” (2010, online). 
He goes on in an equally trivializing tone regarding Flower (2009), another 
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example referred to by Santiago: “Nothing she [Santiago] shows from this game 
seemed of more than decorative interest on the level of a greeting card” (2010, 
online). Afterwards, Ebert reiterates his claim about videogames in general: “No 
one in or out of the field has ever been able to cite a game worthy of comparison 
with the great dramatists, poets, filmmakers, novelists and composers” (2010, 
online). Ebert’s remarks suggest that videogames, as a category, cannot be art 
because no videogame can be considered an artistic masterpiece, and he is skeptical 
that one ever will. Ebert’s argument assumes that if no masterpiece can be created 
in a specific medium, then that medium cannot be an art form. 
A few months after “Videogames Can Never Be Art,” Ebert returned to the 
debate and softened his position. In “Okay, Kids, Play on My Lawn,” Ebert wrote, 
“What I was saying is that video games could not in principle be Art. That was a 
foolish position to take, particularly as it seemed to apply to the entire unseen 
future of games … It is quite possible a game could someday be great Art” (2010, 
online). Ebert rescinded his original conclusion on the grounds that sometime in the 
future a videogame might be considered an artistic masterpiece. Nonetheless, a 
serious problem concerning the aesthetic value of videogames can be pulled from a 
charitable interpretation of Ebert’s position.  
While it’s wrong to think that videogames can never be art in a categorical 
sense, perhaps it is the case that videogames can never offer the aesthetically rich 
experiences the ‘high arts’ do. This is the line of reasoning that Brian Moriarty 
defends in “An Apology for Roger Ebert.” A professor of game design at 
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Worcester Polytechnic Institute, Moriarty has been involved with the gaming 
industry for over 30 years, developing and producing games for LucasArts since 
the 1980’s. Thus Moriarty’s videogame experience and expertise are significantly 
more substantial than Ebert’s, yet he stands by the claim that videogames cannot be 
great art:  
But as much as I admire games like M.U.L.E., Balance of Power, Sim City 
and Civilization, it would never even occur to me to compare them to the 
treasures of world literature, painting or music. And I’m pretty sure the 
authors of these particular games wouldn’t presume to, either. (Moriarty 
2011, online) 
Moriarty goes on to give three related arguments to support his claim that 
videogames can’t be great art. First, he gives a pragmatic argument grounded in the 
idea that the videogame industry is not the appropriate environment to create great 
art.54 He supports this claim by first noting that creating great art requires mastery 
of a medium that necessitates years of practice with the tools used in that particular 
medium. When it comes to videogames, he goes on to say that “the tools and 
technology we work with are, and always have been, slippery” (Moriarty 2011, 
online).  Videogames and the technology used to produce and consume them are in 
a constant state of flux. The relatively brief history of videogames has witnessed 
dramatic advancements in the sophistication of the computing hardware and 
software games utilize. Compare some of the first widely produced games like 
Atari’s Pong (1972) to current titles like Nintendo’s Legend of Zelda: Breath of the 
Wild (2017); in a little over 45 years, the tools used in the design, production, and 
                                                 
54 Although Moriarty presents his arguments in a different order, I address them in order of 
perceived strength and relevance to my own project. 
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exhibition of videogames have evolved to the point that they are hardly 
recognizable. And with the recent advancements in Virtual Reality hardware, the 
videogame landscape is likely facing another revolutionary technological change. 
As an artistic medium, videogames don’t afford the consistency needed for 
designers and producers to master their craft; thus we can’t hope to see great art 
come out of it. Similarly, Moriarty argues that from a business standpoint, 
videogame companies are subject to far too many changes in management and 
personnel to maintain the consistency needed to master their art form:   
Now let’s talk about the business of video games. During the five years I 
worked at Lucasfilm, the management of the games division changed six 
times. Acquisitions, layoffs, delays, cancellations, closing studio doors, 
lawsuits ... you’ve all been there. How can a potential artist hope to 
accumulate any deep practice in this maelstrom? (2011, online) 
 
Although anecdotal, Moriarty’s point represents a more general concern for the 
artistic worthiness of videogames: working in a hyper competitive entertainment 
industry, videogame designers and producers focus on turning a profit rather than 
making great art, and this leads to an unstable working environment that is ill-
suited for mastery of an art form. Take, for instance, the massively popular Call of 
Duty (2003) series. In just 13 years, a dozen titles have been handled by three 
different developing companies and released on over 15 different platforms ranging 
from personal computers to smartphones, utilizing a variety of different game 




 The remaining two arguments Moriarty gives are conceptually closely 
related. He attacks the artistic value of videogames by noting their similarity to 
kitsch art and then challenges the aesthetic value of videogames by claiming that 
their fundamental nature as games rules out the highest aesthetic experience great 
works of art aspire to: the sublime. Both arguments rely on the general idea that, 
from a standpoint of evaluating great art, videogames do not, and, by their very 
nature as games, cannot produce the kind of experience that great artworks give us.  
 The argument that videogames lack serious artistic value requires an 
understanding of kitsch art. To this end, I turn to Tomas Kulka’s Kitsch and Art 
(1996), in which he gives a careful analysis of both the concept of kitsch and its 
value in the artworld.55  Kulka begins by offering a set of three necessary and 
jointly sufficient conditions for an artwork to be kitsch:  
1. Kitsch depicts objects or themes that are highly charged with stock 
emotions. 
2. The objects or themes depicted by kitsch are instantly and effortlessly 
identifiable. 
3. Kitsch does not substantially enrich our associations relating to the 
depicted objects or themes. (1996, pp.37-8) 
 
It’s worth noting that despite being presented as necessary and sufficient 
conditions, Kulka sees his definition as allowing for differing degrees with respect 
to a work being kitsch: “We should remember, however, that kitsch doesn’t form a 
pure, monolithic category with sharp, clear-cut boundaries. There are paintings that 
are more kitschy than others and there are bound to be many borderline cases” 
                                                 
55 Moriarty offers a brief summary Kulka’s position as well. However, referring to Kulka’s own 
writing provides a better understanding of the issues at hand.  
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(1996, p.77). Presumably, the degree to which a work is considered kitsch 
corresponds to the degree to which the content of the work is charged with stock 
emotions and easily identifiable objects and themes.   
A brief explanation of each of the conditions illustrates the reason most 
videogames might be categorized as kitsch art. Kulka’s focus is on visual arts, and 
he notes that works considered kitsch are “charged with stock emotions that 
spontaneously trigger an unreflective emotional response” (1996, p.26). To bring 
out this instantaneous, cursory emotional response, kitsch art deals with content 
that has mass appeal: “[kitsch art] exploits universal subjects such as birth, family, 
love, nostalgia, and so forth, which could, perhaps, be further analyzed in terms of 
Jungian archetypes” (1996, p.27).  Condition one requires that kitsch speaks to its 
audience in a supportive manner, reinforcing fundamental beliefs and common 
emotional platitudes. Condition two establishes the way in which condition one is 
met. As Kulka notes, “the positive response to the depicted object obviously 
depends not only on what is represented but also on how it is represented” (1996, 
p.28). Successful kitsch art doesn’t call for any interpretation of the subject matter; 
trees should be immediately recognizable as trees, a happy person should be 
smiling, and a sad person should be crying and look remorseful. The stock 
emotional responses required from condition one ought to come at zero intellectual 
or interpretative cost to the audience.  Lastly with condition three, Kulka 
establishes what kind of experience audiences have with kitsch art. He argues that a 
mark of great art is that it can “transform the familiar ideas and associations related 
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to the depicted object in various ways. Standard associations can be sharpened, 
amplified, intensified, or altogether transformed” (1996, p.35). When it comes to 
kitsch art, the familiar ideas and associations with the depicted content are taken at 
face value. Kulka goes on to say that “kitsch art does not exploit the artistic 
possibilities of structural elaboration, extension of expressive potentialities, 
elaboration of unique individual features, interpretation and innovation” (1996, 
p.37). Not only should the objects and themes of kitsch art be easily identified, but 
they shouldn’t be left open for interpretation: what you immediately see is what 
you get, and it’s unnecessary to look for underlying implications or draw any 
inferences. Regarding kitsch paintings, Kulka argues that “the picture should be 
totally explicit and one-dimensional; no ambiguities, no hidden meanings” (1996, 
p.37). The content of kitsch art exploits standard and stereotypical themes with 
little room for further analysis; happy is happy, sad is sad, evil is never good, and 
good is never evil.56 Kitsch art reinforces the most common ideas and concepts 
associated with its content. On the other hand, high arts challenge and enhance, 
inviting audiences to go beyond the surface representations and contemplate a 
deeper understanding of what they are experiencing. 
 If we follow Kulka’s definition and apply it to videogames, then it’s no 
surprise that Moriarty argues that videogames lack the artistic value required for 
great art.  Part of what makes the videogame industry financially successful is its 
                                                 
56 Kulka readily admits that what is considered kitsch art is partly dependent on social and cultural 
context. Kitsch artwork functions in methods that are standard and conventional relative to the 
context in which it’s created and observed. As such, what might constitute kitsch art in the present-
day U.S. may have been artistically innovative and challenging in the early 1900’s.  
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mass appeal to a wide variety of audiences. In garnering this appeal, production 
companies and designers seem to purposely make the artistic style of videogames 
kitsch. A game that depicts easily identifiable, stock emotions or themes and 
reinforces the contextual stereotypes associated with those themes is undoubtedly 
going to appeal to a wider audience than its counterpart. Most of the best-selling 
videogames easily seem to fall under the definition of kitsch art. For example, take 
the Super Mario Bros. franchise (1985-2015). It’s one of the most financially 
successful videogame series to date, with over 18 individual titles; the first game in 
the series, Super Mario Bros. (1985), has sold over 40 million copies (Lama 2013, 
online). Released 2006, New Super Mario Bros. has sold over 30 million copies 
(Lama 2013, online). Suffice it to say, Super Mario games have massive appeal. 
And from an artistic standpoint, the games follow a fundamentally basic narrative 
format that aligns with Kulka’s definition of kitsch. In the first game, players 
control Mario, an average man whose day job is as a plumber (as reflected by his 
attire, complete with a red poor boy cap and blue overalls), but who moonlights as 
a hero tasked with saving his beloved girlfriend from the evil King Bowser within 
plumbing pipes that lead to a fantasy land known as Mushroom Kingdom. Mario 
makes full use of stock emotional appeals and themes. The stereotypical plot of the 
unassuming hero needing to save his lady love from the clutches of evil is the basis 
for nearly every Mario game produced. Mario represents the average, everyday 
man with a blue-collar job who is forced to find his inner strength to save the 
woman he loves. Princess Peach is his one true love and always the damsel in 
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distress; she is often depicted as a blonde-haired, blue-eyed, hourglass figure 
wearing a pink evening gown. Bowser is Mario’s archenemy and fits the part of the 
typical villainous ne’er do-well: hailing from the magical Mushroom Kingdom, he 
looks like a cross between a dragon and a turtle, complete with a giant spiked shell, 
sharp claws, and the ability to breathe fire.  
In nearly every iteration of Mario, Bowser kidnaps Princess Peach and 
holds her prisoner in his ominous fortress, complete with fiery death traps and evil 
henchmen. From a narrative standpoint, Mario relies heavily on stock emotions 
associated with the easily identifiable and stereotypical “good vs. evil” motif, 
reinforced by the visual representations of the characters. It’s also steeped in some 
of the worst stock gender stereotypes and hierarchies; through her position in the 
story and her visual representation, Princess Peach is cast as the physically and 
emotionally weak woman, incapable of looking out for herself and entirely 
dependent on the strong, brave man to save her.57 Moreover, it doesn’t ask of its 
audience to think too deeply about the characters or themes in the story: You’re 
there to rescue the Princess from the clutches of evil and live happily ever after.58  
Nothing about the series (or the individual titles) suggests that it’s anything but 
kitsch art (if, in fact, it is art at all).  The Super Mario series represents many 
financially successful games that are proudly kitsch: if the primary goal of most 
videogames is financial success, then making them kitsch is a proven plan. As 
                                                 
57 A strong case could be made that part of the problem with kitsch is that it not only deals in stock 
emotions, but often deals in the worst kind of stock emotions that reinforce discriminatory 
stereotypes based on race, gender, and ethnicity.  
58 That is until Bowser inevitably kidnaps the Princess again: Eighteen times and counting.  
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Moriarty notes, “kitsch is a risk-reduction strategy, time-tested and good for 
business” (2011, online). Yet employing this strategy seems to come at the cost of 
restricting the potential artistic value of the medium; as kitsch, videogames seem 
fundamentally incapable of being great art. 
Lastly, Moriarty argues that the essential nature of videogames as games 
prohibits the kind of aesthetic experience needed for a work to count as sublime art. 
To this end, he endorses an understanding of aesthetic experience and the sublime 
modeled after Arthur Schopenhauer’s thoughts on the subjects. For Schopenhauer, 
aesthetic experience played a central role in relieving us from our own nature 
(Levinson 1998, p.247). Schopenhauer famously held a particularly cynical view 
with respect to human nature, believing that we spend the majority of our time in a 
constant of state of desire, or willing: “Schopenhauer proclaims, my entire inner 
nature is willing—desiring, striving, urging—and all varieties of affect and 
emotion, pleasure and pain, that conduce to or inhibit action” (Levinson 1998, 
p.246). For Schopenhauer, a constant state of desire inevitably leads to a life full of 
suffering; having desire means being dissatisfied with your current state, which is 
in itself suffering.  Although there may be moments of relief, they are brief and 
cyclical, often only leading back to desire. We can, however, escape perpetual 
suffering momentarily through aesthetic experiences of the beautiful and sublime 
(Levinson 1998, p.46). Echoing a Kantian sentiment, Schopenhauer understands 
sublime experiences as transcending the purposeful will, thus breaking the cycle of 
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suffering. Philosopher Sandra Shapshay nicely summarizes Schopenhauer’s 
concept of aesthetic experience:  
In order for the subject to attain such perception, her intellect must cease 
viewing things in the ordinary way—relationally and ultimately in relation 
to one's will—she must “stop considering the Where, When, Why and 
Wherefore of things but simply and exclusively consider the What.” (2012, 
online) 
With this understanding of what is required for a sublime experience, it’s easy to 
see why Moriarty doesn’t think videogames qualify as high art. Playing a 
videogame explicitly requires players to apply their will, not transcend it: “How 
can an activity motivated by decisions, striving, goals and competition, a deliberate 
concentration of the force of Will, be used to transcend Will itself?” (Moriarty 
2011, online). Necessarily interactive, not only do videogames require players to 
make purposeful choices when playing, but they must do so by first adopting a 
lusory attitude.59 A strong case can be made that by adopting a lusory attitude, 
players are no longer able to transcend their own will. As such, they are incapable 
of being in the appropriate appreciative mindset necessary to experience the 
sublime.60 Videogames seem explicitly designed to keep the player focused on 
achieving goals by exercising their own will. Whether it be advancing to the next 
level, finding all the secret items and power-ups, beating your opponent, getting the 
highest possible score, etc., players are constantly aware of their own involvement 
and impact on their gaming experience. Since videogames by their very nature 
                                                 
59 Recall that adopting a lusory attitude is a necessary condition for gameplay according to Bernard 
Suits. As part of adopting this attitude, players tacitly agree to try and accomplish a specific goal 
within the game by less than efficient means, purely for the sake of doing so.  
60 Brock Rough uses a similar strategy to argue that games cannot be art because they require their 
participants to adopt incompatible attitudes: A lusory attitude and an appreciative attitude. “The 
Incompatibility of Games and Artworks” (2017). 
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disallow the kind of experience needed to access the sublime, Moriarty concludes 
that we ought not seek them out for their artistic or aesthetic value.  
If a person is after a deeply enriching aesthetic experience aimed at 
connecting with the sublime, then she shouldn’t bother playing videogames. 
Regardless of the strength of Moriarty’s individual arguments, it’s this general 
sentiment that videogames aren’t worth our time from an artistic and aesthetic 
standpoint that is the most troubling. After all, with finite time and resources, why 
bother actively engaging in a medium that, through its essential nature, makes it 
impossible to achieve most valuable aesthetic experience? Even if videogames are 
art, they have as little artistic and aesthetic value as pushpin does when compared 
to poetry. 
Section II: Addressing the Pragmatic Concerns 
 At first glance, Moriarty’s position represents a formidable problem for 
understanding videogames as offering serious artistic and aesthetic value. Moriarty 
and his ilk may be correct in contending that most videogames on the market do not 
offer the kind of experience necessary to be considered great works of art. But to 
claim that videogames categorically cannot be high art is misguided. In this section, 
I build a defense against the specific arguments given by Moriarty; in doing so, I 
offer direct responses to each of the three arguments explicated in the previous 
section, highlighting examples of videogames that may offer artistic and aesthetic 
experiences of the highest kind. Additionally, I show that similar pragmatic 
concerns have been raised for other mediums, including cinema and painting. Thus, 
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if we accept Moriarty’s arguments and others of a similar kind, there is an unsavory 
implication regarding the artistic and aesthetic value of other, highly regarded art 
mediums. At the very least, a few case studies offered below serve as 
counterexamples.  
To begin, recall the pragmatic concern voiced by Moriarty. Briefly, he 
makes a two-pronged attack that the tools with which videogames are made and the 
industry where they’re created limit their ability to be considered great works. The 
first prong claims that to produce great works of art requires mastery of the tools 
used in that particular medium, and since the tools and technology used to make 
videogames are continually changing, game designers cannot become masters of 
their medium. The general implication that advancement in technology or the basic 
tools used to create other works of art necessarily limits their aesthetic potential is 
weak at best.  Technological advancements have a rich history in several art 
mediums, and not much concern is expressed about such advancements limiting 
potential aesthetic value simply because artists must adjust to new tools.  
 He compares this to the film industry, claiming that, aside from a few 
minor changes when sound was introduced in film, “the basic format, the 
fundamental engineering parameters controlling the design, production, distribution 
and exhibition of movies, remained virtually unchanged for over 115 years” 
(Moriarty, 2011, online). Although not entirely ungrounded, Moriarty’s comparison 
gravely undersells technological advancements in filmmaking: from early cinema 
where color was literally painted on black and white film stock, to the more recent 
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shift away from the standard 35mm film and cameras to digital recording requiring 
no physical film with editing done entirely on computers, film is no stranger to 
technological change. And despite the shake-up in technology and tools used in 
cinema, there is little worry that such advancements will neuter filmmakers’ ability 
to produce great art. Noted film critics Manohla Dargis and A.O. Scott discuss the 
changing cinematic landscape in their article from the New York Times, “Film is 
Dead? Long Live Movies: How Digital is Changing the Nature of Movies.” Scott 
notes that the rapid advancement in cinematic technology has at times been a boon 
to the overall artistic quality of recent films, referencing the aesthetic achievements 
of digital films like 28 Days Later (2002) and Life of Pi (2012): “Image quality 
improved rapidly, and the last decade has seen some striking examples of 
filmmakers exploring and exploiting digital to aesthetic advantage” (Dargis 2012, 
online). Dargis goes on to explain that cinema has always been fundamentally 
linked with changes in the tools used to produce it. “The history of cinema is also a 
history of technological innovations and stylistic variations. New equipment and 
narrative techniques are introduced that can transform the ways movies look and 
sound and can inspire further changes” (Dargis 2012, online). Admittedly, the 
changes in technology and tools are not always optimally utilized to improve the 
artistic or aesthetic quality of film, as Scott is quick to point out:  
I agree that digital has introduced new visual clichés and new ways for 
movies to look crummy. But there have always been a lot of dumb, bad-
looking movies, and it’s a given that most filmmakers (like most musicians, 
artists, writers and humans in whatever line of work) will use emerging 
technologies to perpetuate mediocrity. (Dargis 2012, online) 
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Still, the idea that some might use developing technologies to an artistic fault does 
not support the claim that changes in the tools used to create works limit the 
potential to make great art in a given medium. In fact, the successful employment 
of new technology in creating works of art could be considered a testament to the 
skill of the artist. After all, what is it they say about a craftsman who blames his 
tools? 
When it comes to the second prong of Moriarty’s pragmatic attack, there 
may be more cause for concern. Instability in an industry that’s primarily 
concerned with making a profit leads to some notoriously poor products.  For 
example, consider the much-maligned Superman 64 (1999). Developed for the 
Nintendo 64 and produced by Eric Caen of Titus Software, Superman 64 is 
regarded as one of the worst videogames ever made (GameRankings.com 2016, 
online).61 Critics often cite the clunky, unresponsive controls, tediously repetitive 
objectives, multiple glitches, and poor graphics: 
The game was buggy in every area. It was easy for Superman to get stuck 
on a building, and in later levels, he could go through a wall or even get 
stuck in the floor. Boss fights were little more than button mashing affairs 
where you wailed away with awkward punches, often hitting nothing but 
thin air. (Wong 2015, online) 
The universal pan of Superman 64 traces back to problems during its development: 
problems that illustrate Moriarty’s general concern about lack of stability within the 
gaming industry. In an interview discussing the game, Caen went into detail about 
                                                 
61 Multiple media outlets have compiled lists of the worst games made, and Superman 64 is 
consistently among them. 
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the difficulties he faced with licensing issues and management turnover that 
contributed to the poor quality of the final product: 
“The Warner licensing team was let go only a few days after our deal was 
inked,” Caen said. “The next people in charge hated us the first minute they 
saw us and our project. They believed a major company such as EA Games 
would pay more and create a better product. In every way, they tried to stop 
its development,” he continued. “First, they asked us to change it from an 
action game to a Sim City-like game, where Superman would be like the 
mayor of Metropolis. That was honestly pathetic.”  (Wong 2015, online) 
The unstable upper management diverted the Caen’s attention so much that he was 
unable to spend the time needed to create a better game:  
“We lost too much time answering Warner Brothers and DC’s concerns and 
weird ideas,” he said. “With more time to focus on the game’s development 
and its playability, instead of the surrounding circus, we could have 
improved the controls and the collisions, and have made a better game at 
the end.” (Wong 2015, online) 
The case of Superman 64 highlights the general motivation behind criticisms like 
Moriarty’s.62 Despite the negative critical reception, the game was financially 
successful; at one point, it was the third best-selling Nintendo 64 title almost three 
months after the initial release (IGN staff 1999, online). Not only is it a case where 
instability within the industry negatively impacted the potential artistic quality of 
the product, it shows that even universally panned games can still make money. If 
an abhorrent game like Superman 64 was profitable, there doesn’t seem to be much 
incentive for game designers to create artistically praiseworthy works, even if they 
had the means and support from a stabilized industry to do so.  
                                                 
62 A more recent example of a game facing similar production problems that negatively affected its 
critical reception is Duke Nukem Forever (2011). The fourth installment in the franchise was stuck 
in development hell for over 14 years, dealing with multiple production companies, lack of funding, 




 Within the artworld, Moriarty’s worry about creating works under the 
backdrop of a volatile industry preoccupied with turning a profit isn’t uncommon. 
When it comes to cinema, those involved with the industry refer to films that get 
bogged down in pre-production as being in “development hell.” Projects can slip 
into development hell for a multitude of reasons, including inadequate funding, 
licensing issues, multiple script rewrites, or casting problems. Regardless of the 
reason, films that end up in development hell often stay there for years at a time, 
sometimes never finding the stability needed to move on. Moriarty sees this as 
fundamentally problematic when it comes to making great art, but being in 
development hell doesn’t always end with disastrous works. Take, for example, 
Dallas Buyers Club. Released in 2013, the film was nominated for multiple 
Academy Awards, including Best Picture, Best Original Screenplay, and Best 
Actor (Matthew McConaughey), and Best Supporting Actor (Jared Leto). Despite 
being both a critical and financial success, Dallas Buyers Club suffered in 
development hell for over a decade (Ulaby 2014, online). The original script was 
written by Craig Borten in 1996 and quickly picked up for production, with Dennis 
Hopper slated to direct and Woody Harrelson cast in the lead role. Not long after, 
the company that purchased the script went bankrupt. Things only got worse from 
there:  
Borten teamed up with Melisa Wallack, and the next year, they sold a new 
script to Universal, with Brad Pitt to star and Marc Forster to direct, the 
latter then hot off the indie hit Monsters Ball. But Forster and Pitt ended up 
making World War Z instead. (Later, Ryan Gosling and director Craig 
Gillespie would sign on but the financing fell apart.) Universal decided the 
script was not ready. (Ulaby 2014, online) 
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It wasn’t until 2009, nearly 13 years after Borten wrote the first script, that the film 
emerged from development hell. After buying back the rights to the script, the co-
writers were able to secure investments for production with help from 
McConaughey, who did some self-promoting for the film (Ulaby 2014, online). But 
the instability and uncertainty that clouded the project remained: 10 weeks before 
filming was scheduled to start, some of the most recent investors backed out. 
Determined to complete the project, producer Rachel Winter used her own personal 
credit cards to help with production costs (Ulaby 2014, online). Dallas Buyers Club 
went through years of industry-induced problems before finally being made, much 
in the same way Superman 64 did. In this case, though, the quality of the work 
wasn’t detrimentally affected by all of the development problems.  
 Although the pragmatic concerns voiced by Moriarty are troubling in their 
own right, they are not insurmountable, nor are they unique to videogames. Other 
artistic mediums, including painting and cinema, have been affected by changes in 
the tools and materials used to create works. Art historian James Elkins spends an 
entire chapter in What Painting Is (1999) discussing how changes in the types of 
paints and how they are made directly impacted the development of particular 
styles and techniques throughout the history of painting (1999, pp. 8-44). And 
when comparisons are drawn with cinema, it’s important to remember that 
videogames are still in their infancy, with the first games coming on the market 
roughly 40 years ago; if it were film, that would put the industry in the 1920’s, 
before sound was introduced. Understood in this light, it’s unsurprising that the 
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tools used in videogame production are evolving rapidly. Overall, it’s no secret that 
as advancements in technology are made, the art created with said technology is 
going to adapt and change as well. In many instances, new technologies emerge 
and are available alongside more traditional technologies. To a certain extent, 
videogames are already experiencing a similar phenomenon, both in terms of 
software and hardware. Take for example, titles like NeuroVoider (2016) and Golf 
Story (2017). Although developed and released using contemporary software and 
hardware, both of the games’ graphics are textured in a pixelated, rough style, 
strikingly similar to the graphics most common in games during the late 1980’s. 
And as first-generation gamers reach adulthood, they’ve created an increased 
market demand for retro gaming consoles. In 2016 Nintendo released a replicated 
version of their original 1985 console, the Nintendo Entertainment System. 
Complete with 30 games designed for the original console, the unit was in high 
demand, with 2.3 million sold between November 2016 and April 2017 (Gilbert, 
2017, online). So even though the technology used to create and display 
videogames has rapidly advanced, this doesn’t entail that the quality of works 
created always suffers. Great works are still produced in the mediums of painting 
and cinema despite the changes within both industries and tools. Consequently, the 
possibility of creating a great work of art in the videogame medium should not be 





Section III: Addressing the Conceptual Concerns 
 Pragmatic objections aside, the most difficult problems gleaned from 
Moriarty’s take are conceptual.  By taking Kulka’s definition of kitsch art and 
applying it to videogames, we’re left with a framework for understanding them that 
seems to necessarily limit their artistic potential. This move is somewhat 
justifiable; there are more than enough examples of games that satisfy Kulka’s 
definition.  Moreover, coupling the kitsch objection with the argument that 
videogames by their very nature as games eliminate the possibility for the most 
meaningful type of aesthetic experience leaves us little motivation to argue for their 
art status. If designers only create games that, at their best, are merely kitsch and 
necessarily unable to provide even the potential of meaningful artistic and aesthetic 
value, we ought not bother thinking about them as anything but a form of mass 
entertainment. But there is hope. Further consideration of Kulka’s theory of kitsch 
provides greater insight into the argument against videogames’ artistic value and a 
possible response to the objection. Additionally, a response to the argument against 
aesthetic value is available through an application of Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi’s 
concept of flow. This strategy is optimal, as it meets the transcendental criteria of 
aesthetic experience Moriarty seems to accept.63  
Recall that Moriarty argues that most videogames are kitsch because kitsch 
sells: making videogames charged with easily identifiable, stock emotions broadens 
their appeal to a larger audience. But looking closely at the concern that 
                                                 
63 The transcendental thesis is, at best, contentious. But for charity’s sake, I’ll address it on the 
assumption that it is viable. 
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videogames lack significant artistic value because they are kitsch calls for another 
pass at Kulka’s work.  
In his evaluation of the worthlessness of kitsch, Kulka makes two distinct 
arguments, one regarding artistic worthlessness and the other regarding aesthetic 
worthlessness. Kulka distinguishes between the artistic value and aesthetic value of 
a work in an intuitive manner; in particular he notes that most of the artistic value 
of a work is less a matter of the formal properties of the work itself, and more a 
function of its position within the history of the artworld. “The artistic value of a 
work of art can be conceived of as reflecting the public, or more specifically the 
artworld significance of the innovation exemplified by the work, and the inherent 
potential of this innovation for subsequent artistic/aesthetic exploitation” (1996, 
p.55). Understanding a work’s artistic value requires attention to its place in an art-
historical context. To illustrate his point, Kulka points to Picasso’s Les Demoiselles 
d’Avignon. Now considered one of Picasso’s most famous works that sparked the 
cubism movement, Les Demoiselles was critically panned and widely considered a 
failure upon its creation in 1907 because of its perceived aesthetic shortcomings 
when compared to its contemporaries (Kulka 1996, p.52-3). The disparity between 
early criticisms and present-day praises is explained through its retrospective 
position in an art-historical context; today, Les Demoiselles is considered an 
innovative and inspiring masterpiece because of its lasting impact in the world of 
painting. By accepting this idea, Kulka readily admits that the artistic value of most 
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innovative works is best determined well after their creation (1996, p.56-7). 
However, he’s quick to add that  
this does not mean that we cannot say anything meaningful about the 
artistic value of a work at the time of its creation. Sensitive art critics can 
often “see” the new artistic possibilities opened for aesthetic exploitation in 
the work that has just been created. They may grasp the significance of the 
innovation even before its influence has actually made itself felt. (1996, 
p.56)  
Thus, for a work to have significant artistic, i.e., art-historical value, it must be 
innovative, or possess a certain novelty that spawns a significant new movement or 
direction within an art-historical context.64 Following Kulka’s lead, it’s safe to 
assume that artistic value comes in degrees, based on the work’s art historical 
impact. And while we may prognosticate about the work’s potential artistic value, 
only in retrospect can it be accurately assessed. It’s also worth mentioning that 
Kulka leaves open the possibility that certain works that, during their time of 
creation, were not innovative or novel may have some art-historical value: “One 
could plausibly argue that even the works that were not radical innovations in their 
time had artistic value because they helped to establish and define the emerging 
artistic style” (1996, p.63). For instance, even though Jean Metzinger’s Nu à la 
cheminée came nearly four years after Picasso’s Les Demoiselles, and therefore was 
not particularly innovative, it still helped to define cubism as an artistic style. If we 
follow this example, then at least some of the artistic value of a work can be 
determined by the degree of excellence with which a particular work exhibits or 
utilizes constitutive elements of an already well-defined artistic style.   
                                                 
64 Works like this may still possess significant aesthetic value by virtue of excellence according to 
the aesthetic standards of their time period or artistic style.  
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 Looking back on Kulka’s definition of kitsch, the conjunction of the second 
and third conditions seems to necessitate that kitsch is artistically worthless (1996, 
58-9). The second condition maintains that if an artwork is kitsch, then the depicted 
objects and themes are instantly and effortlessly identifiable. This means that kitsch 
works are stylistically conservative, relying on well-established artistic conventions 
in the presentation of their content; there is nothing innovative or groundbreaking 
in the artistic style in kitsch art when understood from an art-historical perspective. 
The third condition holds that kitsch provides no sort of enrichment or enlightened 
understanding of its objects or themes; there is nothing inspiring or worth 
contemplating beyond the immediate, automatic response one might have to the 
work. The implied lack of innovation and novelty (from an art-historical 
perspective) taken from the last two conditions virtually ensures that if a work is 
kitsch, then it’s artistically worthless.  
 So what can be said about videogames and their apparent lack of artistic 
value? Two strategies seem available. One is to deny that kitsch art necessarily 
lacks artistic value; this would amount to rejecting Kulka’s definition of kitsch and 
its implications. The other is to take an empirical approach and examine games (on 
an individual basis or perhaps as genres) to determine if they meet the definition of 
kitsch art. The safe assumption is that most of the mainstream videogames do in 
fact meet the definition to a high degree. But we can look to a multitude of outlying 
cases, particularly independently developed games, that don’t fit the kitsch mold; 
they don’t fit precisely because they are innovative, novel, and directly flout 
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commonly accepted tropes, objects and themes seen both in videogames and in 
other artistic mediums. The latter strategy is attractive, as it preserves the work 
done by Kulka on kitsch and simultaneously raises the awareness of both 
academics and those in the gaming industry about possible ways to create more 
artistically valuable videogames. Employing this strategy requires looking at 
examples of games that are innovative and novel with respect to their art-historical 
position, thus possessing a high degree of artistic value. Doing so also helps lay the 
groundwork for a more prescriptive account of the artistic and aesthetic evaluation 
of videogames without relying so heavily on comparative approaches with other 
mediums of art, which often leads to a misunderstanding of what it is about the 
videogame that shapes its artistic value. 
 It’s unsurprising that most products of an industry dominated by giant 
businesses focused on making money employ kitsch principles; Moriarty highlights 
this point in his argument, and even casts smaller, independent game developers as 
attempting to do the same. But he is too cavalier in his dismissal of the entire 
medium in this regard, for two reasons. First, recall that the videogame as a 
medium is in its pubescent stages, comparatively speaking. As such, to accurately 
assess the art-historical value of the medium right now is incredibly difficult, let 
alone attempting to do so with the individual works. Second, judging the artistic 
value of videogames requires going beyond what the representational content is and 
considering how that content is incorporated into the gameplay. Moriarty’s 
argument is another example of how comparing videogames with other forms of art 
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leaves out precisely what makes them rare as an art form: while most videogames 
may contain kitsch-like representational content (that is, they meet the first two 
conditions of the definition), the way in which consumers engage with that content 
may bring with it an opportunity for an enriching, amplifying or even 
transformational experience. In such cases, the third definitional condition is 
violated, opening the possibility that even games with unabashedly kitsch 
narratives, themes, and styles still invite consumers to experience that content in 
non-kitsch ways.  
We can look to examples that violate the third condition and are likely to 
possess artistic value.  Braid, discussed in chapter two, is a clear-cut example of a 
game that takes a kitsch narrative and, through both gameplay and storytelling, 
violates the third condition. As a reminder, Braid tells the story of a physically 
unassuming protagonist named Tim on his quest to save a princess. A side-scrolling 
puzzle platformer, Braid asks the player to guide Tim through a series of puzzles 
and navigate multiple levels populated by enemies and obstacles, ultimately trying 
to rescue his love from her captor. Understood on this level, Braid’s basic storyline 
and gameplay are like those of Super Mario Bros. However, what prevents Braid’s 
narrative from being kitsch is that it was designed against the backdrop of kitsch 
narratives; Braid was a deliberate effort by creator Jonathan Blow to call attention 
to the pervasive kitsch narratives and game design so often found in the videogame 
industry. This is evidenced both in the narrative’s final act, and in how the 
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gameplay corresponds with the story itself.65  The story is left open for 
interpretation and exploration of deeper levels of meaning. It calls into question the 
nature of the “hero saves the day by rescuing the girl” trope by literally reversing 
the theme, in both the story and the gameplay.  At the start of the game Tim is 
represented and meant to be thought of as the hero. In the moments of the last level, 
it’s strongly suggested that Tim is actually the evildoer from whom the Princess 
was rescued. This shift in perspective is foreshadowed in subtle explorations of 
Tim’s motivation throughout the game; it’s clear that he has regrets and wishes to 
make up for past mistakes, a theme reinforced by the central game mechanic of 
time manipulation, whereby the player can press a button to reverse the flow of 
time if mistakes are made. Braid takes a kitsch narrative scheme commonly seen in 
videogames and manipulates it, inviting further contemplation from the player. I 
should add that it’s not this particular method of storytelling that sets Braid apart 
from kitsch art; a wide variety of stories told in different artistic mediums make use 
of a twist ending or revelatory moment. However, the method itself, regardless of 
the context that is used in, necessarily opens the door for further contemplation and 
possible enrichment of the associations made with a narrative, thereby violating 
Kulka’s third condition. In multiple interviews, Blow has made clear his intention 
to leave open Braid’s narrative for analysis:  
The story of rescuing the Princess has a literal interpretation, as well as a 
metaphorical one; and then there are other small-scale levels of change to 
the interpretation, too. I don't intend for any of them to be the sole truth; the 
story I am trying to tell is something like the quantum superposition of all 
these things. (Totilo 2007, online) 
                                                 




Elsewhere, he reiterates, “The narrative in Braid is not being obscure just for 
obscurity's sake. It's that way because it was the only way I knew how to get at the 
central idea, which is something big and subtle and resists being looked at directly” 
(McElroy 2008, online). From Blow’s comments and the game itself, it’s evident 
that Braid’s narrative is not kitsch.   
Even in cases where the representational content of games is, to some 
degree, kitsch, it doesn’t follow the entire work should be considered kitsch. 
Gameplay and design need to be accounted for in our evaluation of the artistic 
worth of the specific works in the medium. To say that a videogame is kitsch only 
because its representational content is kitsch is a misstep, much in the way that the 
comparative approach to categorizing videogames as art is a problem; it ignores a 
large portion of the constitutive properties of the work. A complete evaluation of 
the artistic value of a videogame requires looking at the game design as well as the 
representational content. In doing so, we might find that games with clear kitsch 
narratives like Super Mario garner their art-historical value from the gameplay; 
when game design is considered, Mario has a clear and distinct art-historical value, 
similar to Lichtenstein’s Look Mickey and Picasso’s Les Demoiselles. Each of these 
works represents the first of its kind in a genre. Braid’s success as a work is only 
made possible because of the lasting impact Mario had on the gaming industry, 
much as the Pop Art revolution in the late 1950s is only properly understood in the 
context of the more traditional art movements before it. What salvages Mario from 
being highly kitsch is its lasting impact on gameplay design; it helped usher in an 
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entire genre of side scrolling puzzle platforming games and is a model that many 
games created today still follow. As such, its overall art historical value within the 
videogame medium is quite high, despite its decidedly kitsch narrative.  
It should be evident that regarding videogames en masse as artistically 
worthless is untenable; the evaluation of their artistic value should be done on a 
case-by-case basis, with attention to all the constitutive elements of the work, 
including gameplay design. Doing so allows for a better understanding of 
videogame aesthetics, but it also gives insight on how we might further construct a 
normative account of videogames’ artistic value, looking at gameplay design 
specifically. A kitsch-like framework adopted from Kulka’s work helps us establish 
a more nuanced way of evaluating the overall worth (both artistically and 
aesthetically) of gameplay mechanics.  
What follows, then, is the need for an account of kitsch gameplay. The first 
obstacle towards that effort is clear: all of Kulka’s conditions require that the object 
of evaluation be representational. The focus on representational content is not 
uncommon when it comes to kitsch. Ian Bogost and Brian Schrank specifically 
discuss videogame kitsch, with both focusing mostly on the representational 
content in their accounts; In How To Do Things With Videogames (2011), Bogost 
devotes a chapter to explaining the relationship between kitsch and videogames 
(pp.83-9). In his work Avant-garde Videogames: Playing with Technoculture 
(2014), Schrank recognizes that most mainstream games work mostly in kitsch 
content, easily letting consumers know exactly how they should respond to and 
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interact with the work (pp.34-8). But gameplay is not constitutively dependent on 
its representational content.  
We can borrow from some of the qualities identified in kitsch to help 
establish what kitsch-like gameplay might look and feel like.66 In the last chapter of 
his book, Kulka considers nonrepresentational mediums like abstract painting, 
architecture, and music as they relate to kitsch. He writes, “When an abstract 
painting or a piece of music has no artistic and aesthetic merits of its own, but 
derives its appeal from being parasitic on some previously well received gestalts, it 
functions as kitsch” (Kulka 1996, p.102). Kulka rightly points out that not all music 
which borrows from previously successful musical gestalts results in kitsch. He 
looks to Clement Greenberg’s work on kitsch to help distinguish between parasitic 
borrowing and non-parasitic borrowing:  
The precondition for kitsch…is the availability close at hand of a fully 
mature cultural tradition, whose discoveries, acquisitions, and perfected 
self-consciousness kitsch can take advantage of for its own ends. It borrows 
from devices, tricks, stratagems, rules of thumb, themes, converts them into 
a system, and discards the rest. (Greenberg p.10-1)  
 
By endorsing Greenberg’s sentiments, Kulka provides a clearer understanding of 
parasitic borrowing that falls in line with his third definitional condition, where 
kitsch work does nothing to substantially enhance our understanding or experience; 
it instead uses strategies made successful through other well-received works to 
capture its audience without demanding any further contemplation (aesthetic, 
                                                 
66 I include “feel” because a strong case can be made that gameplay design is best understood as at 
least partially kinesthetic and proprioceptive; for example, videogame critics often talk about how 
game mechanics and responses to user input feel “clunky,” “un-responsive,” or “unnatural.” There is 
a distinct gestalt-based reaction to well-crafted gameplay design intimately tied in with a physical 
response to how user input is received.   
 
133 
artistic, or otherwise). Non-representational art can still qualify as kitsch on the 
basis that it draws directly from the gestalt of well-received artworks of its kind and 
sentimentalizes it for mass consumption. From this understanding, an account of 
kitsch gameplay takes shape with an emphasis on the concept of parasitic 
videogame gestalt.  
I propose that kitsch gameplay is best understood as gameplay that 
parasitically utilizes previously well-received and creatively innovative game 
mechanics (best understood as constitutive rules) and subverts or undermines the 
potential aesthetic value of those game mechanics by creating a highly incentivized 
option to completely avoid or altogether circumnavigate them. It is gameplay that 
lacks complexity and is broken down to create a Pavlovian relationship between 
player and game, cheapening the experience of play. In claiming that kitsch 
gameplay lacks complexity, I do not see games with relatively easy-to-learn 
gameplay, like Tetris or Geometry Wars (2013), as kitsch. While the gameplay is 
based on simple concepts, it’s the utilization of those concepts within the game that 
disqualifies it from being kitsch. The simplified gameplay in these cases operates 
for the sake of playing the game and not for some other non-gameplay related ends. 
It may be the case that such games are on the low end of the spectrum when it 
comes to artistic and aesthetic value, but even that claim may be contentious. Some 
of the most pervasive examples of kitsch gameplay come from mobile platforming 
devices, including games like Clash of Clans (2012), but it occurs in PC and 
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console games as well.67 A closer look at Clash of Clans elucidates the problems 
with kitsch gameplay. 
Developed and released by SuperCell, Clash of Clans is a freemium, 
massively multiplayer online game where players compete against one another for 
in-game resources used to build, repair, and upgrade their town, troops and 
defenses. Within the gaming community, engaging with this game mechanic is 
known as grinding or farming: players repetitively complete the same in-game task, 
typically to gain experience or resources needed to advance the game or narrative 
(if there is one). For Clash, grinding constitutes regularly logging in and finger-
tapping resource collectors, barracks, and troops to accumulate resources.68  
 The basic premise of the game harkens back to real-time strategy and 
resource management games like Warcraft (1994) and Age of Empires (1997), but 
with a key difference in gameplay. Players aren’t required to pay for access to the 
game itself; instead, they are presented with multiple opportunities to make in-
game purchases that help complete prescribed lusory goals. For instance, the in-
game economy relies on three basic resources: gold, elixir (of two types), and 
gems. Each type of resource is needed at various times to construct and upgrade 
buildings, troops, and magic spells used for defending the player’s town and 
attacking enemy bases. Players accumulate resources through a few generalized 
                                                 
67 Star Wars: Battlefront II (2017) produced by EA games is the most recent example of a console 
game receiving significant backlash from the gaming community about its overt attempt to 
encourage players to bypass actual gameplay by way of in-game purchases to unlock basic game 
content.  
68 Even the player versus player battles are passive experiences: players simply click the desired 
number and kind of troops and then unleash them all at once. They have no control over how or 
where their army will attack or defend.  
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lusory means: they can construct “collector” buildings in their base that 
periodically produce gold or one of two types of elixir; they can steal resources 
from other players by successfully attacking their settlements; or they can make in-
game purchases using gems to instantly fill their coffers. As play progresses, 
gamers can use their resources to upgrade their buildings and troops so that they 
might be more successful in defending their settlement and attacking others. With 
each successive upgrade on any building, troop, or spell, there is a correlated rise in 
resource expenditure. Additionally, both the initial construction and tier upgrade of 
any game piece have a real-time build cost. Although the time costs are small 
initially, they dramatically increase at higher tiers. For example, it only takes 10 
seconds to build a tier 1 elixir collector, but it takes five days to update a tier 11 
collector to the maximum tier 12. Thus, it would take nearly 16 full days to 
completely upgrade just one elixir collector. Fully upgrading every available 
building and troop type would take an estimated time of nearly 3,000 days. I can 
imagine that simply reading about the significant time required to fully upgrade is 
starting to feel tedious. Suffice it to say, Clash of Clans players may end up 
spending a considerable amount of time attempting to accomplish the prescribed 
goals of building and maintaining their settlement. 
However, players can bypass the significant gold, elixir, and time 
expenditures by using gems to instantly upgrade units. Going back to the collector 
building example, for approximately 750 gems, a player can avoid the 5-day 
waiting period and instantly upgrade from tier 11 to 12. Players can also use gems 
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to directly purchase the other in-game resources instead of waiting for their 
respective collectors to produce them; the cost is determined by the type of 
resource and size of the storage building a player wishes to fill. Although players 
are periodically rewarded in gems for completing in-game goals, those rewards are 
heavily restricted by the amount of time and other resources needed to accomplish 
those goals.  
Understood as a game mechanic, the concept of resource management and 
grinding is not uncommon. It could be argued that resource management games 
constitute an entire sub-genre within the videogame medium: a sub-genre defined 
by a constitutive rule restricting the efficiency with which players can accumulate 
desired resources.69 Such games can reward patience and persistence and invite 
players to contemplate their own actions as they attempt to collect, steal, win, and 
protect resources in a complex socioeconomic game space shared with others.  
As a style of play, grinding is a divisive topic. At its best, it can be praised 
for rewarding patience, teaching persistence, and highlighting the beauty and grace 
of laboring and striving experiences.70  Others have criticized it, abhorring the 
unending repetitiveness and psychological exploitation of triggering a false sense 
of achievement with an imaginary payoff of little value. Edmund McMillen, 
independent game designer and co-creator of Super Meat Boy (2010), falls in this 
camp. McMillen went as far as creating a satirizing web-based game, A.V.G.M. 
                                                 
69 This understanding fits well with a Suitsian understanding of games.  
70 My thanks to Ivan Davidov for pointing out this way of understanding it.  
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(Abusive Video Game Manipulation), in response to the pervasiveness of grinding. 
In an interview discussing the issue, McMillen states:  
The game was basically commentary on the formula that’s used in most 
MMORPG’s and a lot of online games on Facebook, like Pet Society and 
Farmville…where you’re basically rewarded with digital items for time 
spent and clicks. Quite literally. People don’t see that because they’re lost in 
the repetition of something. There are really irresponsible games that feed 
off of our minds and the holes we have in our brains (Swirsky 2012, 1:45-
1:47) 
 
Negotiating the value or lack thereof in grinding as a style of play is beyond the 
scope of this project, but the debate itself helps elucidate a key feature that 
separates grinding in games like Clash of Clans from grinding in games like Age of 
Empires: the option to spend money to completely circumnavigate grinding 
gameplay. Clash Of Clans players can make in-game purchases to acquire gems 
immediately. Prices are discounted based on the number of gems purchased, 
ranging from 80 gems for 99 cents to 14,000 gems for $99.99.71 By allowing 
players to purchase gems instead of requiring that they complete in-game goals, 
Clash and games like it void their primary style of play of any real value or 
meaning. Even defenders claiming that the playstyle of grinding is valuable 
because it teaches patience and explores the intrinsic worth of play have little 
ground to stand on when players can avoid the entire process. Combined with the 
lengthy upgrade times and steep in-game currency costs, Clash incentivizes gem 
purchasing to the point that it seriously undercuts any sort of value grinding might 
afford. Even though players can technically grind to completion without spending 
                                                 
71 Top ranked players in Clash of Clans have reportedly spent near $16,000 in a year to max out 
their bases and maintain their world ranking. 
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any money, Clash is designed in a way that actively and passively discourages 
players from doing so. Instead, players are subversively encouraged to purchase 
their way towards in-game goals as opposed to playing their way towards them. 
This is where we begin to see the notion of kitsch gameplay appear. Clash uses a 
method of gameplay that has the potential for an enriching experience and 
deliberately strips it of that potential by encouraging players to completely avoid 
engaging in that style of play altogether.72  
The question left is whether employing kitsch gameplay constitutes an 
artistic defect. If we can imagine the same game without the possibility of in-game 
purchases and determine that would be an improvement, then a game mechanic 
allowing for the circumnavigation of grinding constitutes a defect; the game 
mechanics would be there for the sake of play first and foremost, and not some 
other, non-gameplay reason that subverts the value of the mechanic. With Clash of 
Clans, removing the option to pay to avoid grinding would only highlight how the 
game subversively utilizes the grinding mechanic by making the process 
exorbitantly long and tedious. Even proponents of the value of grinding would 
probably agree that extraordinary amount of time required to grind through Clash 
doesn’t add to the potential value the process may provide; the value of grinding 
could still be found if the time restrictions on upgrades were even a little less 
demanding. The safe inference is that the extraordinary restrictions aren’t in place 
                                                 
72 It’s easy to understand this issue under a Suitsian framework as well; it could be argued that when 
the less than efficient means to accomplish lusory goals are intentionally circumvented by allowing 
players to buy their way into those goals, gamers are not actually playing the game at all.  
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to incentivize the value of grinding, but instead exist to encourage players to pay 
their way through the game. 
Finally, it’s important to understand there is no necessary connection 
between in-game purchases and kitsch gameplay. Kitsch gameplay occurs to the 
degree that a subversion of the potential aesthetic value of central game mechanics 
is created by the existence of a highly incentivized option to completely avoid or 
circumnavigate the very same mechanics. I’ve made the argument here that Clash 
of Clans engages in kitsch gameplay for profit, but my account leaves open the 
possibility of kitsch gameplay occurring for a number of other reasons. On a related 
note, videogames might include opportunities for in-game purchases but not be 
examples of kitsch gameplay. Overwatch (2016) and Rocket League (2015) are two 
examples where players have the option of making cosmetic in-game purchases 
that can change the look, costume, color scheme, hair color, etc. of their player-
character or avatar. The availability of these in-game purchases does not subvert or 
incentivize avoidance and circumnavigation of either of the games’ respective 
constitutive rules, so there is no kitsch gameplay involved.  
So far I’ve argued that to assess whether a videogame is kitsch art requires 
that we look at both the representational content of the game (if there is such 
content) and the gameplay mechanics (best understood as constitutive rules). The 
combination of the two aspects will determine to what degree the work is 
artistically valueless because of its kitsch nature. Mainstream videogames often 
employ kitsch representational content, but that alone does not suffice for calling 
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them wholly kitsch; there are some works that resist the kitsch moniker because 
their central gameplay mechanics are decidedly not kitsch. It is in cases where both 
the representational content of the game and the gameplay are highly kitsch that the 
work significantly lacks artistic value. Further, gameplay is best understood as 
being highly kitsch and lacking artistic value if it takes previously well-received 
game mechanics such as resource management and highly incentivizes the option 
to circumnavigate or avoid the mechanics, thereby significantly reducing the 
chances for valuable and rewarding aesthetic experiences. 
Having explored the artistic potential of videogames in relationship to 
kitsch gameplay, the last step is to address the aesthetic concern voiced by 
Moriarty. Recall that Moriarty invests in a general argument claiming that the way 
videogames engage their audiences necessarily prohibits them from potentially 
offering aesthetic experiences of the highest value: the sublime. He endorses 
Schopenhauer’s understanding of sublime art, claiming that experiences of the 
highest aesthetic quality are earmarked by transcendence of the will. That is, when 
a person experiences the sublime, she must be in a state of mind where her desires 
and needs are no longer important as they relate to the object of experience: “In 
other words, will-less perception is perception of objects simply for the 
understanding of what they are essentially, in and for themselves, and without 
regard to the actual or possible relationships those phenomenal objects have to the 
striving self” (Shapshay 2012, online).  
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A caveat is needed before addressing the concern about videogames and the 
sublime. Schopenhauer’s understanding of aesthetic experience and the sublime is 
controversial. One worry is that under Schopenhauer’s model, aesthetic experiences 
may not be possible at all:  
The problem is that aesthetic experience seems to require the breaking free 
of the intellect from its service to the will to life. But according to 
Schopenhauer, the intellect comes into being originally as a tool for and, as 
a rule, serves the needs of the will to life. He holds further that nature does 
nothing in vain. So it would seem that the intellect cannot actually break 
from the will, but if this is so, then aesthetic experience would not be 
possible (Shapsay 2012, online).  
For Schopenhauer, aesthetic experiences of any sort (including the sublime) are 
intellectually and cognitively engaging, but this engagement must be distinct from 
the ordinary everyday way that intellect is applied: it must transcend our instinctual 
will to life. But if the intellect necessarily originates from the purposeful will, then 
it would be impossible to have an experience that is both intellectually engaging 
and transcendental. Although others have called attention to this problem, there is 
little agreement on how it ought to be solved.73 So while there may be a bigger 
reason to reject Schopenhauer’s understanding of aesthetic experiences (and with it, 
the general concern about aesthetic value that Moriarty expresses), for charity’s 
sake let’s assume the possibility of transcending the will in an effort to directly 
address the worry about videogames.  
 Ironically enough, an argument can be made that well-designed videogames 
offer the potential for precisely what is necessary for the transcendental thesis: a 
cognitively engaging yet will-less experience.  In terms of gameplay, a well-
                                                 
73 See D.W. Hamlyn (1980) and Alex Neill (2008) 
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designed videogame invites the player to experience “cognitive flow.” The concept 
of flow was introduced by psychologist Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi in an effort to 
explain the type of mental state that artists may enter when creating their work.74  
Csikszentmihalyi was initially intrigued by the fact that “when work on a painting 
was going well, the artist persisted single-mindedly, disregarding hunger, fatigue 
and discomfort—yet rapidly lost interest in the artistic creation once it was done” 
(Nakamura & Csikszentmihályi 2002, p.89). His research into the phenomenology 
of such experiences lead to the concept of flow and the conditions under which it is 
achieved: 
The conditions of flow include:  
• Perceived challenges, or opportunities for action, that stretch 
(neither overmatching or underutilizing) existing skills 
• A sense that one is engaging challenges at a level appropriate to 
one’s capacities 
• Clear proximal goals and immediate feedback about the progress 
that is being made. (Nakamura & Csikszentmihályi 2002, p.90) 
 
These conditions help facilitate experiences of flow, highlighted by the following 
features: 
• Intense and focused concentration on what one is doing in the 
present moment  
• Merging of action and awareness  
• Loss of reflective self-consciousness (i.e., loss of awareness of 
oneself as a social actor)  
• A sense that one can control one’s actions; that is, a sense that one 
can in principle deal with the situation because one knows how to 
respond to whatever happens next 
• Distortion of temporal experience (typically, a sense that time has 
passed faster than normal) 
                                                 
74 A similar concept can be found in the works of ancient Chinese philosopher Chuang Tzu, where 
the foundations of Taoism and living in accordance with “wu-wei” are explicated (Zhuangzi, 1968).  
 
143 
• Experience of the activity as intrinsically rewarding, such that often 
the end goal is just an excuse for the process. (Nakamura & 
Csikszentmihályi, 2002, p.89-90) 
 
The conditions under which flow is achieved and the features that define the mental 
state of the participant once she enters it represent the type of experiences well-
designed videogames can offer.75 In fact, the majority of videogames are explicitly 
designed to create flow experiences; independent videogame designer Jenova Chen 
wrote his MFA thesis on different methods of game design intended to induce 
states of flow (Chen 2006, online). The concept of flow also helps explain why 
games that are too easy or too difficult are not as enjoyable for the player; both 
types of games violate the first condition of flow by creating challenges that 
underutilize player skill (games that are too easy), or overmatch player skill (games 
that are too difficult), resulting in experiences that lack any feeling of intrinsic 
reward.   
More importantly, the concept of flow not only provides a scaffolding for 
understanding the potential for the rich aesthetic experiences videogames offer, but 
also represents a solution to the incompatibility problem of Schopenhauer’s 
transcendental thesis.76 When gamers enter a state of flow, they can experience a 
sense of transcending their own will. Although what may have opened the door for 
flow to occur could be a willful action (e.g. the desire to accomplish a pre-lusory 
                                                 
75 The similarities between Csikszentmihalyi’s concept of flow and Suits’ definition of games are 
hard to ignore, particularly concerning the idea that one engages in gameplay for its own sake, and 
not for extrinsic goals.   
76 Granted, the solution I propose is only effective if we allow a phenomenological understanding of 
the transcendental thesis: that a person must feel as if the will has been transcended. If actual 
transcendence of the will is read as a metaphysical requirement for aesthetic experience, then the 
incapability problem mentioned above is still in play.  
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goal), when actually engaging in the play, the player can feel as if their actions 
have transcended the initial desire that motivated them. Acting in the game world 
may be deliberate and intentional, but during certain periods of play, the player 
experiences them in a transcendental, effortless state; in these moments of play, the 
player no longer consciously experiences the struggle to impose her will on the 
game. Similar experiences of flow are often reported in competitive sporting events 
and performance-based entertainment; after elite performances, athletes and 
entertainers often speak of “being in the zone,” where their actions are performed 
with keen focus on the task at hand and sustained effort but feel as if they are 
accomplished effortlessly. Even in cases where the actions taken are a product of 
years of purposeful, goal-oriented practice, the phenomenological nature of being 
in flow is one of effortless mindfulness.  
If the aforementioned response to the requirements set by Schopenhauer’s 
transcendental thesis is tenable, then not only are the highest forms of aesthetic 
experience possible with a well-designed videogame, they are more likely to occur. 
Moreover, it helps carve out a better understanding of the possible aesthetic value 
videogames offer. Since gamers go in and out of immersive states of flow during 
play, it’s likely that the aesthetically appreciable features of both the game and the 
playthrough fluctuate in their prominence. The fluctuation caused by entering and 
exiting states of flow is closely related to changes in interactivity as the player 
becomes more familiar with how the game (or other players) responds to user 
input. The initial experiences with the game, during which a player is learning how 
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to navigate the gameworld in order to accomplish prelusory goals, may involve 
direct attention to the features of the gameworld: the visual motifs, color, lighting, 
diegetic and non-diegetic sounds, the narrative structure (if there is a narrative), etc. 
When responses to user input become more predictable (and the level of 
interactivity diminishes), states of flow are more likely to occur because the player 
has a better sense of control over the outcomes of their actions, thus making it 
easier for the 4th feature of flow (the sense that one can successfully handle 
whatever happens next) to occur. When states of flow are reached, what’s 
aesthetically prominent is the relationship formed between the player and the game, 
as opposed to just the features of the game itself. What’s left is an aesthetically 
appreciable mastery of the possible relationship (prescribed by the constitutive 
rules of the game) between the game and the player.77 
By now, it should be clear that Moriarty’s position and others like it fail to 
properly understand the aesthetic and artistic potential videogames offer. There is 
nothing in the nature of videogames or the type of engagement they afford that 
necessitates labeling them as artistically and aesthetically worthless. In defending 
this claim, I’ve offered a more detailed account of how we might seriously evaluate 
the aesthetic and artistic potential of both videogames and the kinds of experiences 
they afford. Doing so helps build momentum for moving away from the kinds of 
comparisons between videogames and other traditional art forms that often lead to 
fundamental misunderstandings. If scholars, gamers, and game designers are to 
take seriously the potential for rich, rewarding, and insightful aesthetic and artistic 
                                                 
77 This relationship is the primary focus of chapter 4. 
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features games can offer, then we must develop a methodology that recognizes how 
those concepts relate to videogames qua games.  
Section IV: Concluding Remarks 
A common theme throughout this dissertation has been that videogames are 
a revolutionary form of art, and as such we need to develop new theories and 
concepts to appropriately understand their artistic and aesthetic potential. Since 
videogames are still in their relative infancy compared with other art forms, it’s not 
surprising that scholars are still fleshing out fundamental issues concerning their 
metaphysical status and normative value as artworks. In the very least, I hope my 
efforts here provide helpful guidance on ways in which we might continue to 
develop an overall theoretical framework to better understand videogames 
artistically and aesthetically. To that end, chapter two explicated a pitfall with a 
common way that videogames are categorized as art. The intention here was not to 
completely dismiss the arguments given, but to raise awareness about what makes 
videogames unique as potential artworks. As a corollary, the arguments in chapter 
two speak to a broader concern about traditional theories of art and how they 
influence our understanding of the artistic and aesthetic value of revolutionary 
artworks. For classificatory purposes, the comparative approach is intuitively 
satisfying and helpful, but we would do well to remember that the normative value 
of new kinds of artworks may require new methodologies for proper evaluation. 
With respect to videogames, this means taking into account their nature as games 
and exploring how that nature shapes the potential aesthetic value of gameplay. 
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Chapter three provided the groundwork for understanding the aesthetic 
experience of gameplay by detailing an original account interactivity as it relates to 
videogames. By distinguishing agent-to-agent interactivity from agent-to-non-agent 
interactivity, we’re left with a better way of unpacking the aesthetic features of 
videogames and a more precise method of tracking how a player’s actions during 
gameplay help create and influence her own aesthetic experience. By highlighting 
the connection between unpredictability and interactivity, we’re better able to 
distinguish between cases of mere manipulation and genuine interaction, which 
helps identify when videogames are an object of interaction or a conduit through 
which agents interact with one another.  
From there, chapter four took a closer a look at the ontological implications 
of videogames as interactive artworks. Specifically, I examined how best to 
understand the AAAR relationship with videogames, adopting the view that as 
artworks, videogames are CGAs. Doing so clarified the unique role gamers take on 
in helping instantiate instances of a CGA, whereby the aesthetic experience of 
gameplay is intimately shaped by the relationship the gamer forms with that 
particular instance. Since engaging in gameplay requires skill, the player’s actions 
are aesthetically relevant and evaluable much in the same way musical and 
theatrical performers actions are. Thus, there are two mutually dependent but 
ontologically distinct objects of appreciation: the CGA itself and the experience of 
the gameplay fostered by relationship created between the player and the particular 
instance of the CGA that she brings about. 
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The last chapter examined the possibility that even if videogames are 
artworks, their nature as games prohibits any chance of affording aesthetic 
experiences of the highest kind. In defending against this objection, I offered a way 
of evaluating videogames based on both their representational content and 
gameplay mechanics by proposing an original concept of kitsch gameplay. My 
view provides a good resource for assessing the artistic and aesthetic worth of 
videogames as potential artworks. Finally, I explained how well-crafted 
videogames are able to put players in states of flow, thereby opening up the 
possibility for immersive, deeply satisfying aesthetics experiences in accordance 
with Schopenhauer’s transcendental thesis.  
Videogames have the ability to transform living rooms into theaters for 
powerful, rewarding and thought-provoking aesthetic experiences. This is not to 
say that every videogame offers that potential; this is true of artworks in every 
medium. But taking seriously the idea that videogames can be as artistically and 
aesthetically valuable as traditional artworks found in museums will benefit 
scholars and gamers alike. My hope is that this dissertation helps foster continued, 
mutually beneficial lines of communication between the academic and gaming 
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